

**FILED**

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MAY 25 1994

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

By \_\_\_\_\_  
Chief Deputy Clerk

PETER RICHARD KOSHEL,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

S.C.T. CASE NO.

DCA CASE NO. 93-1966

83765

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW  
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL  
FIFTH DISTRICT

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

JAMES B. GIBSON  
PUBLIC DEFENDER  
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

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ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER  
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OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED:

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## STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On July 16, 1993, the State Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit filed a second amended information charging the petitioner with two counts of aggravated stalking. (R 34-35) On July 14, 1993 the defense filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the stalking statute, Section 784.048, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutionally vague. (R 29-32) The trial judge, the Honorable Jerry T. Lockett, Circuit Judge, entered an order August 2, 1993, dismissing both counts of the second amended information based on his ruling that the term "harass" as used in the stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague. (See appendix to this brief)

The State appealed Judge Lockett's August 2 order to the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (R 67) The parties briefed the issue of the stalking statute's constitutionality and the district court reversed Judge Lockett's order by its decision issued May 20, 1994. (See appendix to this brief) The petitioner filed in the district court a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this court on May 20, 1994.

#### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court's opinion paired this case for review with its earlier decision in Bouters v. State, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D678 (Fla. 5th DCA March 25, 1994), jurisdiction pending no. 83,558 (Fla. 1994). In both Bouters and this case the Fifth District Court held that the stalking statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The petitioner submits that the statute should be held void for vagueness and overbreadth, and that it violates substantive due process in that it sweeps plainly innocent conduct protected by the First Amendment within its broad prohibition. The petitioner requests this court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and to review the Fifth District Court's decision in this case.

## ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE IS PAIRED FOR REVIEW WITH A CASE THAT EXPRESSLY DECLARES A STATE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

The district court in this case reversed per curiam the trial court's order dismissing the information filed in this case, and declaring the term "harass" in the stalking statute unconstitutionally vague. The Fifth District's per curiam opinion in this case consists of a citation to the Fifth District's earlier decision in Bouters v. State, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D678 (Fla. 5th DCA March 25, 1994), jurisdiction pending no. 83,558 (Fla. 1994). In Bouters the Fifth District held that the term "harass" in the stalking statute is not unconstitutionally vague, and that the statute as a whole passes constitutional muster. (See appendix to this brief) The District Court's opinion paired this case for review with Bouters. See Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).

The stalking statute makes it a crime to "willfully and maliciously harass" or to "willfully and maliciously follow" another person. The statute defines "harassment" as a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress in that person and which serves no legitimate purpose. (See Judge Lockett's order in the appendix to this brief) The question of the stalking statute's validity has been litigated in a number of cases statewide. Cf. Pallas v. State, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D988 (Fla. 3rd DCA May 3, 1994) (upholding statute) with State v. Knodel, 1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 542 (Fla. Escambia Cty. Ct.


September 2, 1993) (invalidating statute; "follow" vague) and State v. Caraway, 1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 407 (Fla. Hernando Cty. Ct. May 12, 1993) (invalidating statute; "harass" vague). The petitioner submits that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that it violates substantive due process in that it sweeps plainly innocent conduct protected by the First Amendment within its broad prohibition. The petitioner requests this court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and to review the Fifth District Court's decision in this case.

CONCLUSION

The petitioner requests this court to accept jurisdiction of this case.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES B. GIBSON  
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\_\_\_\_\_  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on Michael Neimand, Ruth Bryan Owen Rhode Building, Dade County Regional Service Center, Suite 921N, 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Miami, Florida 33128, by mail; and mailed to Peter R. Koshel, 849 Turtle Mound Drive, Casselberry, Florida 32707, on this 13<sup>rd</sup> day of May, 1994.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NANCY RYAN  
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

PETER RICHARD KOSHEL,	)	
Petitioner,	)	
vs.	)	S.CT. CASE NO.
STATE OF FLORIDA,	)	DCA CASE NO. 93-1966
Respondent.	)	
_____	)	

A P P E N D I X

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| Order of Judge Jerry T. Lockett dated August 2nd, 1993  | A |
| Opinion of the Fifth District Court of Appeal dated May 20, 1994                                | B |
| <u>Scott Bouters v. State of Florida</u> , 19 Fla. L. Weekly S678 (Fla. 5th DCA March 25, 1994) | C |

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH  
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LAKE  
COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO. 93-428-CF-JL

STATE OF FLORIDA,

vs.

PETER RICHARD KOSHEL,

Defendant.

AUG 2 4 52 PM '93

ORDER

This matter presents for consideration an alleged tension between the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Florida Statute 784.048, the anti-stalking statute.<sup>1</sup>

FACTS

A sparse record indeed is presented for review herein. Sworn testimony was taken during a hearing on the States' Motion To Revoke Bond and a Traverse and Demurrer has been filed. Defendant is charged with violation of both sections (3) and (4) of Florida Statute 784.048 and is free on bond. It appears that there exists a business and personal dispute between defendant and the victim. Defendant contends his contacts with

<sup>1</sup> This court is aware of the doctrine that courts should avoid holding a statute unconstitutional if a fair construction of the legislation will allow, and that this duty extends to avoid ruling that a statute is unconstitutional if the case can be resolved in another matter. State v. Williams, 584 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). This court denied defendant's Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4) motion based upon the Traverse and Demurrer filed by the State. Nevertheless, the term "harasses" alleged to be unconstitutional is found in both Counts I and II of the Second Amended Information and must be addressed herein. c.f. f.n.3.

the victim, both before and after the various injunctions entered in the companion civil case #93-578-CA-01, have been strictly of a business nature. The victim and law enforcement maintain the defendant has harassed and threatened the victim, stating he will "love her to death", "waste" her, and that "she will get what she deserves." There is no evidence that defendant has "followed" the victim, but rather all allegations of statutory violation involve alleged spoken threats.

#### LAW

Defendant launches several attacks upon Florida Statute 784.048. Only one deserves discussion. It is argued that the definition of the term "Harasses" found in section (1)(a) of 784.048 Fla. Statute is facially vague and over-broad and that since this term is incorporated in both sections (3) and (4), which defendant is charged with violating, the Second Amended Information should be dismissed.

The defendant asserts that this definition invokes a concept of the "subjective victim" which is abhorrent to our jurisprudence of criminal law. We are told that to prohibit by criminal sanctions conduct directed at a specific person "that causes substantial emotional distress in such person (emphasis supplied) and serves no legitimate purpose" is tantamount to introducing the concept of the "eggshell plaintiff" from tort law into the criminal law as the concept of the "eggshell victim." A constitutional analysis ensues.

In McKenney v. State, 388 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 1980) there is found a three-fold analysis for use in examining a vagueness

and over-breadth challenge to a criminal statute:

1. The statute cannot infringe upon constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms of expression and association;

2. The statute must be phrased so that persons of common intelligence have adequate notice as to the nature of the proscribed conduct, and;

3. The statute may not be worded so loosely that it leads to arbitrary and selective enforcement by vesting undue discretion as to its scope in those who prosecute.

The State attempts to defend the statute on several grounds. First, it maintains the eggshell victim is not new to the criminal law and directs us to the "assault" statutes. However, a careful reading of the "assault" definition in the statutes and the jury instructions reveals otherwise.

Secondly, the State maintains that the language "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly" which precedes "harasses" in both sections 784.084(3) and 784.084(4) of the statute somehow cures the vagueness. This is simply without merit.

Next, it is argued that since the language "... and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury"<sup>2</sup> in section 784.084(3) is joined with "harasses" this cures the vagueness defect. However, this language is not a modifier or a further definition of "harasses", but defines additional activity required to be

<sup>2</sup> Here, interestingly, we find the objective standard of the criminal law: in "reasonable fear."

proved.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, the nub of the State's position is reached as it examines the void for vagueness test as applied. The resolution of the issue presented is dependent upon the method of constitutional analysis applied.

