

IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

*Handwritten signature*

74,251

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

vs .

CASE NO. 88-0275, *SD J WHITE*

ROBERT L. JOHNSON,

Respondent.

FILED

JUN 5 1989

CLERK SUPREME COURT  
By *[Signature]*  
Deputy Clerk

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF  
THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL  
SECOND DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON JURISDICTION

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

BRENDA S. TAYLOR  
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL  
PARK TRAMMELL BUILDING  
1313 TAMPA STREET, SUITE 804  
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33602  
(813) 272-2670  
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

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Johnson v. State, Slip Opinion No. 88-00275  
(Fla. 2nd DCA May 24, 1989)

STATEMENT TO THE CASE AND FACTS

The State of Florida will rely the pertinent facts set forth by the Second District Court of Appeal in its opinion below:

The state charged the defendant with sale and possession of cocaine, violations of sections 893.13(1)(a) and 893.13 (1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987). The offenses occurred when the defendant sold cocaine "hand to hand" to a St. Petersburg undercover detective for \$20. The jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. The court sentenced the defendant to seven years' imprisonment.

Relying on Hatten v. State, So.2d \_\_\_, 14 F.L.W. 1118 (Fla. 2nd DCA May 5, 1989), Gord n v. State, 528 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1988) and Blanca v. State, 532 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1988), the Second District Court determined that Johnson's conviction for possession of cocaine should be set aside.

On May 26, 1989, the State filed its Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction on the basis of alleged conflict of decisions; and the instant Brief on jurisdiction follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court needs to resolve the conflict between the Second District and this Court's opinion in Smith v. State, infra, as well as Section 775.021(4). As the decisions now stands, the trial courts of this district are left in the dark as to whether to rely on this court's opinion in Smith v. State, and Section 775.021(4) or to follow the Second District's mandate that possession cannot be a separate offense from sale.

ARGUMENT

ISSUE

WHETHER THE DECISION BELOW IS IN  
CONFLICT WITH SMITH V. STATE, 430 SO.2D 488  
(FLA. 1983), AND WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD  
EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO REVIEW THE DECISION?

With its decision in the The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1988), this Court has established the standard for measuring jurisdictional conflict at the hypothetical level. Having done so, this Court recognized that it "...has subject matter jurisdiction to hear any petition arising from an opinion that establishes a point of law..." Id. at 288-289. This case certainly falls within that class as there is a written decision establishing a point of law.

The question thus becomes whether the court should exercise its discretion in a given case involving a written opinion establishing a point of law. B.J.F. recognizes that jurisdiction is appropriately exercised where the decision under review establishes a "...point of law contrary to a decision of this Court or another district court." Id. at 289.

The point of law established by the district court is that a defendant cannot be convicted of both sale of a controlled substance and simple possession (not possession with intent to sell) of the same substance. This position is in conflict with this Court's opinion in Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1983). Smith, analyzed the offense of sale and possession and found that each had an element of proof that the other did not.

This holding was not changed by Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987), which held only that one could not be convicted of both sale and possession in addition to trafficking. Carawan appears to agree that they are separate offenses. In Carawan, this Court receded in part from Rottenberry v. State, 468 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1985), but continued to recognize that:

"sale of drugs can constitute as separate crimes from possession..."

This Court has always understood that, simply because one offense may be "comprehended" State v. Anderson, 370 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1973) or "implied" within another, Payne v. State, 275 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), does not mean one is a lesser included to the other, Anderson, Payne nor that the implication makes it a necessary element under §775.021(4). As the court in Payne stated:

While the state may be correct that an allegation of delivery implies possession or constructive possession, an implied allegation is insufficient to bring a secondary offense within the scope of the information where the secondary offense is not a necessarily included offense. Where the secondary offense is not necessarily included within the offense charged, the elements of the secondary offense must be specifically alleged -- not implied -- by the accusatory instrument.

Id. at 263

Finally, sale and possession also remain separate crimes under the new statute effective July 1, 1988, for crimes occurring thereafter, because each has an element separate from the other. Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1988). See also State v. Doaphin, 533 761 (Fla. 1988) [Simple possession is

not a necessarily lesser included offense of trafficking by delivery].

The Second District's opinions fails to follow both this Court's opinion in Smith and the legislative intent expressed in Section 775.021(4) in failing to distinguish the requisite elements of possession and sale. In Gordon v. State, 524 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (review pending, State v. Gordon, Fla. S.Ct. #72,850) the court held that a defendant cannot be convicted and sentenced for both sale and possession with intent to sell. The charges before the court in the instant case, however, were sale and simple possession. Smith specifically holds that convictions can be had for both sale and possession.

This Court needs to resolve the conflict between the Second District and this Court's opinion in Smith v. State, supra, as well as Section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes. As the decisions now stand, the trial courts of this district are left in the dark as to whether to rely on this Court's opinion in Smith v. State Section 775.021(4) or to follow the Second District's mandate that simple possession cannot be a separate offense from sale.

It should be noted that on May 15, 1989, this Court accepted jurisdiction on State v. Bobby Joe Burton, Fla. Supreme Court Case No. 73,700 in which the Second District held that convictions for delivery and possession of cocaine violated the defendant's double jeopardy rights.



CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, arguments and authorities, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

*Brenda S. Taylor*  
BRENDA S. TAYLOR  
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL  
FLA. BAR NO. 0778079  
PARK TRAMMELL BUILDING  
1313 Tampa Street, Suite 804  
Tampa, Florida 33602  
(813) 272-2670  
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to Brad Permar, Assistant Public Defender, 5100-144th Avenue, Clearwater, Florida 33518 this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of June, 1989.

*Brenda S. Taylor*  
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER