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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

When this case, Anderson v. State, 592 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) first issued, it was the lead case in which the district court first certified a question of great public importance. However, a subsequent panel of the district court in Hodges v. State, 17 F.L.W. D787 (Fla. 1st DCA March 24, 1992), interpreted and applied the **case** here, Anderson, in a manner which negated the underpinnings of the certified question and placed the district court in direct and express conflict with a decision of this Court in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980). Nevertheless, the Hodges panel certified the same question of great public importance. Thereafter, because of the subsequent interpretation and application by the Hodges panel and of procedural delays by respondent Anderson in filing his answer brief, Hodges became the lead case. Opposing counsel both here and in Hodges are the same. The facts in each case, although slightly different in detail, present the same legal issues. **The** state's arguments here, although adjusted for factual distinctions, are the same as those previously presented in Hodges. Thus, this case should travel with and be controlled by the Court's decision in Hodges.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Respondent, Willie Lee Anderson, was charged with and convicted of four counts of sale of cocaine and four counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, for which he received concurrent sentences of thirty years' imprisonment as an habitual felony offender. (R 131-147)

At trial, respondent testified that he had been convicted of three felonies. (T. 100) Prior to sentencing, respondent was provided written notice of the prosecution's intention to seek habitual sentencing. (\$1. 20)<sup>1</sup> At sentencing, without objection, copies of two prior judgments and sentences were admitted in evidence, one for armed robbery and one for burglary and grand theft, the latter of which was rendered within five years of the current offense. (S2. 4-6) Defense counsel conceded that respondent was the same person as was identified in the two judgments and sentences, and he presented no evidence at the sentencing hearing. (S2. 5) When asked, "[I]s there any argument about whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support the finding' that the respondent qualified as an habitual felony offender, defense counsel responded, "No, sir. We just don't want to concede that it is." (S2. 6) Shortly thereafter, the trial court stated, "Based upon the evidence, I do find him to be a habitual felony offender."! (S2. 7)

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<sup>1</sup> There are two supplemental records, the first of which will be referred to as "\$1" and the second one as "\$2," the latter of which includes the sentencing transcript.

On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, respondent raised two sentencing issues. He challenged the constitutionality of the habitual offender statute and the adequacy of the trial court's compliance with the provisions of the statute. With respect to the latter issue, he argued the following:

Section 775.084(1)(a)1-4, Florida Statutes (1989), require the court to make four findings before imposing an extended term of imprisonment. Here, the trial court found that appellant was convicted of two earlier felonies, substantially satisfying ss. 775.084(1)(a)1 and 2; however, **the state made no showing whatsoever, and consequently the court was unable to find, that appellant had not received a pardon for the earlier offenses, or that the convictions had not been set aside in a post-conviction proceeding.**

Section 775.084(3)(d) provides that each of the findings required as the basis for an enhanced sentence "be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence . . . ." Here, there was no evidence. The failure to make the minimal findings requires resentencing.

(I.B. 12) (emphasis supplied in boldface underlined type)

In response, the State argued as follows:

Mr. Anderson contends that the trial court failed to find that his prior felony convictions were still valid and that he had not been pardoned for these offenses. This issue is controlled by Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980) where the supreme court stated:

We also reject [the defendant's] contention that the State failed to prove that he had not been pardoned of the previous offense or that it had not been set aside in a post-conviction proceeding since these are affirmative defenses available to Eutsey

rather than matters required to be proved by the State.

Id., at 226,

Mr. Anderson testified at trial that he had been convicted of three prior felonies. (T. 100) The import of this testimony is that these convictions were still valid and that there had been no pardon; otherwise, he would not have admitted them, or, at the very least, would have explained that he had been pardoned. The trial court **heard** this testimony at trial.

At sentencing, Mr. Anderson raised no objection to the information contained in the presentence investigation report. Neither did he object to the calculations on the guidelines scoresheet, which included points for three prior third-degree felonies and one first-degree felony punishable by life. (T. 147) In addition, he stipulated that he was the defendant referred to in the two judgments and sentences admitted in evidence. (SR. 5)

The above facts make it abundantly clear that Mr. Anderson's convictions have not been set aside, and neither has the Governor pardoned him for committing these offenses. This was obvious to everyone at the hearing, and it explains why Mr. Anderson did not raise these affirmative defenses. Unless raised, the trial court **was** under no obligation to rule on them. The habitual offender statute must be read with its judicial gloss.

(A.B. 6-7)

Thereafter, the First District published its opinion reversing the sentencing order because the trial court failed to find that the predicate convictions had not been pardoned or set aside. Inexplicably, no mention was made of Eutsey.

The State filed a motion for rehearing (copy attached), pointing out that **the** district court had overlooked controlling



precedent from this Court, Eutsey. Anderson filed a response to the State's motion (copy attached) in which he argued in substance that the trial court must make the statutory findings, irrespective of the absence of any evidence on the issues. To support his argument, he relied on Justice England's dissent in Eutsey.

The First District denied the State's motion with the following explanation:

The State's rehearing motion is premised on Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980). In Eutsey, the appellant was classified as an habitual offender under the 1977 habitual offender statute, following the trial court's finding that he "had not received a pardon and that his convictions had not been set aside in post-conviction relief proceedings." Eutsey at 223. Eutsey challenged this finding on appeal, alleging that the state had "failed to prove that he had not been pardoned of the previous offense or that it had not been set aside in a post-conviction proceeding." The Supreme Court rejected Eutsey's contention, in that "these are affirmative defenses available to Eutsey rather than matters required to be proved by the state." Eutsey at 226.

The State relies on this language to argue that the trial court's failure to **make** findings regarding the pardoning or setting aside of the predicate convictions was not error. It contends that, after Eutsey, no such findings are required if a defendant does not affirmatively raise the argument that the predicate convictions have been pardoned or set aside.

We reject this argument on several grounds. First, the habitual offender statute, both now and when Eutsey was decided, states that "each of the findings required as the basis for [an habitual offender] sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the

evidence." § 775.084(3)(d), Fla.Stat. (1989) (emphasis supplied). The statute does not qualify this requirement with regard to the pardoning or setting aside of the predicate convictions as set forth in section 775.084(1)(a)3. and 4. Therefore, the plain statutory language cannot be reconciled with the position which the state urges us to take on this issue.

The state attempts to overcome this obstacle by arguing that the plain language of the statute must be read with the "judicial gloss" placed thereon by Eutsey. However, the Eutsey trial court, unlike the trial court herein, made the statutorily required findings regarding the pardoning or setting aside of Eutsey's predicate convictions. Thus, the necessity of making findings on these issues in the absence of their allegation by the defendant was not before the court when it classified them as affirmative defenses, and we are reluctant to apply that language as urged by the state to qualify the plain requirements of the habitual offender statute.

Anderson, 592 So.2d at 1120-1121.

Stating that this Court's Eutsey decision of 1980, some 12 years prior to the decision of the district court here, had now "create[d] doubt as to the proper application of these statutory requirements," the First DCA certified the following question as one of great public importance:

Does the holding in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980) that the state has no burden of proof as to whether the convictions necessary for habitual felony offender sentencing have been pardoned or set aside, in that they are "affirmative defenses available to [a defendant]," Eutsey at 226, relieve the trial court of its statutory obligation to **make** findings regarding those factors, if the defendant does not affirmatively raise, as a defense, that the qualifying convictions provided by the state have been pardoned or set aside?

Anderson, 592 So.2d at 1121.

## SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The district court decision conflicts with this Court's decision in Eutsey and with decisions of other district courts and the district court below. Eutsey should be reaffirmed and the decision below reversed.

2. The decision below is contrary to the settled rules that the burden of proof for affirmative defenses falls on the defendant and that a trial court is not required to rule on unraised affirmative defenses.

3. The decision below is contrary to the rule that final convictions are presumed valid until a colorable challenge is raised.

4. The decision below is contrary to the rule that sentencing hearsay is presumed valid until its accuracy is brought into question.

5. The Eutsey certified question should be answered yes and the decision below reversed.

ARGUMENT

ISSUE:

SHOULD THIS COURT RATIFY THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION BELOW WHICH OVERRULES EUTSEY V. STATE, 383 So.2d 219 (FLA. 1980) BY HOLDING THAT THE STATE HAS **THE BURDEN** OF PROOF FOR SHOWING, AND **THE TRIAL COURT MUST FIND**, THAT PREDICATE FELONIES NECESSARY FOR HABITUAL FELON SENTENCES HAVE NOT BEEN PARDONED OR SET ASIDE?

Because the case here should be controlled by this Court's disposition of Hodges, case no. 79,728, now pending, it is necessary to examine the inextricably intertwined holdings and relationship of Hodges and the case here, Anderson.

Anderson argued in the district court that the state failed to introduce evidence showing, and the trial court failed to find, that the predicate felonies for the habitual offender sentence had not been pardoned or set aside. This issue had not been raised at trial. The state relied on this Court's holding in Eutsey that these were affirmative defenses which had to be raised and proven by the defendant, rather than the state, and pointed out that Anderson had conceded three predicate felonies at trial, that he had not challenged either the presentence investigation report or the sentencing guidelines scoresheet, and had stipulated that he was the person in the two certified predicate judgments admitted in evidence. Nevertheless, without acknowledgment or reference to Eutsey, the district court held in relevant part:

The trial court's failure to make the findings required by section 775.084(1)(a)

is. however. reversible error, even in the absence of 'objection. Rolle v. State, 16 F.L.W. D2558 (Fla. 4th DCA October 2, 1991), citing Parker v. State, 462 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1989) and Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1985). Anderson's sentence must therefore be reversed. We note that, on remand for resentencing, the trial court may resentence Anderson as an habitual offender, if the requisite statutory findings are made by the court and supported by the evidence. [e.s.] Cites omitted.

Anderson, 592 So.2d at 1120.

By petition for rehearing, the state argued that the district court had overlooked entirely the state's reliance on Eutsey which had interpreted and glossed the statute to place the requirement for raising the affirmative defenses on the defendant. On petition for rehearing the district court wrote to explain its decision and to certify a question of great public importance. The explanatory opinion acknowledged that Eutsey placed the burden of proof on the defendant, not the state, but concluded that the trial court was nevertheless required to make the findings even if no evidence was introduced and no objections were entered. (The Anderson documents are in appendix A.)

Three significant points about Anderson require comment. First, **the case** law cited in support is factually inapposite. Rolle, without setting out the facts of the case or even the year of the statute at issue, simply holds that the trial court failed to make unspecified statutorily **required** findings and then cites Parker and Walker in support. The latter two cases address the failure of a trial court to **make** the formerly mandatory finding that protection of the public required imposition of habitual felon sentencing. That requirement, which clearly was **not** an

affirmative defense, **was** deleted from section 775.084 in 1988. The cited cases lend no support to the proposition that a trial court must rule on the unraised affirmative defenses at issue here. Second, because, in good faith, we must assume that the district court considered that its holding was not in conflict with the Eutsey holding that the burden of proof was on the defendant, it had to believe that requiring the trial court to **make** factual findings was consistent with neither party introducing evidence to support the findings. That conclusion is simply illogical, as Hodges subsequently held. Third, again in good faith, the district court's statutory interpretation of section 775.084 had to be based on a conclusion that Eutsey was not grounded on a statutory interpretation by this Court that section 775.084(1)(a)3 & 4 created affirmative defenses which had to be raised by the defendant and which were waived when not raised. By not recognizing that it was simply reploughing ground already authoritatively covered in Eutsey, the district court created direct and express conflict with a controlling decision of this Court.

The decision in Hodges removes any doubt about direct and express conflict with Eutsey by (logically) interpreting Anderson as requiring the state, not the defendant, to assume the burden of proof on whether predicate felonies had been pardoned or set aside:

"A corollary of the holding in Anderson, although not discussed, would appear to **be** that the burden rests upon the state to present evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to make such findings."

Contrast, Eutsey:

We also reject his contention that the State failed to prove that he had not been pardoned of the previous offense or that it had not been set aside in a post-conviction proceeding since these are affirmative defenses available to Eutsey rather than matters required to be proved by the State. Eutsey, 383 So.2d at 226.

(The Hodges decision is in appendix B.)

As will be seen below, Anderson and Hodges not only conflict with this Court's case law, they also conflict with case law from other districts and from the first district itself. It was helpful for the Hodges panel to explicitly recognize the implicit corollary holding of Anderson but these separate actions of the two panels individually and collectively placed the district court in direct and express conflict with Eutsey. It would have been even more helpful for this Court, for the district court itself, and all the parties who appear before it in these habitual felon cases, had the panel followed the sound advice of In Re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982):

We have full confidence that the district court of appeal judges, with a full understanding of our new appellate structural scheme, will endeavor to carry out their responsibility to make law consistent within their district in accordance with that intent. We would expect that, in most instances, a three-judge panel confronted with precedent with which it disagrees will suggest an en banc hearing. As an alternative, the district court panel could, of course, certify the issue to this Court for resolution. Consistency of law within a district is essential to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation.

Id.