The defendant argues that the analysis involves a straight one, two, three application of the McKenney, supra, analysis. That is, a facial attack on the statute as void for vagueness is permitted if the statute infringes upon protected First Amendment freedom of expression. Then the language of the statute itself, without regard to the defendant's actual conduct or speech,

is examined with regard to prongs two and three of the analysis.

The State seems to urge that the Court should examine the defendant's actual conduct or speech before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law, citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed 2d 362 (1981). However, Hoffman instructs otherwise. 71 L.Ed 2d at 369. The first task is to determine whether the enactment (statute) reaches a substantial amount

<sup>3</sup> It is noted that in both sections the language "follows or harasses" is used. In a proper case a charge of "follows" etc. coupled with the "credible threat" language could save section 784.084(3). Query the result as to section 784.084(4) where this language is not found. Since there is no factual allegation in this case that the defendant has "followed" the victim, the doctrine of "severability" announced in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137 So.2d 828, 830 (Fla. 1962) has been applied in the result herein. c.f. State v. Cuda, 18 F.L.W. D 1612 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) for an enlightening discussion by Judge Peterson of this issue in a similar context.

of constitutionally protected conduct. Certainly that test is met in this case. At stake is defendant's fundamental freedom of expression, which he maintains involves business dealings and personal conversation. Any speech, no matter how innocuous, may cause distress in the hypersensitive victim embodied in the statute's subjective personae.

If the answer to the above question is "no"<sup>4</sup> then, and only then, do we examine defendant's statements in this particular case. We do not reach this point in this analysis.

It is clear that on its face a portion of Florida Statute 784.048 is unconstitutionally vague. The subjective standard contained in the definition of "Harasses" is impermissibly vague.<sup>5</sup> No citizen of this state should be required to comport his or her conduct or speech to the "hypersensitive victim." No person of common intelligence can know when this victim may be encountered. No law enforcement agent will feel bound in any given case by any standard of victim sensitivity.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that this court is well aware of the very real societal problem involved in the stalking scenario. Death may result; lives may be ruined. Not only women may be victims. Male teachers, and judges, and others, may be


<sup>4</sup> That is: Does this statute infringe upon protected First Amendment freedom of expression?

<sup>5</sup> The attempt to save the statute by insertion of the language "and serves no legitimate purpose" in section (1)(a) fails. K.L.J. v. State, 581 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Can harassment ever serve a legitimate purpose, as one understands the common meaning of the term?

victims. The solution to a social problem is not overreaction by unconstitutional legislation. The simple solution to this legislative creation, in this court's opinion, is to remove the subjective test of emotional distress from the "Harasses" definition and to insert the objective test of the reasonable person which the criminal law has asked juries to apply for over one hundred years.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted and Counts I and II of the Second Amended Information, as to the allegations of "or harass", are dismissed.<sup>6</sup>

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Tavares, Lake County, Florida, this 2nd day of August, 1993.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JERRY T. LOCKETT, Circuit Judge

<sup>6</sup> It is to be noted that this decision does not leave the victim in this case unprotected. She has in full force and effect an Injunction for Protection which, if it has been or may be violated, can be enforced by the contempt power of the issuing court. The defendant can be sentenced to six (6) months in jail for each violation.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was furnished by Hand Delivery this *2nd* day of August, 1993 to DIANE DIPIETRO, Assistant State Attorney and WILLIAM H. STONE, Assistant Public Defender.

*Robin R. Manchester*  
Judicial Assistant



IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA  
FIFTH DISTRICT

JANUARY TERM 1994

✓ 93-717  
UR

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

CASE NO.: 93-1966 ✓

PETER RICHARD KOSHEL,

Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1994 ✓

Appeal from the Circuit Court  
for Lake County,  
Jerry T. Lockett, Judge.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General,  
Tallahassee, Michael J. Niemand, Assistant  
Attorney General, and Parker D. Thomson and  
Carol A. Licko, Special Assistant Attorneys  
General, Miami, for Appellant.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy  
Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach,  
for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

REVERSED. See Bouters v. State, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D678 (Fla. 5th DCA  
March 25, 1994).

COBB, SHARP, W. and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL THE TIME EXPIRES  
TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND,  
IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.

RECEIVED

MAY 26 1994

PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE  
7th CIR. APP. DIV.

State to be sentenced under the guidelines was involved. We find the distinction significant.

We find that procedurally, the facts of the instant case are identical to those in *State v. Hogan*, 611 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). In *Hogan*, the defendant initially received a downward departure sentence negotiated and agreed to by the state. Hogan violated his probation, and when it was revoked, he was placed on a new and extended probation which was again a downward departure. The trial court's judgment did not set forth any written reasons supporting the downward departure from the guidelines. In affirming the trial court, the Fourth District stated:

This court has held that the state's prior stipulation to a downward departure is a valid ground supporting a subsequent sentence below the guidelines. *State v. Devine*, 512 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA), *rev. denied*, 519 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1987). Additionally, section 948.06(1), Fla.Stat. (1991) authorizes a trial court, in sentencing following a violation of probation, to impose "any sentence which it might originally have imposed before placing the probationer on probation . . ."

*Id.* at 79. We concur. Of course, the trial judge could have sentenced Glover under the guidelines if he believed the facts surrounding the violation so justified. We believe *Hogan* is sound public policy because it gives trial judges greater flexibility when dealing with the many variables involved in violation hearings.

However, in light of the constraints of section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1993), we must remand with instructions to allow Glover credit for time previously served on community control for these offenses. See *State v. Ogden*, 605 So. 2d 155, 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

Sentence REVERSED and REMANDED with directions. (DAUKSCH, J., concurs. HARRIS, C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion.)

HARRIS, C. J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.) While I agree that *State v. Ogden*, 605 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) requires reversal, I dissent from that portion of the opinion that permits the trial court to depart based on a previous negotiated plea.

I agree that the majority opinion is consistent with *State v. Hogan*, 611 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); however, because I disagree with *Hogan*, I must dissent from the majority.

But for the negotiated plea arrived at during the initial appearance of this case in the system, unquestionably the sentencing judge, upon the finding of a violation of probation, would be required to sentence within the guideline range or give a written, acceptable reason for departure.

Rule 3.701(b)(6), Rules of Criminal Procedures, provides:

While the sentencing guidelines are designed to aid the judge in the sentencing decision and are not intended to usurp judicial discretion, departures from the presumptive sentence established in the guidelines shall be articulated in writing and made when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the aggravation or mitigation of the sentence. (Emphasis added.)

Regardless of the internal inconsistency of the preamble clause and the underlined portion of the above provision, judges are directed to deviate only for reasonable circumstances or factors.

While it is reasonable to depart based on a negotiated plea at the initial sentencing, is it reasonable to use that original agreement which was clearly limited in time and condition, to justify future departures after the defendant has proved himself unable or unwilling to comply with the conditions that prompted the State to agree in the first instance?

To me, the answer is clearly no. Consider the facts of this case. Glover was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery. The State permitted him to plead to attempted sexual battery but with the condition that "there will be restraints on Mr. Glover and he will get counseling . . ." The court included in its original order placing Glover on community control the

provision that "you will continue with mental health counseling and evaluation."

In the violation report, the officer advises the court:

While the subject's attitude has not been rude, his compliant behavior can best be described as minimal. It is unclear to this officer whether the subject is truly "slow", or whether he is a typical sex offender waiting on the right moment. The Florida Department of Corrections has afforded the subject several opportunities to maintain an acceptable level of compliance. In the four months since his release from incarceration he has avoided mental health counseling. He lied to this officer in order to move to another county. He manipulated a situation bringing a three year child into his residence, and he has been found away from his new residence on two occasions in less than a week after relocating to Seminole County.

It is simply not reasonable to construe the State's original agreement to a downward departure as justifying a subsequent downward departure after Glover has breached a key condition of the agreement. It should be stated that the trial judge did not indicate that he was relying on the original negotiated plea to justify the departure. In fact, he gave no reason at all. The majority infers that since *Hogan* permits a downward departure on this basis, we will assume that the trial judge relied on *Hogan*. Perhaps he did.

