Supreme Court of Florida

ORIGINAL

No. 79,386

JAMES REEVES, 111, Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

[December 3, 1992]

OVERTON, J.

We have for review <u>Reeves v. State</u>, 593 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in which the district court affirmed Reeves' sentence as a habitual violent felony offender and certified the following questions as being of great public importance:

> 1. Does section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), authorize habitual felon sentencing for a criminal defendant who has previously been convicted of a violent offense enumerated in the statute, but who is currently being sentenced for a non-violent offense?

2. If section **775.084**, Florida Statutes **(1989)**, authorizes habitual felon sentencing for a criminal defendant who is currently being sentenced for a non-violent offense, does the statute violate the constitutional principles of equal protection, due process, double jeopardy, or ex post facto?

Id. at 232.¹ We answer the first question in the affirmative, the second question in the negative, and approve the decision of the district court.

In <u>Tillman v. State</u>, No. 78,715 (Fla. Nov. 19, 1992), we recently held that section **775.084(1)(b)**, Florida Statutes (1989), does not violate the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. In <u>Ross v. State</u>, 601 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1992), we held that section **775.084(1)(b)** does not violate equal protection or due process. This court has also rejected ex post facto challenges to the habitual offender statute in <u>Reynolds v.</u> <u>Cachran</u>, 138 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1962); <u>Washington v. Mayo</u>, 91 **So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1956);** and <u>Cross v. State</u>, **96** Fla. **768**, **119 So. 380** (1928).

It is so ordered.

McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BRRKETT, C.J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

¹ We have jurisdiction. Art. V, §3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

KOGAN, J., dissenting.

I dissent on the basis of my dissenting opinion in <u>Tillman</u> <u>v. State</u>, No. 78,715 (Fla. Nov. 19, 1992). The petitioner has only been convicted of one violent crime and therefore *cannot* be a habitual violent felony offender,

BARKETT, C.J., concurs,

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great Public Importance

> First District - Case No. 90-3336 (Duval County)

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Steven A. Been, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

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Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; and James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, Assistant Attorney General and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent