IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF FLORIDA

GEORGE GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 67,740

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.
_____/

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent accepts petitioner's Statement of the Case, except as may be outlined in its brief, with the following corrections and additions:

The state filed its Motion for Continuance and Extension of Speedy Trial on June 9, 1983, not July 9, 1983.

In reference to his Motions for Discharge, which petitioner alleges were filed on February 27 and 28, 1984, the actual dates of filing were February 7 and 8, 1984.

On June 9, 1983, the trial court granted motions for continuance sought by petitioner's co-defendants based upon their assertions that they could not be prepared for trial on the June 13, 1983, trial date, prompting the state to move for an extension of the speedy trial period. (Petitioner's Appendix, Exhibits 2 and 3). The record reflects no objection to the June 9th motions and order for continuance.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Petitioner's "Statement of the Facts" is more argument than a statement delineating "facts" upon which Mr. Garcia's conviction was based. Petitioner repeatedly makes arguments and assertions which have nothing to do with the facts as adduced at trial. Respondent does not accept petitioner's statement in any regard. The following is a synopsis of the evidence presented by the state.

The principle participants in this conspiracy were Robert LeMaire, Thomas Rice, George Garcia, and Warren Parks. Warren Parks was an undercover law enforcement officer who acted as the potential buyer seeking five (5) kilograms of cocaine. Robert LeMaire was the "middleman" who was attempting to bring together the buyer, Agent Parks, and the supplier (R 482). Thomas Rice was the representative of the seller, and became integrally involved in the negotiations as the delivery date grew closer. George Garcia delivered the cocaine.

This case involved an undercover narcotics transaction which is where a law enforcement officer poses as a drug purchaser (or seller) to infiltrate illegal drug trafficking. In the instant case, Warren Parks was the undercover law enforcement officer who acted as a drug purchaser from New Jersey (R 62). In December of 1962, Robert LeMaire contacted David Thomason about re-establishing their association, which in the past had been drug dealing (R 89). Unbeknownst to Mr. LeMaire, David Thomason was a confidential informant for the Volusia County Narcotics Task Force (R 91). Mr. Thomason got back in touch with

Mr. LeMaire to discuss drug dealing and allowed Agent Parks to record the conversation (R 88). Mr. Thomason gave Mr. LeMaire a phone number where he could reach Mr. Parks to negotiate (R 91-92). Mr. LeMaire called Agent Parks at that phone number the next day and discussed doing a cocaine deal (R 92). Several days later, they decided to meet at the Empress Lily Restaurant in Orlando (R 93).

On January 20, 1983, Mr. LeMaire and Agent Parks did meet at the Empress Lily Restaurant. There they discussed the purchase of five (5) kilograms of cocaine by Agent Parks from Mr. LeMaire and his suppliers (R 94). They also roughly discussed how the transaction would work (R 94). Mr. LeMaire then provided Agent Parks with a sample of cocaine (R 94, 489). Mr. LeMaire did not mention the name of his supplier at that time, but a price of $57,000 per kilogram was discussed (R 95). Mr. LeMaire testified that he had discussed this drug deal with Thomas Rice, and at the time of his meeting with Agent Parks on January 20th, LeMaire intended to have Mr. Rice supply the cocaine (R 486). There was continuing discussion between Agent Parks and Mr. LeMaire. On February 1, 1983, there was several phone conversations between LeMaire and Parks. During one of those conversations, LeMaire had Agent Parks talk to "one of his people" (R 99). That person was identified by both Agent Parks and Mr. LeMaire as Thomas Rice (R 101,492-494). Mr. LeMaire testified that prior to his meeting with Agent Parks on January 20th, he had told Mr. Rice that he had some people interested in purchasing a large quantity of cocaine (R 488). Mr. Rice ex-

pressed interest, and provided Mr. LeMaire with a sample of cocaine to give to Agent Parks (R 488). Mr. LeMaire and Mr. Rice also discussed the price of kilograms of cocaine (R 489).

At this point in time, there was difficulty in reaching an agreement as to where and how the transaction would take place. Eventually an agreement was reached where the deal would take place on February 9, 1983 (R 103). Mr. LeMaire, Mr. Rice and Agent Parks were in agreement as to that date (R 104, 494). Mr. LeMaire testified that Mr. Rice was in contact and dealing with the party who was the actual supplier of the cocaine. Mr. LeMaire had no contact with this party (R 494-498). On February 16, 1983, Mr. LeMaire and Agent Parks met face to face to discuss how the deal would be consummated (R 105,498). The agreement was that Agent Parks would have the money for all five (5) kilograms to show to Mr. Rice. Then Agent Parks would be taken where one (1) kilogram of cocaine was, check it out, and phone back to his accomplice when he approved of the cocaine. At that point, Parks would take the cocaine and Rice would take the money for one (1) kilogram. Then Rice would make a call and the other four (4) kilograms would be delivered (R 119,509). Mr. Rice agreed to those terms (R 499-500).

