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MAY 4 1992

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

By _____
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 79,669

WILFREAD BEAUBRUM
Petitioner

-vs-

THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Respondent.

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA

PETITIONERS BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

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INTRODUCTION

The Petitioner was the appellant in the district court below, and the Respondent was the appellee in the proceedings below. The parties will be referred to by their names respectively or by Petitioner or Respondent.

The reference to the portions of the record are attached in the appendix and will be referred to by the symbol (A) in parenthesis followed by the appropriate page number.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The Petitioner was charged with several criminal violations of Florida Statute, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. (App. pg. 3).

The Petitioner was convicted by jury and sentence under s. 775.084 (amended) (1989). (App. pg. 4-7) The trial court imposed said sentence under the statute and exceeding the sentencing guidelines.

The Petitioner appealed the judgment and sentence to the Third District Court of Appeal. During the course of the Appeal, Petitioner's counsel filed a "Anders" brief alleging that she could not find any meritorious points on appeal from the judgment and sentence and that the Petitioner should be permitted to file his own brief.

Petitioner subsequently with the aid of paralegals from around the country submitted his own brief alleging the claim that s. 775.084 violated the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution, Article III, section 6, and therefore due process and equal protection of the law. (App. 1)

The Third District Court of Appeal issued an opinion on March 10, 1992., (see App. 26), that section 775.084 did not violate the single subject rule of Article III, section 6, Florida Constitution, and that the statute did not deny the

Petitioner due process or equal protection of the law. The court further found that the jury instruction on "Reasonable Doubt" was not unconstitutional. (App.27)

The Petitioner on April 6, 1992, filed his Notice for Discretionary Review in this Court in light of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and the conflict with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and the fact that review had been granted on the case utilize by the Third District Court of Appeal affirming the constitutionality of s.775.084., F.S. by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

This petition follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

It is the position of the Petitioner that s.775.084., F.S., violates the single-subject rule of Article III, Section 6., Florida Constitution.

That the district courts decision conflicts expressly with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 589 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) which holds that the statute in question here does violate the applicable law under Burch v. State, (cite omitted).

The Petitioner submits that this court has accepted jurisdiction to here the case of McCall v. State, 583 So.2d

411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), rev. granted, Case No. 78,536 February 10, 1992 (Fla. 1992), which found that the statute was constitutional, conflicting with Johnson, supra.

Based on the acceptance of McCall, supra., and the conflict with Johnson, supra., jurisdiction should be granted in Beaubrum, supra.

ISSUE:

THAT THE DISTRICT COURTS DECISION CLEARLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION OF ANOTHER DISTRICT COURT ON THE SAME QUESTION OF LAW (i.e., Constitutionality of s.775.084., violating the single-subject rule of the Florida Constitution)

The Third District Court's decision in Beaubrum v. State, ___ So.2d ___ (17 FLW) (Fla. 3rd DCA March 10, 1992), clearly and expressly conflicts with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 589 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in holding that s.775.084., Florida Statute, (amended 1989) does not violate the single-subject rule of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution.

The defendant submits that his sentence is illegal and therefore subject to collateral attack due to the basis that said statute, i.e., s.775.084 F.S., violates the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution.

The defendants sentence was imposed after the October 1, 1989 effective date of section 775.084., Florida Statutes, (1989). Chapter 89-280., Laws of Florida. Defendant was sentenced to a term of years in the Department of Corrections as to the count involved in this case pursuant to the Statute.

Defendant contends that section 775.084., Florida Statutes, Chapter 89-280., Laws of Florida violates the one subject rule of Article III, Section 6, of the Florida Constitution. Chapter 89-280 embraces two subjects: habitual felony offenders and the repossession of motor vehicles. The first three sections of Chapter 89-280 amended Section 775.084 (habitual offender statutes).. 775.0842 (career criminal statute), and 775.0843 (policies for career criminals), Florida Statutes, section four of Chapter 89-280 created section 493.30(16), Florida Statutes, defining "repossession"¹ Section five amended section 492.306(6), adding license requirements of repossessors. Section six created section 493.317(7) and (8) prohibiting

¹Section 493.30(16) states: "repossession" is the legal recovery of a motor vehicle or motorboat as authorized by the legal owner, lienholder, or lessor to recover, or to collect money payment in lieu of recovery of, that which has been sold or leased under a security agreement that contains a repossession clause. A repossession is complete when a licensed repossessor is in control, custody, and possession of such motor vehicle.

repossessors from failing to remit money or deliver negotiable instruments. Section seven created section 493.3175, regarding the sale of property by reposessor. Section eight amended section 493.318(2), requiring repossessors to prepare and maintain inventory. Section ten created section 493.3174, requiring certain information be displayed on vehicles used by repossessors.

In State v. Burch, 558 So.2d 11, 2, (Fla. 1990), the Florida Supreme Court quoted as follows from State v. Thompson, 163 So.2d 270 (1935):

Where duplicity of subject-matter is contained for as violative of Section 6 of Article III of the Constitution relating to and requiring but one subject to be embraced in a single legislative bill the test of duplicity of subject is whether or not the provisions of the bill are designed to accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort. Chenowith v. Kemp, 396 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1981)

Defendant submits that there is no "natural or logical connections" between recidivits repossessors of cars and ~~acts~~. Half of Chapter 89-280 addresses the prosecution and sentencing of recidivits, while the other half addresses the regulation of a lawful occupation. It is therefore clear that the law is "designed to accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort" as prohibited by Burch and Thompson.

Like the law in Bunnell, Chapter 89-280 is a two-subject law: it is not a comprehensive one. The relationship between recidivits and repossessors of cars and boates is even more tenuous than the relationship between the obstructio of justice by providing false information and reduction in the membership of the Florida Criminal Justice Council. Accordingly, the inescapable conclusion is that Chapter 89-280 violates the one-subject rule and is unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner moves this court to accept jurisdiction and quash the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and remand to the court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.

Respectfully submitted



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CERTTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the afore has been furnished to Counsel for the Respondent, **PATRICIA ANN ASH**, Assistant Attorney General, 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Department of Legal Affairs, Maimi, Florida, 33101, this 29 day of April, 1992, by U.S. Mail.


Wilfred Beaubrum Pro se