It seems clear that the Hodges panel recognized there was a serious analytical flaw in Anderson which created conflict with Eutsey. The state suggests that intracourt resolution is far preferable to sending the parties off to the state's highest court with a certified question, particularly when, as here, there is also intracourt and intercourt conflict and the certified question has been undercut by the corollary holding. In Re Rule and Article V, section 3(b) of the Florida Constitution do not contemplate that this Court's limited jurisdiction, as with certified questions, will be a device to resolve intradistrict conflict or to otherwise substitute for district court en banc procedures.

The Anderson/Hodges holdings are not only inconsistent with the explicit holding of Eutsey that the statutory burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the predicate felonies have been pardoned or set aside. They are also contrary to the entire rationale of Eutsey in upholding the constitutionality of the statute. The Court in Eutsey addressed the broader question of whether the full panoply of due process rights required in the guilt phase was also required in the sentencing phase, i.e., was the state required to affirmatively prove all information used in the sentencing process beyond a reasonable doubt? The Court held it was not. One of the specific issues was whether the state could rely on presentence investigation reports and other hearsay in showing that the defendant should be sentenced as an habitual offender. The Court held that it could and that the burden was on the defendant to come forth with specific challenges to the



accuracy of hearsay and to introduce evidence and witnesses as appropriate. This principle is well-settled in case law, including cases from the 1st DCA below. See, Myers v. State, 499 So.2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (Defendant is required to dispute truth of sentencing hearsay and, relying on Eutsey, in the absence of such dispute, "the trial court was not required to order the state to produce corroborating evidence,"); Wright v. State, 476 So.2d 325, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ("Where, **as** here, the defendant does not dispute the truth of the listed convictions, the state is not required to come forward with corroborating evidence. Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980); McClain v. State, 356 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)");

It should also be noted that Eutsey was decided in 1980. Despite the numerous changes to the statute over the **years**, as Hodges acknowledged, none have changed the relevant provisions which Eutsey interpreted. Thus, the subsequent legislative amendments and reenactments are presumed to approve Eutsey. See Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1992) ("It is a well-established rule of statutory Construction that when a statute is reenacted, the judicial construction previously placed on the statute is presumed to have been adopted in the reenactment.")

The above shows **beyond** all doubt that Anderson and Hodges were wrongly decided. However, there are still other flaws and fallacies which deserve attention<sup>2</sup>. One of the characteristics

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<sup>2</sup> Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973) holds that "District Courts of Appeal . . . are free to certify questions of great public interest to this Court for consideration and even to state their reasons for advocating change" **but** "[t]hey are bound to follow the case law set forth by this Court." Because the

of affirmative defenses is that they represent exceptions to the norm, i.e., they represent a minority occurrence. For example, the overwhelming majority of homicides are not justifiable as self defense. Several propositions flow from this characteristic. Affirmative defenses are rarely at issue, so that evidence showing their absence would be irrelevant in the overwhelming majority of cases. Burdening trials with irrelevant evidence would serve no useful purpose, needlessly expand their length and cost, and tend to confuse the proceedings, even to the extent of causing reversible error. The only party who can claim an affirmative defense is the defendant. It would be improper, possibly reversible error, if the state made the absence of self defense a feature of a trial when self defense was not claimed by the defendant. Moreover, the party in the position to bring forth evidence on affirmative defenses is the defendant. That was, in fact, one of the major points at issue in Eutsey. Who has the burden of proving that a predicate conviction has been pardoned or overturned by post-conviction proceedings? Eutsey contended that the trial court's finding that no pardon or post-conviction reversal had been entered was not supported by the record and that the state had the burden of proof. This Court rejected this argument by holding that the defendant had the

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district court did not follow Hoffman v. Jones, the posture of the parties in this case is upside down. The petitioner/state is in the unusual position of urging this Court to uphold its own case law against a contrary district court decision without first hearing why this Court should recede from its own case law. Thus, the state's initial brief is perhaps longer than it might otherwise be if it were answering arguments for receding from settled law.

burden of raising and proving these affirmative defenses. Eutsey clearly stands for the proposition that introduction of certified copies of judgments or PSIs satisfy the preponderance of evidence test set out in the statute. This holding was consistent with settled law which, happily, is itself based on a common **sense** understanding of what is involved in proving or disproving affirmative defenses.

The common sense aspects are obvious if one thinks through the pardon and post-conviction processes. Pardons are granted by the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Executive Clemency Board. See art. IV, §8, Fla. Const.; Ch. 940, Fla. Stat. To understate the matter, pardons are very rare. During the period 1989-1991 only 100 pardons were granted, an average of **33** per year.<sup>3</sup> Again severely understating the matter, if we assume that there are only 10,000 felony convictions a year, and that all **33** pardons are for felony convictions, the annual percentage of pardons to

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<sup>3</sup> This information was extracted from the public records of the Board of Executive Clemency by the person responsible for maintaining those records. It is contained in a letter and attachment from the Coordinator of that office which is included here as appendix C. The figures confirm what common sense suggests, pardons as a percentage of felony convictions are extremely rare, very nearly non-existent. The state asks the Court to take judicial notice of this public record information pursuant to section 90.202(12) and 90.203(1), Florida Statutes. (A separate motion has also been filed). In this connection, note the holding in Eutsey that hearsay information may be considered by the courts in determining sentences, **as** in PSIs, unless their accuracy is challenged and refuted. This is particularly apt here because the Court is addressing sentencing issues which were not raised in the trial court. Should the Court decline to consider the figures in this paragraph, the entire paragraph can be struck without impact on the state's argument. The figures illustrating the statistical insignificance of pardons merely serve to put this pseudo issue in factual context.

felonies would be less than one-third of one percent. Raise the hypothetical 10,000 felonies to a realistic figure and it can be fairly said that the likelihood that a given defendant has received a pardon for a predicate felony is so unlikely as to be pragmatically nonexistent.

This pragmatic nonexistence decreases even further by factoring in the criteria for obtaining pardons set out in the Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida. A comparison of the eligibility requirements for applying for a pardon under the Rules<sup>4</sup> and the eligibility requirements for an habitual offender under section 775.084 is very instructive. Section 5.A of the current Rules provides:

A person **may** not apply for a pardon unless he or she has completed all sentences imposed and all conditions of supervision have expired or been completed, including but not limited to parole, probation, community control, control release, and conditional release for at least 10 years. (e.s.)

Section 775.084(1)(a)2 provides:

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony or other qualified offense of which he

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<sup>4</sup> These Rules constitute a plenary statement of the law in this state pursuant to Article IV, section 8 of the Florida Constitution. *Dugger v. Williams*, 593 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1991). If needed, copies of the Rules should be obtainable from the Office of Executive Clemency pursuant to chapter 119, Florida Statutes, the Public Records Act. The previous rules in effect at the time of sentencing here were last amended on 18 September 1986. The current rules were last amended on 18 December 1991, effective 1 January 1992. A copy of the latter, which was provided by the Coordinator of the Office of Executive Clemency is provided here as appendix D. If respondent objects, and/or this Court wishes, the appendix can be struck without impact on the state's argument.

was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later; (e.s.)

It is clear that the "within" five years eligibility criteria for an habitual offender and the "for at least 10 years" eligibility criteria for a pardon are mutually exclusive. The ten years represents a recent increase from a former five year requirement but the "within" and "for at least" would still be mutually exclusive. It is harder, and rightly so, for a person with a criminal record to meet the criteria for a pardon than it is for the same person to merely avoid the criteria for enhanced sentencing as an habitual offender,

There **are** two ways to prove or disprove that a pardon has been granted: (1) introduce affirmative evidence that a pardon has been granted, i.e., the pardon or (2) introduce negative evidence tending to show that a pardon has not been granted. Because the law strives for rationality and certainty, approach one, taken by this Court in Eutsey, placed the burden of proof on defendants by requiring them to affirmatively **prove** that they had received a pardon. As common sense and the above analysis show, this places practically no burden on the courts or the parties because pardons **are** so rare as to be statistically nonexistent. Moreover, as Eutsey and other settled authority holds, there is no due process problem in placing a burden on defendants to make an adequate claim and a colorable showing that an affirmative defense exists. By analogy, see Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.200, Notice of Alibi, which **places** such burden on the

defendant. These rules comport with common sense. Rules of due process are intended to bring relevant issues to the fore so that the parties may fairly controvert them. Imagine, if possible, the difficulty of affirmatively proving that no conceivable alibi exists in the absence of a claim pursuant to rule 3.200. The number of persons required to testify as to **the** absence of an alibi is limited only by the population of the world.

