CODE OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 1--GENERAL
PROVISIONS
CHAPTER
III--ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES
PART
305--RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
1 C.F.R. s 305.87-2
s 305.87-2 Federal
protection of private sector health and safety
whistleblowers (Recommendation 87-2).
Private sector employees
who make disclosures concerning health and safety
matters pertaining to the workplace are protected
against retaliatory actions by over a dozen federal
laws. By common usage these employees, as well as
others who make similar disclosures concerning
fraud or other misconduct (but who are beyond the
Conference's current study), [FN1] have
become known as whistleblowers. Under current
statutes, for example, nuclear power plant workers,
miners, truckers, and farm laborers are
specifically protected when acting as
whistleblowers. Other workers may be covered under
the more general protections granted by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) or
various environmental laws.
[FN1] The
Conference has limited its study to health and
safety related disclosures because in this area a
pattern of federal statutory protections has
emerged with sufficient experience to allow a
study.
The protection provided
employees by the so-called whistleblower statutes
under study serves the important public interest of
helping ensure the health and safety of workers in
the various regulated industries or activities, as
well as that of the general public. The statutes
are intended to create an environment in which an
individual can bring a hazardous or unlawful
situation to the attention of the public or the
government without fear of personal reprisal. Such
disclosures can be a valuable source of information
especially where the public lacks the knowledge or
access to information necessary to be fully
informed on these important issues.
In its examination of the
current federal statutory scheme designed to
protect whistleblowers in the private sector, the
Conference found that, as currently written, the
various whistleblower statutes lack uniformity in a
number of areas including the following:
1. Investigative
responsibility is assigned to numerous agencies,
including the Department of the Interior and
several within the Department of Labor (DOL), with
little coordination among them.
2. Adjudicatory
responsibility is similarly divided. For example,
while several statutes provide for adjudication by
a DOL administrative law judge, others provide for
decisions by different agencies or for trial in the
district court.
3. Judicial review
likewise differs. Some statutes provide for review
in the district court, some in the court of
appeals. And for some, no review is available.
4. Statutes of limitations
for filing a complaint range from 30 days to 180
days.
5. Definitions of
protected conduct differ according to statute. For
example, protected disclosure may include any
disclosure or may be more narrowly defined as
disclosure to "the public," to the media, to the
responsible agency, or to a union or employer.
Protected conduct may or may not include refusals
to work.
6. In certain cases where
the designated agency declines to proceed with the
complaint (under either the OSHA or the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act), the complaining
employee is left without any further administrative
or judicial review.
As a result of these
statutory incongruities, available procedures and
protections may differ depending solely upon the
industry to which an aggrieved employee belongs.
For example, an employee seeking protection under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) has 30 days in which to
file a complaint, while an employee filing under
provisions of the Migrant Seasonal and Agricultural
Worker Protection Act (MSAWPA) has 180 days. And
while both CAA and MSAWPA violations are
investigated by the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor, adjudication of CAA complaints
is before a DOL administrative law judge, while
MSAWPA complaints are adjudicated in the district
courts. The Conference has concluded that this lack
of uniformity does not appeal to be reasoned, but
most likely reflects the incremental enactment of
the various statutes over a period of years.
Accordingly, the
Conference believes that omnibus whistleblower
legislation providing for centralization of the
investigative and adjudicative functions is needed.
Because the Department of Labor now investigates
and adjudicates such complaints under the majority
of existing statutes, centralization in that
Department is the logical choice. Although
specialized expertise possessed by agencies
responsible for the various regulatory programs
covered by whistleblower provisions may be required
in exceptional circumstances to resolve these
disputes, the Conference believes that
centralization is preferable and that enforcement
and adjudicative responsibilities should where
feasible be assigned to the DOL.
The Conference study also
discussed areas of regulation where gaps in
whistleblower protection exist. These include the
aviation and aeronautics industries, vessel
construction and operation, and manufacturing and
production of food, drugs, medical devices or
consumer products generally. Where Congress has
judged it necessary to regulate an industry so as
to ensure the safety of its workplace, products,
services or the environment, Congress should
consider whether it is appropriate that enforcement
of the regulatory scheme be strengthened by
providing whistleblower protection for the
industry's employees who report statutory
violations.