*Hogan* relies, I believe, on an improper interpretation of that portion of section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes, (1991), which permits the sentencing judge in sentencing one who has violated probation to impose "any sentence which it might originally have imposed before placing the probationer on probation." [Emphasis added.] *Hogan* interprets this to mean that if the court had a valid reason for departure prior to originally placing the defendant on probation, it can use that original reason, regardless of new circumstances or conditions, for departure when the defendant is up for sentencing for the violation. Notice, however, that in section 948.06(1), the legislature recognized the distinction between a "sentence" and the "placing" of the defendant on probation. The legislature recognized that probation is not a sentence; it merely defers sentencing. This makes it clear that, by enacting section 948.06(1), the legislature did not intend to authorize the court to use an outdated negotiated plea agreement as a basis for departing from the guidelines. The legislature was merely emphasizing that the previous probation (deferring of sentence) would not restrict the trial court from imposing any appropriate sentence that it could have initially imposed when it finally decides to sentence the defendant.

I would reverse for sentencing within the guidelines.

\* \* \*

#### Criminal law—Aggravated stalking—Statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad

SCOTT BOUTERS, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. 5th District. Case No. 93-504. Opinion filed March 25, 1994. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Richard F. Conrad, Judge. James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and S. C. Van Voorhees, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Michael J. Neimand, Assistant Attorney General, Parker D. Thomson, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Carol A. Licko, Special Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Appellee.

(PER CURIAM.) The appellant, Scott Bouters, was charged with the offense of aggravated stalking pursuant to section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), known as the Florida Stalking Law. He moved to dismiss on the ground that such statute is facially unconstitutional because of vagueness and overbreadth. Following denial of that motion, he pled nolo contendere and then filed the instant appeal. Without belaboring the issue, we find the aforesaid statute to be facially constitutional, and basically agree with the analysis of that statute as found in *State v. Pallas*, 1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 442 (Fla. 11th Cir. June 9, 1993). In respect to the argument that the definition of the word "harasses" in subsection (1)(a) of the statute is vague because of

the nonspecific term "serves no legitimate purpose," we agree with the analysis in *State v. Bossie*, 1 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 465, 466 (Fla. Brevard County Ct. June 22, 1993), that the statute, read in its entirety, renders that particular phrase superfluous, hence, harmless.

AFFIRMED. (DAUKSCH, COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.)

\* \* \*

**Criminal law—Lewd acts upon a child—Sexual activity with child—Evidence—Hearsay—Testimony regarding statements made to witnesses by child victim was not hearsay where child victim had testified and been cross-examined and where testimony was admitted to rebut inference that victim did not disclose abuse, that disclosure of abuse was at later time than that to which victim testified, and that victim's testimony was recent fabrication—No error to admit testimony without hearing outside presence of jury—Any error in admission of testimony of child's victim's aunt and uncle that victim would awake screaming during night was harmless—Jury instructions—Trial court's refusal to give jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as defense to primary charges although instruction was given as to lesser included offenses—Issue not preserved for appellate review where defendant did not request instruction as to primary offenses in trial court—Affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication does not extend to general intent crimes**

JERRY DEAN BELCHER, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. 5th District. Case No. 92-1653. Opinion filed March 25, 1994. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, Belvin Perry, Jr., Judge, Kirk N. Kirkconnell and David A. Henson of Kirkconnell, Lindsey & Snure, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

(THOMPSON, J.) Jerry Dean Belcher appeals his convictions on 12 counts of lewd acts upon a child<sup>1</sup> and one count of sexual activity with a child.<sup>2</sup> Belcher was sentenced to 17 years in the Department of Corrections on the charge of sexual activity with a child and 12 years on each count of lewd acts upon a child, all sentences to run concurrently. We affirm the convictions and the sentences.