On February 9, 1983, Mr. LeMaire and Mr. Rice met Agent Parks at the Seasons Restaurant on U.S. 92 in Daytona Beach (R 107,500). Rice did not have the cocaine at that time, but it was supposed to arrive in Daytona that day (R 501). Mr. LeMaire introduced Mr. Rice to Agent Parks (R 107). The three left and went to Agent Park's motel room at the Indigo Motel (R 108,501).

This room was wired with a microphone to tape any conversations (108). The three (3) waited there for the money to arrive, and Mr. Rice indicated he would be the one to check the money (R 111-112). Eventually, Agent Elder arrived at the motel room with the money (R 113,508). Mr. Rice counted the money and indicated that it was all there and went to make a phone call at a pay phone (R 114,504). Mr. Rice and LeMaire subsequently left Agent Parks' motel room. Around midnight that night, Mr. LeMaire called Agent Parks and indicated that the cocaine had arrived (R 122). Mr. LeMaire testified that at approximately midnight, Mr. Garcia arrived at Mr. Rice's motel room (R 510). At that time, Mr. LeMaire discussed the agreement with Mr. Garcia who agreed with the arrangement (R 520-521). Mr. Rice and Mr. LeMaire then went to Agent Parks' motel room (R 123,522). Mr. Rice stayed in Agent Parks' motel room with Agent Elder and the money (R 126, 522). Mr. LeMaire then took Agent Parks back to a Holiday Inn motel room to look at the cocaine (R 522-523). Mr. Garcia was present when Agent Parks arrived (R 523,126). Mr. Garcia presented half a kilogram of cocaine to Agent Parks (R 127,523). Agent Parks weighed it, indicating there was slightly more than 500 grams in that package (R 237,523). Mr. Garcia then left the room and returned with another package identical to the first (R 130,523). Agent Parks checked this package and indicated that the cocaine was adequate (R 130,524). Mr. Garcia requested a small portion of the cocaine for his journey back to south Florida to get the other four (4) kilograms and return (R 127,524). Agent Parks then phoned Agent Elder and told him to deliver the $56,000 to Mr. Rice (R 131,525). Then Agent

Parks left with the cocaine (R 132,526). Agent Elder then arrested Mr. Rice and other officers arrested Mr. LeMaire and Mr. Garcia.

Subsequently, Mr. LeMaire pled guilty to the charges and became a witness for the state.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT ONE:

Petitioner's motions for discharge were properly denied, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d)(3)(ii), where the delays and continuances in his trial were attributable, either to himself, or his co-defendants. Discharge was also properly denied, pursuant to Rule 3.191(d)(3)(i), since the trial court had entered an order extending the time for trial.

Extension of the time for trial by the trial court was proper due to exceptional circumstances. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate abuse of discretion in the trial court findings relating to the existence of exceptional circumstances in this case.

POINT TWO:

The transcripts of tapes sought by petitioner contained the interpretation by the prosecutor's secretary of who said what on the tapes, despite several inaudible parts on the tapes, which could not be certified as accurate transcripts of the tapes. The petitioner had access to the tapes for a whole year prior to trial, and chose not to make his own transcripts.

The prosecutor had not intended to use the transcripts during the trial. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered the prosecution to give copies of the transcripts to petitioner. The transcripts contained no evidence favorable to petitioner. Having had access to the original tapes for one year, petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from any alleged discovery violation.

POINT THREE:

Controlling the scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court. Witness Parks was being investigated by a grand-jury, but no charges had been filed against him, nor was there any showing that any prosecution of Parks would be pursued. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in limiting this aspect of cross-examination.

POINT FOUR:

The trial court's instruction on substantial assistance was a proper instruction relating to Florida's substantial assistance law. If anything, it reflected badly upon witness LeMaire for having agreed to assist the state.

POINT FIVE:

Petitioner's jury instruction was properly denied as the only competent, substantial, evidence was that petitioner did, in fact, conspire with co-conspirators other than a law enforcement officer to traffic in cocaine.

POINT ONE

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCHARGE, INASMUCH AS THE FAILURE TO HOLD TRIAL WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO CONTINUANCES OBTAINED BY PETITIONER'S CO-DEFENDANT IN THE SAME TRIAL.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner seeks reversal of his cocaine convictions and discharge alleging that the trial court erroneously granted the state's motion seeking an extension of the speedy trial time and erroneously denied his motion for discharge. The respondent respectfully disagrees.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(3)(ii), provides in pertinent part:

> " . . . a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that . . . the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a co-defendant in the same trial, or their counsel.