The contradictory approach, adopted by the Anderson and Hodges panels, requires the state to prove a negative by showing the absence of evidence that a pardon has been granted. Where the predicate conviction was obtained in Florida, this would require communicating with the Office of Executive Clemency and asking that it search its records in the years since the conviction to determine if a pardon had been granted and to attest in a letter or other written communication that there was no evidence showing that a pardon had been granted. Where the predicate conviction is from another jurisdiction, obtaining evidence on pardons would require the state to research the law of the foreign jurisdiction and locate the appropriate office or offices which can attest to the **lack** of evidence showing that a pardon has been granted. Sentencing would be routinely delayed for the weeks or months that this process requires. This Court is aware, of course, that habitual felony sentencing is, and has been, commonplace and that thousands of such **sentences** are imposed each year. The burden of Anderson and Hodges will be substantial, if they stand **for** any significant period of time, particularly when those sentenced over the last decade or so

begin to file their post-conviction motions. As this is written, 20 June 1992, there are already scores of direct appeal cases pending in the 1st DCA which will require reversal and resentencing proceedings pursuant to Anderson/Hodges unless the 1st DCA recedes therefrom or this Court overrules<sup>5</sup>.

These same general factors discussed above also apply to proving or disproving that a predicate conviction has been overturned in a post-conviction proceeding. For obvious reasons, the burden of bringing forth colorable evidence that a predicate felony has been pardoned or set aside is inconsequential for the defendant involved. Under the provisions of the habitual offender statute, defendants are given advance notice of the state's intent to seek habitual offender sentencing. The purpose of this notice is to give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the predicate convictions by showing, e.g., they never happened, are too remote, have been pardoned, or have been set aside in post-conviction proceedings. Because of this prior notice, as Eutsey so plainly holds, whether one speaks of affirmative defenses to habitual offender sentencing or the

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<sup>5</sup> The state continues to argue in the district court below on each of these cases that Anderson and Hodges were wrongly decided and should be receded from. A timely decision to do so would significantly mitigate the mischief of having violated Eutsey and Hoffman by reducing the time period in which this bad law rules. However, the Public Defender's office moved to strike the state's briefs on the grounds that a party may not argue in its merits brief that a district court decision is in error because this constitutes an improper indirect motion for en banc consideration in violation of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(b). The district court has ordered the state to show cause why the briefs should not be stricken and the state has responded. At writing, the district court has not ruled. *See*, appendix E.

accuracy of PSIs, it comports with due process to place the burden on the defendant to challenge the validity of predicate convictions.

Our adversarial system **goes** to great lengths and expense to require, e.g., prior notice and assistance of counsel at trial. This system loses its *raison d'etre* if appellate courts treat trial counsel and courts as, to use a recent description, "potted plants." The state submits it is entirely reasonable to expect and require trial counsel, given prior notice of habitual offender sentencing, to consult with the client for the purposes of raising, e.g., pardons and post-conviction reversals.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast to the simplicity of requiring the defendant to raise and introduce evidence tending to show that a conviction

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<sup>6</sup> The unfortunate trend, as in *Anderson and Hodges*, denigrating the role of trial courts and counsel can also be seen in, e.g., *Ford v. State*, 575 So.2d 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 581 So.2d 1318 (Fla. 1991), which rests largely, if inadvertantly, on the proposition that trial counsel are presumptively incompetent to provide effective assistance of counsel by recognizing and objecting to errors which may conceivably occur at or following entry of a guilty or no contest plea, *Ford* requires that appellate counsel and appellate courts conduct *de novo* review of all guilty or unreserved no contest pleas to search for errors not recognized by trial counsel and the trial court. See Judge Letts perceptive lament on the state of contemporary appellate law in *Demons v. State*, 577 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991): "I grow impatient with the ever increasing demands the appellate courts place on already overburdened trial judges. More and more, we require them to justify themselves in minute detail or we will reverse. As I see it, trial judges should not have to carry the burden of proof to establish they were not wrong. To the contrary, it should be the duty of the criminal-appellant to overcome the presumption that the trial court was right." This comment is particularly apt where, as here, the issue is whether the trial court erred in not ruling that an affirmative defense did not exist when the defense was not raised and no evidence was introduced.



has been collaterally overturned in those rare instances where it has, *see* the difficulty of disproving the proposition in the overwhelming number of cases where the conviction has not been set aside in collateral proceedings. It can be fairly said, as with pardons, that post-conviction reversals of actual convictions are also very rare. Disproving their presence would consist largely of showing that the state has been unable to find any evidence that the conviction was overturned in the various records of state, foreign and federal courts and the data **bases** of, e.g., WESTLAW.

