CODE OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 1--GENERAL
PROVISIONS
CHAPTER
III--ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES
PART
305--RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
1 C.F.R. s 305.89-1
s 305.89-1 Peer Review and
Sanctions in the Medicare Program (Recommendation
89-1).
As the Administrative
Conference noted in Recommendation 86-5
[FN1] , the Medicare program relies heavily
on implementation of federal requirements by
localized carriers, intermediaries and,
increasingly, peer review organizations (PROs).
[FN1] ACUS
Recommendation 86-5, Medicare Appeals, 1 CFR
305.86-5.
The PRO system was created
in 1982. It is made up of state-wide, Physician-
controlled organizations under individual contracts
with the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). These contracts are negotiated pursuant to a
general contractual "Scope-of-Work" promulgated by
HHS every three years. PROs are delegated a number
of important responsibilities under the Medicare
system. They identify substandard, unnecessary or
inappropriate services rendered to Medicare
beneficiaries, and oversee education and corrective
actions for substandard providers (e.g., hospitals)
and medical practitioners. They also recommend to
HHS that it sanction providers and practitioners
when they find seriously improper practices, deny
Medicare payment for inappropriate or unnecessary
services, and protect the rights of
beneficiaries.
This recommendation
follows the suggestion made in Recommendation 86-5
that the PRO program was deserving of further
study. It recognizes the evolutionary nature of the
PRO's role in Medicare, and the administrative
difficulties posed for HHS in overseeing this
decentralized program--especially since new
legislative directions affecting the program appear
regularly, often contained in year-end omnibus
budget reconciliation acts. Nevertheless, the
Conference urges the Department (and, where
necessary, Congress) to make changes designed to
improve the accessibility of PRO-related policies,
the fairness and firmness of PRO sanctions imposed
on providers and practitioners, and the
effectiveness of PRO safeguards for beneficiary
rights.
In Paragraph A of the
Recommendation, the Conference urges several
enhancements of HHS' current practices in
disseminating, making accessible, and soliciting
comments on, PRO program guidelines of general
applicability, including the scopes of work,
manuals, and the criteria and norms used to
evaluate medical care. Paragraph B seeks to promote
improvements in the PRO's assigned duty of
investigating complaints by beneficiaries, and
urges Congress to allow PROs to act in response to
oral complaints.
Paragraph C recommends
invigorating the process of investigating and
adjudicating sanctions against health care
practitioners and providers charged with violations
of their obligations under the Medicare program.
The current sanction process begins when a PRO
gives formal notice to the practitioner or provider
involved that it considers that poor quality care
may have been rendered or that other violations
have occurred. The PRO is required to have at least
one quite formalized meeting with the practitioner
or provider to discuss the allegations that the
care rendered either "failed in a substantial
number of cases substantially to comply" with the
statutory obligations to render proper medical
care, or "grossly and flagrantly violated such
obligations in one or more instances." 42 U.S.C. s
1320c-5(b). (In the former type of case, at least
two meetings are required.) If, after the meeting,
the PRO believes that violations have occurred, it
recommends to the HHS Office of Inspector General
(OIG) that a sanction be imposed, either in the
form of an exclusion from participation in the
Medicare program for some period of time, or a
civil monetary penalty of no more than the amount
of the cost of medically improper or unnecessary
services. If the OIG agrees that violations have
occurred, and in addition finds that the
practitioner or provider is unwilling or unable to
comply with the obligations to render proper care,
the OIG may impose one of these sanctions. If the
sanction is exclusion, it becomes effective fifteen
days after notice. [FN2] The sanction is
appealable to an ALJ, then to the Appeals Council;
judicial review is subsequently available.
[FN2] Certain
practitioners in rural areas are permitted to have
the exclusion stayed, pending OIG proof that the
practitioner would pose a "serious risk" to program
beneficiaries if allowed to remain in the program
during the pendency of the administrative
appeal.