(Emphasis supplied). This court recognized in Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So.2d 968 (Fla. 1980), that if a co-defendant causes a delay or moves for a continuance, he waives the speedy trial periods under the speedy trial rule, but retains his constitutional guarantee to speedy trial within a reasonable time. Thus, where a co-defendant moves for a continuance which results in a trial outside of the speedy trial time period, the limitation period of the speedy trial rule has been waived, and a court may, properly deny a defendant's motion for discharge from a conspiracy charge. State v. Jordan, 436 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

In the instant appeal, the July 5, 1983, order of the trial court denying petitioner's motion for discharge specifically re-

fers to the June 15, 1983, order of the same court extending the time for trial in this case. Petitioner's July 1, 1983, Motion for Discharge and Dismissal is specifically directed toward the June 15, 1983 extension order by the court. Although petitioner cleverly and inaccurately suggests that continuance was granted for the convenience of the state, in this order, the court specifically found, in Paragraph #3, that a continuance of the trial was attributable to petitioner's co-defendants, who were not prepared for trial, so as not to infringe upon their rights to a fair trial. The court also found, in Paragraph #6, that the delay in the trial caused by the continuances was not one which could be anticipated, or was avoidable or foreseeable. As a result, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(3)(ii), petitioner's motion for discharge was properly denied.

Petitioner's reliance on Miner v. Westlake, 478 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1985), is misplaced. In Westlake, the record revealed that the sole reason for not granting a motion to sever by the defendant was the convenience to the state of trying the grand theft co-defendants together. Although, in the instant appeal, it would appear that no motion for extension of time by the prosecutor was necessary because petitioner was not entitled to discharge by virtue of the continuance attributable to his co-defendants and their counsel, which resulted in the waiver of speedy trial, the prosecutor moved for an extension anyway. As grounds for the extension, the prosecutor noted that the co-defendants were properly joined on charges of conspiracy, that the offenses were based on the same acts and transactions. Most

importantly, the prosecutor noted that the trial court had granted on June 9, 1983 (just four days before the June 13, 1983, trial date), a motion for continuance by petitioner's co-defendants, in order to allow them to properly prepare for trial and that this last minute granting of the continuance by the trial court could not be anticipated by the prosecutor, and would materially affect the trial of petitioner and the co-defendants. The prosecutor had essentially prepared his witnesses, questions, and arguments for a trial involving three defendants. The last minute continuance attributable to petitioner's co-defendants made it impossible for the prosecutor to redraft questions and arguments, and reprepare witnesses for a trial of petitioner, alone. Exceptional circumstances include those that will cause a delay for an indefinite period of time. Ferris v. State, 475 So.2d 201, 202 (Fla. 1985). Defense preparation for trial in a conspiracy case certainly involves an indefinite period contemplated in Ferris. By granting the prosecutor's motion for extension of time based on the last minute co-defendant continuances, the trial court provided substantial justice to the state in exceptional circumstances. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in granting the extension. Nothing in the record on appeal suggests that petitioner objected to the continuance moved for by his co-defendants and granted by the court on June 9th. It appears that petitioner acquiesced in the continuance.

There was reason not to sever the cases, in that they were properly joined, and an in pari materia reading of Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b)(1)(i) and Rule 3.191(d)(3)(ii), demonstrates that petitioner had no speedy trial right which needed protection. Pursuant to Rule 3.191(d)(3)(ii), petitioner had no speedy trial right as a result of the continuance attributable to his co-defendants, regardless of a motion for extension by the prosecutor. Any motion for discharge by petitioner was required to be denied. It appears that this honorable court may have overlooked this provision in deciding Westlake. Additionally, as a result of the prosecutor's motion for extension, an extension of the speedy trial time had properly been entered by the court mandating denial of petitioner's motion for discharge, pursuant to Rule 3.191(d)(3)(i).

The instant appeal is also distinguishable from Westlake, because of the conspiracy charges with which they were charged. As pointed out by the court in Garcia v. State, 474 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985):

> The inherent nature of the crime of conspiracy necessitates a single trial of co-conspirators. United States v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465, 1476 (11th Cir. 1984); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.150(b)(2). Often, "[o]nly by prosecuting all the members of [a conspiracy] together and by culling the sum total of their knowledge is it possible to obtain a detailed mosaic of the whole undertaking."[4] Moreover, the character and the effect of a conspiracy must be judged by looking at it as a whole and not by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts. 16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 8 (1964).