The Eutsey holding also reaffirms the settled presumption of validity accorded to final judgments and sentences. A judgment of conviction is presumed to be correct until reversed. Stevens v. State, 409 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1982). A recent example can be found in State v. Beach, 592 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1992). By affidavit, Beach claimed he had not been afforded counsel for prior final convictions. The trial court ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to shift **the** burden to the **state** but the 1st DCA held otherwise. This Court reversed because the affidavit was simply insufficient to overcome the presumption that the prior convictions were valid and that constitutional protections had been afforded. The same principle applies here. There is no rational reason to require the state to reprove the continued validity of prior Convictions every time they are used in sentencing. This would be incredibly burdensome on all concerned, including defendants. It would also be totally pointless in that, as Eutsey holds, there is no due process

problem in requiring a defendant to come forth with a challenge to the hearsay which is commonly used in all sentencing procedures. The question naturally arises, if the district court below would require the state to sua sponte prove the current validity of every prior conviction used in habitual offender sentencing, why would it not also be necessary to prove the current validity of every conviction on the PSI or sentencing guidelines scoresheet? It is plain that the decisions below are contrary to Eutsey in both letter and spirit in that they accelerate the current, undesirable, trend to make sentencing, which was once the least complex of legal proceedings, into a very complex undertaking fraught with hidden hazards. The state submits that the working presumption that an otherwise valid final judgment of conviction has not been pardoned or set aside is one of the safest, and sensible, that the law could adopt.

Aside from being erroneous, the state submits that Anderson and Hodges are decisions whose final effect on the actual outcome of cases is simply legal churning. The wasteful use of scarce judicial resources and taxpayer money will be substantial, as will the lengthy delays in every habitual sentencing procedure, but, in the end, because pardons and post-conviction reversals of predicate convictions are rare to nonexistent, the actual number of habitual offender sentences overturned as a result of all this pointless activity, i.e., legal churning, will be rare and probably nonexistent.

Two points are worth noting in this connection. First, from the viewpoint of an appellate counsel, it is improper to argue a point merely for the sake of argument if winning the point does not offer some benefit, or prevent some injury, to the client upon remand to the trial court. Appellate counsel has the burden of showing, not only that there was "error," **but** that the error injured the client. Second, consistent with the preceding professional responsibility of appellate counsel, an appellate court may not reverse a judgment, even when error occurs, unless that error "injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant." Section 924.33, Florida Statutes. In this connection, it should be remembered that there is no constitutional right to appeal a non-capital criminal judgment or sentence under either the United States or Florida Constitutions. The right to appeal is a substantive right which is granted subject to the terms and conditions which the state or legislature chooses to impose.<sup>7</sup> As section 924.33 applies here,

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<sup>7</sup> See, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) ("[I]t is clear: that the State need not provide any appeal at all. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 38 L.Ed 867, 14 S.Ct. 913 (1894)"); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) ("It is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal;" and "The right of appeal as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute; in order to exercise that statutory right of appeal one must come within the terms of the applicable statute"); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) ("Almost a century ago, the Court held that the Constitution does not require States to grant appeals as of right to criminal defendants seeking to review alleged trial court errors. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 38 L.Ed 867, 14 S.Ct. 913 (1894)."); and State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735, 739 (Fla. 1985) ("Cases decided after the 1972 revision of article V [of the Florida Constitution] still recognize the right of appeal as a matter of substantive law controllable by statute not only in criminal cases but in civil cases as well. [cites omitted].").

consistent with the constitutional separation of powers, an appellate court may not reverse an habitual felony sentence unless the appellant makes a colorable showing that he has suffered an injury from the claimed error. See, e.g., State v. Beach and the requirement to allege actual injury. There has been no claim or showing of actual injury here and the state suggests that respondent cannot in good faith allege that his predicate felonies have been pardoned or set aside or that he has even a colorable reason to so believe<sup>8</sup>.

The Anderson and Hodges holdings that the state must show, and the trial court must find, that the predicate felonies have not been pardoned or set aside also conflict with case law from other districts and the first district itself. In Stewart v. State, 385 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), the trial court made findings that the defendant had previously committed a

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<sup>8</sup> Although the facts will vary from case-to-case, those here are both representative and instructive. The record shows that Anderson is simply a career criminal who commits felonies, serves time, is released, and commits additional felonies in such close proximity that he never even becomes eligible for consideration for a pardon. Yet here we are, two years after a sentencing proceeding where no issues were raised or preserved, arguing whether the state must prove, and the trial court find, that unraised affirmative defenses do not exist. An issue which this Court resolved twelve years ago. The state suggests that there is more than a merely coincidental relationship between the trend condemned by Judge Letts in Demons, footnote 6, as exemplified by this appeal, and the continuing inability of public defenders to furnish timely representation to indigent criminal appellants, necessitating large scale withdrawals which place costly burdens on the host counties and lengthy delays on the appellate process. See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1991); Woods v. State, 595 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Young v. State, 580 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Day v. State, 570 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Terry v. State, 547 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Grube v. State, 529 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

felony for which he had been released within five **years** of the current offense and that habitual offender sentencing was necessary for the protection of the public. Stewart contended that the trial court erred in not finding that he had not been pardoned or his sentences set aside. Relying on Eutsey, the second district rejected the argument:

**The** evidence that Stewart had been released from prison less than five years prior to the instant conviction was un rebutted. The record would amply support findings that Stewart had not been pardoned and that his conviction had not **been** set aside. Since the **findings** required by the statute are fully supported on the face of the record, the mere failure to recite a specific finding in the sentencing order to that effect is harmless error, if error at all, and therefore, the judge properly imposed the extended sentence. Cf., McClain v. State, 356 So.2d 1256 (Fla.2d DCA 1978).

Id.

Similarly, in Myers v. State, 499 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), jurisdiction discharged, 520 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1988), Myers challenged the trial court's acceptance of a PSI, an affidavit, and copies of judgments as hearsay and contended the trial court erred in not finding that he had not received a pardon or set **aside** of his predicate felonies. The 1st DCA rejected the hearsay challenge and the absence of the findings because, "as settled by Stewart v. State, 385 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), the trial court committed harmless error, if any error at all, in failing to recite the specific finding that **Myers** had not been pardoned or received post-conviction relief from his last felony conviction since this finding was fully supported on

the face of the record." Id. In the same vein, see Adams v. State, 376 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), which was **relied** on by Eutsey, where the 1st DCA recited:

Turning to the facts of this case, we see that the sentencing judge found Adams was previously convicted of armed robbery and was released less than five years before committing the felonies for which he was to be sentenced, all of which was admitted or properly proved by competent evidence, including a witness who was subject to cross-examination. Adams was thus shown to be an habitual felony offender within the meaning of section 775.084(1)(a). (e.s.)

Section 775.084(1)(a) referred to in Adams includes the pardon and set aside provisions at issue here. It is **clear** from the recitation of facts that it is not necessary to controvert and disprove affirmative defenses which are not raised by the defendant. See, also, Likely v. State, 583 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), Caristi v. State, 578 So.2d 769, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), and Jefferson v. State, 571 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), where the 1st DCA held that a defendant could waive any or **all of** the findings and hearings prerequisite to sentencing **as** part of a **plea** bargain. The state suggests that, for the purpose of a knowing waiver, a defendant, such as here, who appears in open court, accepts the validity of all hearsay information showing the predicate felonies, and offers no legal reason why sentencing should not be accomplished, has fully waived any right on appeal to **challenge the** absence of evidence or findings that predicate felonies have not been pardoned or set aside. In citing and analyzing these conflicting intradistrict cases, the state recognizes that intradistrict conflict does not provide

jurisdiction for this Court. In Re Rule; Art. V, §3(b), Fla. Const. However, when jurisdiction otherwise exists, such cases are persuasive for the purposes of showing that the latest panel case law from the district court is wrongly decided and **that** the district court case law is in disarray. In any event, the district court not only conflicts with itself, it also conflicts with this Court and other district courts.


As this is written, two other district courts have declared positions on the Anderson/Hodges versus Eutsey dichotomy. In Baxter v. State, 17 F.L.W. D1369 (Fla. 2d DCA May 27, 1992), consistent with its decision in Stewart on which the 1st DCA relied in Myers, the 2nd DCA again analyzed this issue and concluded on the authority of Eutsey that the affirmative defenses of pardon and collateral set aside had to be raised by the defendant **and** that the state and trial court were not required to address such unraised defenses. The court certified conflict with both Anderson and Hodges. Followed by Bonner v. State, 17 F.L.W. D1421 (Fla. 2d DCA June 5, 1992). Contra, Banes v. State, 17 F.L.W. D1217 (Fla. 4th DCA May 13, 1992), where the court, without analysis except citation to factually inapposite cases, followed Anderson and certified the Anderson question. **The court did not cite or recognize Hodges**, although Hodges had issued well prior to Bonner and highlighted the conflict with Eutsey.

CONCLUSION

The district court decision should be reversed for the reasons set forth above by reaffirming Eutsey. To the degree it has any remaining relevance after Hodges, the certified question should be answered yes.

Respectfully submitted,

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ATTORNEY GENERAL




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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been hand-delivered to Carol Ann Turner, Assistant Public Defender, Leon County Courthouse, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, this 23rd day of June, 1992.



JAMES W. ROGERS