This recommendation seeks
to balance the vital interest in protecting the
health and safety of program beneficiaries and the
need to assure fairness to the accused provider or
practitioner whose livelihood is at stake and whose
services might be needed. The Conference urges that
the current PRO sanction process be streamlined. It
also urges that all providers and practitioners,
not just some, be permitted to seek a stay of an
HHS order to exclude them from the Medicare
program, in a proceeding akin to that of a
temporary restraining order at the administrative
law judge adjudication stage of that process.
However, the burden would be on the practitioner or
provider to show that no serious risk would be
posed to beneficiaries during the pendency of the
administrative appeal. The Conference also urges
changes that, while maintaining the requirement
that the OIG prove that violations have occurred,
would eliminate the additional requirement of
proving that the practitioner or provider is
unwilling or unable to comply with the obligations
to provide quality care. The offenses or
oversights, which have been found both by peers
(PROs) and regulators (OIG) to be substantial or
gross and flagrant, already serve as indicators of
inability or unwillingness to comply. Under the
current law, before excluding a provider or
practitioner on the basis of these findings, the
government must bear an additional evidentiary
burden that is inappropriate for this type of
proceeding. It must prove what amounts to a
speculative negative--that violators would be
unwilling or unable to comply with the law in the
future. The apparent result of this evidentiary
requirement has been to chill the initiation of
exclusion proceedings against providers and
practitioners who are providing improper care or
otherwise violating the law. Further, the
Conference recommends legislative changes to
provide for meaningful civil money penalties, as
well as for the current sanction of excluding
providers and practitioners from the program. It
shoud be noted that the Conference views the
changes in the sanction procedure contained in this
paragraph as a unified package, one that in its
present form balances conflicting interests but
that will become unbalanced if any one significant
portion were not to be accepted.
Paragraph D urges changes
in the PRO statute and regulations to ensure that
beneficiaries are better informed of their rights
to appeal decisions concerning their lack of
coverage or discharge from a hospital or other
facility, and that they will not be discharged
until such appeals are resolved. Paragraph E covers
the PRO's role in denials of payment for care
determined to be unnecessary, substandard or
rendered in an inappropriate setting. It recommends
that HHS implement in final rules 1985 legislation
concerning PRO denials for substandard care.
[FN3] It also urges HHS to amend its rules
to require that PROs not make any final decisions
affecting payment without adequate review by
medical practitioners who are qualified in the
relevant area. Finally, Paragraph F urges HHS to
take steps to permit PROs to share information with
provider facilities and state medical boards.
[FN3] On January
18, 1989, HHS published a proposed rule covering
this subject. 54 Fed. Reg. 1956.
Recommendation
A. Publication and
Dissemination of PRO Program Guidelines. 1. HHS
should enhance its current practice of publishing
and disseminating all Peer Review Organization
(PRO) program rules having a substantial effect on
providers, medical practitioners and beneficiaries
by taking the following steps:
(a) Notice-and-comment
procedures should be used for rulemaking except
when the agency for good cause finds that notice
and public procedure thereon are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
[FN4]
[FN4] See ACUS
Recommendation 83-2, The "Good Cause" Exemption
from APA Rulemaking Requirements, 1 CFR s
305.83-2.
(b) Proposed PRO "scopes
of work" and any generally applicable modifications
or interpretations of the responsibilities of PROs
during a contract cycle should be published in the
Federal Register and disseminated to relevant
interest groups. Interested parties should be
allowed 30-45 days of commenting, unless explicit
Congressional deadlines would be contravened
thereby, or unless there is good cause for
immediate implementation.
(c) HHS should make PRO
contracts, manual instructions, and other
guidelines of general applicability regarding the
PRO program readily available to the public at
convenient locations, including social security
offices. HHS should publish an updated list of such
materials in the Federal Register at least
quarterly.
2. HHS should encourage
PROs to use outreach and consensus-building
techniques analogous to negotiated rulemaking when
they are developing criteria and norms for PRO
review of the quality, necessity and
appropriateness of medical care. [FN5] HHS
should further encourage PROs to make these
criteria and norms consistent nationwide.
[FN5] See ACUS
Recommendations 82-4, 85-5, Procedures for
Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 CFR s 305.82-4,
85-5.
B. PRO Investigations of
Beneficiary Complaints. 1. Congress and HHS should
coordinate the system of PRO review of beneficiary
complaints concerning quality of services with
other federal and state regulatory schemes.
Initially, priority consideration should be given
to complaint investigations in the hospital
setting, where PROs have the most expertise and
where alternative means to investigate complaints
are least available.
2. Congress should amend
42 U.S.C. 1320c-3(a)(14) to permit PROs to
investigate and otherwise act on oral complaints
concerning the quality of services. Until it does
so, HHS should require PROs to receive such oral
complaints from beneficiaries or witnesses, and
reduce them to writing, before acting on them.
3. HHS should require PROs
to use investigative techniques that, so far as may
be feasible, protect from disclosure the identity
of complainants who do not expressly and
voluntarily consent to such disclosure. Where the
identity of a complainant who desires anonymity
cannot be kept confidential, the PRO should give
the complainant the option of withdrawing the
complaint in lieu of disclosure, although the PRO
may at its discretion continue to investigate the
underlying problem.
4. HHS should amend the
PRO Scope of Work to conform to the 1986 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act by requiring PROs to
inform beneficiaries fully regarding the final
disposition of all complaints, whether involving
providers or practitioners. PROs also should be
required promptly to inform providers and
practitioners of the final disposition of
investigations involving them.
5. HHS should establish
guidelines and a significantly more expedited
schedule than the current several-month process for
PROs to complete initial investigations of
complaints of potentially life-threatening quality
deficiencies. HHS also should establish procedures
for receiving and acting on requests for
intervention in cases where PROs do not process
complaints on a timely basis.
C. Sanctions Against
Providers or Practitioners Who Have Provided
Improper or Unnecessary Services. Congress should
streamline the sanction process by taking the
following interrelated steps to promote heightened
enforcement, while preserving fairness to the
accused provider or practitioner.
1. HHS should seek to
ensure greater uniformity among PROs through
training and the development of a model sanction
referral form. To preserve needed healthcare
resources, HHS and the PROs should continue to
emphasize education and corrective action rather
than sanctions as the primary means of addressing
quality problems. HHS should also amend its rules
(a) to require that, once a PRO determines that
there is a quality problem for which a sanction is
the appropriate intervention, it immediately start
the sanction process, and (b) to provide that,
ordinarily, there will be only one formal meeting
between the PRO and the accused provider or
practitioner after the sanction proceeding has been
initiated.
2. Congress should amend
the PRO statute to offer all providers and
practitioners (urban and rural), upon their receipt
of an HHS notice of exclusion pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1320c-5(b), the opportunity for a preliminary
hearing and decision. Such a proceeding would be
conducted by an ALJ on the issue of whether the
provider or practitioner would pose a serious risk
to patients during the pendency of the subsequent
ALJ proceeding on the merits of the exclusion. The
preliminary hearing would be in the nature of a
temporary restraining order proceeding, and would
arise and be conducted according to the following
procedures:
(a) If, within 10 days of
receipt of notice of the exclusion, the provider or
practitioner appeals the decision of the HHS Office
of Inspector General (OIG) imposing an exclusion, a
preliminary hearing on the "serious risk" issue
should take place before the exclusion takes
effect.
(b) If the provider or
practitioner establishes at the preliminary hearing
that continued participation in the Medicare
program pending the ALJ's decision on the
underlying appeal will not pose a serious risk to
patients, or that such participation can be
restricted to preclude such risk, the HHS exclusion
order shall be stayed or modified by the ALJ until
the ALJ issues a final decision on the merits of
the exclusion.
(c) The ALJ must render
the preliminary decision on the "serious risk"
issue as quickly as possible but within no more
than 30 days after the filing of the appeal, and a
final decision on the exclusion within a time
period reflecting assignment of the highest
priority to the adjudication.
3. Congress should retain
the requirement in 42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(b)(1) that
sanctions be based on determinations that a
practitioner or provider has either (A) "failed in
a substantial number of cases substantially to
comply" with statutory obligations to render
appropriate and quality care, or (B) "grossly and
flagrantly violated such obligations in one or more
instances." However, Congress should eliminate the
separate and additional requirement in 42 U.S.C.
1320c-5(b)(1) that the OIG must determine the
provider's or practitioner's "unwillingness or lack
of ability substantially to comply" with program
obligations before imposing sanctions on the
provider or practitioner.
4. Currently the PRO
statute [42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(b)(3)] limits
monetary penalties to "the actual or estimated cost
of * * * medically improper or unnecessary
services." In order to provide for a wider range of
sanctions, Congress should amend the PRO statute to
allow the OIG to assess a substantial civil money
penalty for each violation against providers and
practitioners who are found to have grossly and
flagrantly violated their obligations on one or
more occasions, or to have substantially violated
such obligations in a substantial number of cases.
The OIG should be given the discretion to impose
such monetary penalties in addition to an exclusion
where appropriate.
5. HHS should assign PRO
sanction cases to ALJs attached to the Departmental
Appeals Board (who currently hear other sanction
cases in the Department) rather than to Social
Security ALJs, as is the current practice.
D. Notice to Beneficiaries
of Noncoverage. 1. Congress should amend 42 U.S.C.
s 1320c-3(e)(3) to assure that hospitalized
beneficiaries who appeal the hospital's notice of
noncoverage by noon of the day following receipt of
the notice, should not have such coverage
discontinued until the PRO rules on their request
for review.
2. HHS should amend the
PRO regulations to assure that, at the time a
hospital informs beneficiaries of its decision to
discharge them or of the discontinuance of
coverage, they are informed of their discharge
appeal rights under the PRO program.
3. The notice of a right
to appeal should be on a form drafted by HHS
(developed in consultation with beneficiary
organizations and other interested parties), and
should include a concise and easily understood
statement of the basic beneficiary right to a
no-liability appeal to the PRO. If the current
system of separate appeal tracks (depending on
whether the hospital and attending physician concur
or not) is retained, separate notices should be
given for each track to avoid the confusion caused
by a notice that describes multiple procedures.
E. PRO Denials of Payment
for Substandard or Unnecessary Care. 1. HHS should
proceed expeditiously to final rulemaking to
implement PRO authority, contained in 42 U.S.C. s
1320c-3(a)(2), to deny payment to practitioners or
providers for care that does not meet
professionally recognized standards.
2. HHS should require by
regulation that PROs not make final utilization
review denials (denials of payment for care that
has been determined to be unnecessary or rendered
in an inappropriate setting) until a proposed
denial and the response to it by the affected
provider or practitioner have been reviewed by at
least one practitioner qualified by professional
training and experience relevant to the matters in
controversy. Although HHS should at a minimum apply
the same standard to reviews of denials of payment
for failure to meet professional standards of care,
it may be appropriate in this context to require
that the review be performed by a physician
practicing in the same care specialty.
F. PRO Sharing of
Information. 1. HHS should issue PRO manual
instructions and amend the Scope of Work in order
to implement the Congressional mandate requiring
the sharing of information among the PROs and state
medical boards and licensing authorities regarding
practitioners and providers who violate quality
standards, and should modify its current
confidentiality and disclosure regulations to
require that a copy of any PRO final sanction
recommendation be provided to such bodies. HHS
should explore the feasibility of including
sanction recommendations in the National
Practitioner Data Bank.
2. HHS should amend PRO
regulations to require PROs to share with hospitals
information about confirmed violations of quality
of care standards involving doctors on the staffs
of such hospitals, including the contents of
corrective action plans.
[54 FR 28965, July 10,
1989]
Authority: 5 U.S.C.
591-596.
SOURCE: 38 FR 19782, July
23, 1973; 57 FR 61760, 61768, Dec. 29, 1992, unless
otherwise noted.
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