474 So.2d at 1205. (Footnote omitted).

Finally, petitioner asserts that he should have been tried within five days after the application by his co-defendants for a Writ of Prohibition (relating to the denial of their motions

for severance in the trial court), in the Fifth District Court of Appeal was denied. The trial court had entered its order staying the trial of petitioner and his co-defendants, and extending the trial date for a period of 90 days from the receipt of mandate, order, or other notice of resolution of their appeal of the denial of severance. The reason petitioner was not brought to trial was attributable to the delay and continuance sought by himself and his co-defendants in their motions to stay. The trial court, once again, properly extended the time for trial as a result of this exceptional circumstance, and properly denied petitioner's second motion for discharge. Cf. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So.2d 968 (Fla. 1980); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d)(3)(i) and (ii).

POINT TWO

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO COMPEL THE STATE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WITH COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO TRIAL

Petitioner contends it was error for the trial judge to refuse to compel the state to provide petitioner with copies of transcripts of tape recorded conversations between petitioner, a co-conspirator, and the undercover law enforcement officer. Said transcripts had been requested before trial started. These transcripts were made by the Assistant State Attorney's secretary at his request and were her interpretation of what was said on the tapes and by whom. There were several points where the transcriber could not understand what was said on the tapes. These transcripts were the Assistant State Attorney's work product.

The transcripts were viewed by petitioner's co-defendant's counsel, prior to trial. The first time they were used at trial was by defense counsel (R 243). Petitioner had access to the tapes for a whole year prior to trial, and had ample opportunity to have transcripts of his own made, but he chose not to (R 211). The Assistant State Attorney had not intended that these transcripts be used during the trial, rather, they were to aid him in his prosecution of the trial. The prosecutor stated several times that if petitioner wanted to stipulate to their introduction, then he would give them copies of the transcripts (R 239). Finally, the trial judge, out of an abundance of caution, ordered the prosectuion to turn copies of the transcripts over to petitioner on the third day of the trial.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any reversible error.

If error occurred at all, it was harmless. Respondent contends that there was no error. No due process violation occurred, such that petitioner was denied a fair trial. Not only were the transcripts work product, but they contained no evidence favorable to the defendant. For the most part, they were detrimental to petitioner's case. Petitioner's attorney had the tapes available to him for approximately a year. In State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), the court held that the prosecution is required to disclose only, ". . . those matters which the accused cannot, by reasonable diligence, otherwise avail himself of." Gillespie at 555. The court also noted that, " . . . no intelligent concept of fairness has ever been advanced which would require one side to prepare the case for his adversary, or to furnish such adversary with evidence favorable to him when such evidence is otherwise reasonably available." Gillespie at 553. The best evidence was the tapes themselves, not the transcripts. The transcripts were not favorable evidence. The petitioner had these tapes available and could have easily had his secretary transcribe them. Any contention that such transcription could be different than that done by the prosecutor's secretary lends further support for the position that these materials were work product. Also, the prosecutions' secretary could not certify that these were accurate transcripts of the tapes. Petitioner's contention is without merit. Petitioner's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.

POINT THREE

IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO LIMIT PETITIONER FROM CROSS-EXAMINING WITNESS PARKS CONCERNING AN INVESTIGATION BY THE VOLUSIA COUNTY GRAND-JURY.

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of a state witness concerning an investigation by the Volusia County grand-jury on charges of over-zealous enforcement of the narcotics law. When petitioner attempted to inquire of the witness concerning these charges, the prosecution objected and the trial court ruled that:

> . . . Bare accusations of criminal charges are not admissible for the impeachment of a witness. I think the exception is where it can be shown to the court that because of present criminal charges or investigations, as a direct result of those investigations that there is a likelihood that the witness will testify favorable to the state in order to seek preferred treatment on those charges or investigations, then that matter is admissible and under these circumstances the reason with the general rule they're not admissible is because it's so easy to accuse people of things, to instigate criminal charges against a witness even for the purpose of discrediting him in the future. (R 217).

It is well-established that the trial judge has wide discretion in controlling the scope of cross-examination, which is not subject to review, absent any clear abuse of that discretion. Oviatt v. State, 440 So.2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Sireci v. State, 399 So.2d 964 (Fla. 1981); Mancebo v. State, 350 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 1977). A discretionary curtailment of cross-examination, before it actually exceed the bounds of proper cross-examination, can be harmless error, if no prejudice can be demon-

strated by the petitioner. Coxwell v. State, 361 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1978).

The petitioner attempted to impeach witness Parks by inquiring as to charges being investigated by the Volusia County grand-jury. There were no charges filed against the witness and there was no showing that prosecution of the witness would be pursued. The witness did not stand to benefit for testifying favorably to the state, such as a witness with charges pending against him would. The witness was a law enforcement officer and testifying for the state was part of his job, it was not with the intent to receive leniency from the State Attorney's office on other current or recent charges. The trial court did not err in limiting petitioner in his cross-examination of the witness in this area.

POINT FOUR

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LAW OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, SECTION 893.235, FLORIDA STATUTES.

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by giving an instruction on the Substantial Assistance Law, section 893.135 (3), Florida Statutes, as requested by the state. The state requested the judge give this instruction because the defense made an issue of the deal struck between the state and its key witness, co-conspirator Robert LeMaire (R 999). Rice's counsel objected to this proposed instruction stating, "I don't believe anybody knows what substantial assistance means" (R 999). The instruction requested by the prosecution and given by the court merely recited word for word, section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes (R 1037-1038). The court stated that it would give this instruction because the defendant had painted the Assistant State Attorney as an "unfair monster" for making a deal with Mr. LeMaire. The court held that the state was entitled to an instruction on the law. The court went on to say:

> I would agree if this was an ordinary case, this should not be given and the only reason I will give it in this case is because a lot has been made of the fact that the state has used it with LeMaire (R 1001).

At this point, petitioner raised the possibility that this instruction improperly referred to petitioner's right to remain silent (R 1002). The court concluded that this was not a valid concern, and that the instruction should be given to let the jury know that the deal which the defense attacked was a legal deal (R 1005).

Petitioner asserts two grounds in support of his contention that the giving of this instruction was error. The second ground is that the instruction lent authority or credence to the testimony of witness LeMaire. Petitioner initially notes that this ground was never argued to the trial court as required by 3.390(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and therefore, petitioner is precluded from arguing this theory on appeal. Furthermore, in light of the court's instruction to the jury that they are to independently weigh the credibility of each witnesses' testimony, the overall jury instructions negate the prejudicial effect, if any, of the instruction in that regard.

The petitioner's contention that this instruction violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent by calling to the jury's attention, the fact that petitioner had not come forward and offered substantial assistance to the state is not logical. Petitioner's logic fails because, before the jury would ask themselves that question, they would necessarily have to have concluded that the petitioner was guilty. If they were not already convinced of petitioner's guilt, then there would be nothing for the petitioner to come forward with. If they had already concluded petitioner was guilty, then this instruction would not be prejudicial to the petitioner.

The petitioner was the one who made an issue of the defendant's deal with LeMaire. Since the propriety of the deal was made an issue, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the law concerning such deals. The judge merely read the statute to the jury. Respondent respectfully contends that the giving of this instruction was not error. Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate that reversible error occurred.

POINT FIVE

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENYING TO GIVE PETITIONER'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6.

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not giving his requested jury instruction number 6. Petitioner contends that the trial court properly denied petitioner's request, on the basis that the state presented competent, substanial evidence that petitioner did, in fact, conspire with co-conspirators other than a law enforcement officer. Furthermore, petitioner had the opportunity to argue to the jury that the law stated that the prosecution must prove that petitioner conspired with persons other than law enforcement officers. Petitioner's concern was two-fold; one, that the information that petitioner conspired with the named co-conspirators and other unknown persons which petitioner feared could be interpreted as the law enforcement officers, and, that the basis of his defense was that he had not conspired with anyone other than Agent Parks (R 997-998).

The petitioner had the opportunity, during argument, to inform the jury who the unknown person was, and that if the state only proved that petitioner conspired with Agent Parks, then no conspiracy was proven (R 997). The trial court was of the opinion that the giving of petitioner's requested jury instruction number 6, would confuse the jury, as to whether or not it was allowable for Agent Parks to be an integral part of the conspiracy (R 998). Clearly, the prosecution proved that petitioner conspired with at least LeMaire, when he discussed how

the transaction would occur, and later when he discussed driving back down to south Florida and returning with the additional four (4) kilograms of cocaine (R 520-524). Thus, there was no evidence to support petitioner's instruction, and the instruction would only serve to confuse the jury.

Petitioner contends that the denial of this request for jury instruction was not error. If it was error, it was, at best, harmless. Petitioner's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments and authorities presented herein, respondent respectfully prays this honorable court affirm the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoing Respondent's Brief on the Merits has been furnished by mail to John W. Tanner, P.A., Tanner and Lambert, 630 N. Olive Avenue, Suite A, Daytona Beach, Florida 32018, counsel for the petitioner, this 7 day of May, 1986.

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