The study also indicated
that access to written decisional precedents in
these cases needs to be improved. The Department of
Labor's Office of Administrative Law Judges does
not yet publish its decisions (although it has
recently announced plans to do so), and a unified
index for these decisions and those of other agency
adjudicative bodies does not exist. Publication and
indexing of existing case law should help narrow
the issues for future adjudications, contribute to
a sense of fairness in the adjudicatory process,
and improve case management. In addition, the study
found that, with certain exceptions, there is
little interation between the program agency and
the investigating/adjudicating agency, thus
diminishing the involvement of the lead program
agencies. Procedures should be established by which
program agencies provide assistance to
investigative agencies, and adjudicatory agencies
report decisions back to the program agency.
Finally, the Conference
notes that there is a growing amount of litigation
in state courts concerning whistleblowers, but does
not take a position on whether federal statutes do
or should preempt state law in this field. (ACUS
Recommendation 84-5, Preemption of State Regulation
by Federal Agencies, recommends that Congress
address foreseeable preemption issues, and advises
regulatory agencies to be aware of situations where
a conflict might arise.)
With the increasing
interest in these matters by Congress, the media
and the general public, the Conference hopes that
its study will provide a foundation for needed
improvements.
Recommendation
1. In the interest of
uniform treatment of private sector health and
safety whistleblowers, Congress should enact
omnibus legislation for the handling and resolution
of whistleblowers' complaints. In enacting this
legislation, Congress should review the categories
of workers to which it is appropriate to extend
whistleblower protection. As a general matter, the
administration of this program should be
centralized in the Department of Labor in
furtherance of efficiency and harmony of results.
If, however, Congress deems it necessary for a
program agency to retain or receive investigative
or adjudicative responsibility for whistleblower
complaints. Congress should strive for uniformity
in the substantive protections and procedures
applicable to the separate program. [FN2]
The omnibus and any other whistleblower legislation
should include:
[FN2] The
Conference does not intend to suggest that
whistleblower protection provisions now
administered by the Department of Labor be
reassigned. Nor is this recommendation intended to
affect the existing jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board to investigate and adjudicate
allegations of unfair labor practices.
(A) A uniform definition
of protected conduct;
(B) A uniform statute of
limitations of not less than 180 days governing the
filing of complaints;
(C) A uniform provision
for remedies:
(D) Assignment of
preliminary investigative responsibility to the
Secretary of Labor [FN3] for all private
sector health and safety whistleblowing retaliation
cases;
[FN3] All
references to the Secretary of Labor in
recommendations I(D)-I(H) encompass other
appropriate agency heads in instances where
Congress deems it necessary for a program agency to
retain responsibility.
(E) Authorization for the
Secretary of Labor to employ alternative means of
resolving these disputes, with the consent of the
parties (see ACUS Recommendation 86-3, Agencies'
Use of Alternative Means of dispute
Resolution);
(F) Provision for an
opportunity by any affected person to request an
on-the- record APA hearing before a Department of
Labor administrative law judge and for
discretionary review by the Secretary of Labor,
judicial review in the courts of appeals, and
enforcement in the district courts;
(G) A grant of subpoena
power to the Secretary of Labor for whistleblowing
investigations and hearings, with provision for
judicial enforcement; and
(H) A grant of rulemaking
authority to the Secretary of Labor with respect to
investigative and adjudicatory procedures,
notice-posting requirements and mandatory
coordination with other agencies.
II. Whether or not
Congress enacts omnibus whistleblowing legislation,
the Secretary of Labor should:
(A) Promulgate rules of
appellate procedure governing practice and
procedure in connection with the Secretary's review
of administrative law judge decisions in
whistleblower cases;
(B) Transfer primary
private sector health and safety whistleblowing
investigative responsibility to a single entity
within the Department of Labor, absent compelling
reasons to the contrary;
(C) Develop, in
consultation with the agencies responsible for the
substantive regulatory programs, detailed written
procedures for coordinating investigation,
adjudication and follow-up in whistleblowing cases;
and
(D) In accordance with the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2)(A),
index and publish all ALJ and Secretarial decisions
in whistleblowing cases, including those rendered
prior to the date of this recommendation.
[52 FR 23631, June 24,
1987]
Authority: 5 U.S.C.
591-596.
SOURCE: 38 FR 19782, July
23, 1973; 57 FR 61760, 61768, Dec. 29, 1992, unless
otherwise noted.
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