CODE OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 1--GENERAL
PROVISIONS
CHAPTER
III--ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES
PART
305--RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
1 C.F.R. s 305.78-3
s 305.78-3 Time Limits on
Agency Actions (Recommendation No. 78-3).
(a) Eliminating undue
delay in administrative procedures has long been a
public concern. Congress addressed the problem in
general terms in the Administrative Procedure Act
in 1946. Section 6(a) of the original Act required
each agency to conclude any matter presented to it
"with reasonable dispatch." Section 10(e)(A) of the
Act authorized a reviewing court to enforce this
command by compelling agency action "unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed." Although these
two sections (now codified as section 555(b) and
section 706(1) of Title 5) contain enforceable
prohibitions against unlawful or unreasonable
delay, they have contributed little to the
reduction of delay. Because what constitutes
unlawful or unreasonable delay is not readily
ascertainable, courts have afforded relief from
administrative dilatoriness only occasionally and
in egregious cases. Courts have also recognized
that the present statutory provisions are too
general to deprive agencies of the broad discretion
they need to allocate limited resources among
competing demands for official attention.
(b) Frustration over the
inability of agencies and courts to speed the
course of administrative proceedings has
occasionally led Congress to adopt a somewhat
mechanistic approach to the problem. In recent
years Congress has with increasing frequency
enacted statutory provisions that require
particular agencies to complete adjudicatory or
rulemaking proceedings within prescribed periods of
time. In these instances, the statutory limits are
stated in terms of specific numbers of days or
months; the statutes also identify the categories
of agency proceedings that are subject to the
prescribed schedules. Congress evidently expects
that if it establishes a deadline for agency
action, the affected agency will meet that
deadline, or will at the least complete its
assigned statutory duty more promptly than it would
otherwise have done.
(c) Congressional
expectations that statutory time limits would be
effective have remained largely unfulfilled. There
has been a substantial degree of noncompliance with
all the statutory time limits studied. Agency
officials often view statutory timetables as
unrealistically rigid demands that disregard the
agency's need to adjust to changing circumstances.
Practical experience at diverse agencies lends
support to this appraisal.
(d) Statutory time limits
tend to undermine an agency's ability to establish
priorities and to control the course of its
proceedings. Such limits also enable outside
interests to impose their priorities on an agency
through suit or threat of suit to enforce them.
When asked to enforce statutory time limits, courts
have recognized that an agency's observance of the
prescribed limits may conflict with other
requirements of law (e.g., the right of interested
persons or parties to a full and fair hearing) or
with the requirements of sound decisionmaking.
Judges have, therefore, treated the enforcement of
statutory time limits as a matter lying within
their own equitable discretion despite the
precisely measured language of the statutes.
(e) A recent task force
study for the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs [FN1] has concluded that
particularized timetables or deadlines established
by individual agencies to govern their own
proceedings can be useful tools for reducing delays
and are preferable to seemingly more rigid
legislative prescriptions. This finding fully
accords with those of the study underlying the
present recommendation of the Administrative
Conference.
[FN1] Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
sess., IV Study on Federal Regulation: Delay in the
Regulatory Process, 132-52 (1977).
Recommendation
1. Reasonable timetables
or deadlines can help reduce administrative delay.
Generally, it is preferable that such limits be
established by the agencies themselves, rather than
by statute.
2. Before determining to
impose statutory time limits for the conduct of
agency proceedings, Congress should give due
consideration to the alternative of requiring the
agency itself to establish timetables or guidelines
for the prompt disposition of various types of
proceedings conducted by it. It may also require
that significant departure from agency adopted
timetables be explained in current status
reports.
3. Whether or not required
to do so by statute, each agency should adopt time
limits or guidelines for the prompt disposition of
its adjudicatory and rulemaking actions, either by
announcing schedules for particular agency
proceedings or by adopting regulations that contain
general timetables for dealing with categories of
the agency's proceedings.
4. Congress ordinarily
should not impose statutory time limits on an
agency's adjudicatory proceedings. Statutory time
limits may be appropriate, however, when the
beneficial effect of agency adjudication is
directly related to its timeliness, as may be true
in certain licensing cases or in clearance of
proposed private activity where a delayed decision
would deprive both the applicant and the public at
large of substantial benefit. If Congress does
enact time limits, for cases of any type, it should
recognize that special circumstances (such as a
sudden substantial increase in caseload, or
complexity of the issues raised in a particular
proceeding, or the presence of compelling public
interest considerations) may justify an agency's
failure to act within a predetermined time.
Statutes fixing limits within which agency
adjudication must be completed should ordinarily
require that an agency's departure from the
legislative timetable be explained in current
status reports to affected persons or in a report
to Congress.
5. Congress ordinarily
should not impose statutory time limits on
rulemaking proceedings. Purely as a practical
matter, modern rulemaking proceedings are too
complex and varied, and involve too many stages, to
permit fixing unyielding time frames for agency
decisionmaking. Strict time limits, moreover, may
foreclose the use of procedural techniques that can
be valuable in enhancing the degree of public
participation and insuring completeness of
information. [FN2] Congress should
therefore enact statutory time limits applicable to
rulemaking only when it can be relatively specific
about what it expects the agency to do, and when it
intends the agency to have relatively little
discretion in doing it. Congress may appropriately
indicate by statute the time within which an agency
should respond to individual requests to commence
rulemaking, but it should avoid combining that time
limit with a restriction on the discretion the
agency otherwise enjoys to commence or not commence
proceedings and to establish priorities for its
rulemaking activities.
[FN2] See, for
example, Administrative Conference Recommendations
76-3, 72-5, and 77-3.
6. If Congress does impose
a statutory time limit on agency decisionmaking,
whether in adjudicatory or rulemaking matters, it
should be attentive to the need for revision. A
time limit considered desirable at the outset may
prove to have been unrealistic because it was based
on incomplete information. If realistic at the time
of enactment, the limit may cease to be so with the
passage of time. Statutes imposing time limits
therefore should provide for periodic
reconsideration by the Congress or grant the agency
authority to revise the limits under standards
established by the Congress.
7. If a statutory time
limit is imposed, Congress should expressly state
whether affected persons may enforce the time limit
through judicial action and, if so, the nature of
the relief available for this purpose. In cases
where the time limit is intended only as a norm by
which the agency's performance is to be measured, a
requirement that the agency report deviations from
the time limit to Congress may be a desirable means
of assuring oversight of its performance.
[43 FR 27509, June 26,
1978]
Authority: 5 U.S.C.
591-596.
SOURCE: 38 FR 19782, July
23, 1973; 57 FR 61760, 61768, Dec. 29, 1992, unless
otherwise noted.
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