#### FACTS

Belcher was arrested on 10 February 1992 after his minor daughter reported that he had engaged in sexual improprieties with her from June 1989 through August 1990. The state presented testimony from six witnesses relevant to this appeal: the victim, Belcher's daughter; her friend; her friend's mother; her aunt; her uncle; and, a physician from the Child Protection Team. The child testified that Belcher had fondled her vaginal area approximately once per month for five months beginning in January of 1989. She then testified that he progressed to a monthly fondling of her breasts and vaginal area during most of the following months between June 1989 and June 1990. His acts culminated in frequent digital penetration of her vagina in May, June and July of 1990 and ended with an act of simulated sexual intercourse on 4 August 1990. The last act prompted her to move into her aunt and uncle's home.

She testified that she had told her friend and her friend's mother about Belcher's actions, when they occurred, but no one else. She also testified that she told her aunt and uncle what happened. The final witness presented by the state was a doctor from the Child Protection Team who testified as to the child's physical condition after a medical examination. He testified that the child had small "notches" in the hymenal tissue consistent with repeated digital penetration and not consistent with an injury done by a tampon.

Prior to the trial beginning, Belcher moved to exclude hearsay statements made by the victim to other witnesses and that the state be required to proffer any possible hearsay statements outside the jury's presence because these statements would not qualify as early outcry, pursuant to section 90.803(1), (2) or (3) Florida Statutes (1991). The state agreed to proffer any state-

ments before they were admitted. During the trial, however, the court allowed the witnesses to testify to statements made to them by the victim about Belcher's behavior. There was no proffer made outside the presence of the jury. The defense objected repeatedly to this testimony.

The defense also objected to testimony from the victim's aunt that after the victim came to live with them, she would awake in the night screaming "Daddy, get away from me. Daddy, don't do that. Stop." The defense objected to this testimony as hearsay and irrelevant to any legitimate issue in the case. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the witness to testify. Although the defendant requested a proffer outside the presence of the jury, again, the request was denied. Belcher elected not to put on any witnesses or evidence after the state rested its case.

On appeal, Belcher argues that the requested instruction on voluntary intoxication should have been given as to all counts, although he only requested the instruction for the lesser included offenses of battery and assault at trial. The trial court did give the instruction to the lesser included offenses. Belcher argues this court should determine that the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication should have been given as to all counts. Belcher was convicted and timely appeals.

#### POINTS ON APPEAL

Belcher raises three issues for appellate review. The first issue concerns the admissibility of hearsay evidence without a proffer being offered outside the presence of the jury in derogation of section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1991). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing the victim's aunt to testify that the victim screamed in the night and to the words she screamed. The final point on appeal is whether the trial court erred in limiting the defendant's requested jury instructions on the affirmative defenses of voluntary intoxication to only the lesser included offenses of battery and assault instead of to all counts.

#### A. THE VICTIM'S PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

The Florida supreme court in *Pardo v. State*, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992) and *State v. Kopko*, 596 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1992), held that a child's hearsay statements may be admissible when the statements qualify under the statutory exception of section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1991). However, the trial court must weigh the reliability and the probative value of the statements against the danger that the statements may unfairly prejudice the defendant, confuse the issues, mislead the jury or result in the presentation of needless cumulative evidence. Thus, the state may present hearsay testimony as long as the balancing test of *Pardo* and *Kopko* has been met.

In this case, it is conceded that the trial court did not conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury as required by section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1991). The state argues, however, that the statements were not hearsay and that the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the defendant abused the victim. The statements by the four witnesses were offered to rebut the inference that the victim did not disclose the abuse or that the disclosure of the abuse was at a later time than that to which the victim testified. The trial court ruled that the testimony of the four witnesses was properly admitted because the testimony was not hearsay. The court ruled that because the defendant had cross-examined the victim and had questioned the victim's veracity, the testimony of the four witnesses regarding prior consistent statements of the victim was offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to show that the victim reported the abuse to friends and family contemporaneously with the abuse occurring. This testimony is not hearsay.<sup>3</sup> The testimony was not hearsay under section 90.801(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) which provides:

(2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is: