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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

WILLIAM JAMES SIMMONS, Petitioner,	)	
vs.	)	CASE NO. 79,806
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.	)	

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

WILLIAM JAMES SIMMONS, Petitioner, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.	CASE NO. 79,806

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent, the State of Florida, was the prosecuting authority in the trial court and appellee below and will be referred to herein as "the State" or "Respondent." Petitioner, William James Simmons, was the defendant in the trial court and appellant below and will be referred to herein as "Petitioner."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

The State accepts Petitioner's statement of the case and facts.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Within its plenary power, the Legislature has defined the meaning of "habitual violent felony offender" and "habitual felony offender." For habitual felony offender status, a defendant must have two prior felony convictions within the specified time period. For habitual violent felony offender status, a defendant must have one prior enumerated violent felony conviction within the specified time period. Since it is wholly within the Legislature's power to define crimes, there is no internal conflict as Petitioner suggests. Likewise, as this Court and others have held for many years, recidivist statutes such as the one at issue here are rationally related to the object sought to be attained--protecting society from recidivists--and do not twice place a defendant in jeopardy for the same offense. Therefore, the habitual violent felony offender statute does not violate the due process or double jeopardy clauses of the Unites States or Florida Constitutions.

ARGUMENT

ISSUE

WHETHER THE HABITUAL VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER STATUTE, FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1989), VIOLATES A DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND PUNISHES HIM TWICE FOR THE SAME OFFENSE IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Restated).

Initially, before addressing the issues raised in the certified questions, Petitioner claims that the habitual violent felony offender provisions "suffer from internal conflict" because the title employs the term "habitual violent felony offender," while the body of the statute defines a habitual violent felony offender as one who has previously committed an enumerated violent felony within five years of the instant nonviolent felony. Brief of Petitioner at 7-9. In other words, the premise of Petitioner's argument is that the term "habitual" modifies the term "violent" in the title, so that the instant offense must also be a violent felony in order for one to be a "habitual violent" felony offender deserving an enhanced penalty.

Petitioner's reliance on the dictionary definition of "habitual" is misplaced. The Legislature has defined the meanings of "habitual violent felony offender" and "habitual felony offender." See Fla. Stat. § 775.084(1)(a),(b) (1989). A habitual violent felony offender is a currently convicted felon whose previous record includes one or more of eleven specified violent felonies for which the defendant was sentenced to or released from incarceration within five years of the current

offense. The distinction between a habitual violent felony offender and a habitual felony offender is that habitual felony offender status requires two previous felony convictions, neither of which have to be for violent offenses. In other words, a previous violent felony counts as two nonviolent felonies when determining the appropriate habitual offender status. Because of the Legislature's plenary authority under the Constitution, there is no constitutional impediment to the legislature's definitions. It may require one prior felony, violent or otherwise, or two prior felonies, or three, or any other number, as the defining characteristics of "habitual,"

Turning to the questions certified, Petitioner next claims that "the habitual violent felony provisions fail the due process test of 'a reasonable and substantial relationship to the objects sought to be obtained,'" because the statute does not attain the object sought: "to enhance the punishment of those who habitually commit violent felonies.'' Brief of Petitioner at 9. Again, however, Petitioner's argument is premised on a false assumption. As noted above, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended to punish more severely those recidivist felony offenders with a previous violent felony. As previously stated, one prior violent felony is the functional equivalent of two nonviolent felonies for the purpose of habitualization.

In attempting to discredit an interpretation of the statute by the First District Court of Appeal, which is adverse to

Petitioner's argument, Petitioner takes issue with the court's use of the word "propensity." Brief af Petitioner at 10-11 (citing to Ross v. State, 579 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. pending, Fla. S. Ct. No. 78,179, wherein the First District stated, "In our view, just as the state is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender, its even more severe treatment of a recidivist who has exhibited a propensity toward violence is also reasonable."). Correctly noting that the term connotes a tendency or inclination, Petitioner then spuriously concludes that "a single, perhaps random act of violence does not fit within the common understanding of the word." Id. at 11. Quite the contrary, a "tendency" is "[a] demonstrated inclination to think, act, or behave in a certain way." The American Heritage Dictionary 1252 (2d ed. 1985). It is certainly reasonable for the Legislature to decide that a single act of violence, when coupled with at least one other act of lawlessness, constitutes a sufficient basis for enhanced penalties, including mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment.

Besides being rejected by the First District in Ross, the same due process argument made by Petitioner was rejected by the First District in Perkins v. State, 583 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. pending, Fla. S. Ct. No. 78,613. In Perkins, the First District stated:

> Although the burglary for which [the defendant] is now sentenced is not one of the enumerated violent offenses, section 775.084(1)(b) does not require that the

> current offense be violent. The appellant argues that this application of the statute is not sufficiently related to the apparent purpose of the enactment, thereby offending the requirements of due process. Habitual offender provisions are generally designed to allow an enhanced penalty when new crimes are committed by recidivist affenders. See e.g., Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980). Section 775.084(1)(b) encompasses the general objective of providing additional protection to the public from certain repetitive felony offenders. When the statute is considered as a whole, section 775.084(1)(b) effectuates this objective by providing additional protection from repetitive felony offenders who have previously committed a violent offense. The decision to allow an enhanced sentence after only two felonies, and when only the prior felony is an enumerated violent offense, is a permissible legislative determination which comports with and is rationally related to this statutory purpose, so as to satisfy the requirements of due process.

Id. at 1104.

Petitioner's final challenge to the statute is equally specious, as it is likewise based on a false premise. Petitioner claims that the habitual violent felony offender statute violates state and federal constitutional provisions against double jeopardy because "the enhanced punishment is not for the new offense, to which the statute pays little heed, but instead for the prior, violent felony." Brief of Petitioner at 12. Acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and Florida district courts have rejected similar arguments for the past several decades, Petitioner nevertheless maintains his position, while relying on a concurring opinion from Judge Zehmer in the First District. Petitioner's reliance on an anomalous position, however, cannot resurrect an argument long-dead.

As this Court so aptly stated in Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380 (Fla. 1928):

> 'The propriety of inflicting severer punishment upon old offenders has long been recognized in this Country and in England. They are not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier penalties when they are again convicted.' As was said in People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 17 Am. Rep. 401: 'The punishment for the second [offense] is increased, because by his persistence in the perpetration of crime he [the defendant) has evinced a depravity, which merits a greater punishment, and needs to be restrained by severer penalties than if it were his first offense.' And as was said by Chief Justice Parker in Ross' Case, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 165: 'The punishment is for the last offense committed, and it is rendered more severe in consequence of the situation into which the party had previously brought himself.' The statute does not make it an offense or crime for one to have been convicted more than once. The law simply prescribes a longer sentence for a second or subsequent offense for the reason that the prior convictions taken in connection with the subsequent offense demonstrates the incorrigible and dangerous character of accused thereby establishing the necessity for enhanced restraint. The imposition of such enhanced punishment is not a prosecution of or punishment for the former convictions. The Constitution forbids such action. The enhanced punishment is an incident to the last offense alone. But for that offense it would not be imposed.

Id. at 386 (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (citation omitted)). ~~See also~~ Washington v. Mayo, 91 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 1956); Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1962); Conley v. State, 592 So.2d 723, 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (again rejecting the same argument raised by Petitioner).

As is evident from the sampling of cases cited to above, "[recidivist] statutes are neither new to Florida nor to modern jurisprudence. Recidivist legislation . . . has repeatedly withstood attacks that it violates constitutional rights against ex post facto laws, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, denies defendants equal protection of the law, violates due process or involves double jeopardy." Reynolds, 138 So.2d at 502-03. After a century or more, Petitioner's challenges are no more viable now than **they** were when recidivist statutes were first created. With no new added twist or dimension, Petitioner's arguments must fail. Accordingly, the certified questions should be answered in the negative.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, Respondent respectfully asserts that this Honorable Court should answer the certified questions in the negative.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH
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

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

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Leon County Courthouse, Fourth Floor North, 301 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, this 5th day of June, 1992.

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