IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

v.

ERNEST COLEMAN,

Respondent.

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

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LORIDA SID J. WHITE NOV! 28 19941 CLERK, SUPREME COURT By Chief Deputy Clerk

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CASE NO: 5th DCA No.: 93-2403

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Respondent pled guilty to two counts of sale of cocaine and two counts of possession of cocaine. He signed a plea form that stated that a hearing may be set to determine if he qualified as an habitual offender and that he understood that he could be subject to a maximum sentence of 80 years imprisonment with no eligibility for basic gain time if found by the judge to be a He affirmatively indicated at his plea habitual offender. hearing that he read the written agreement before he signed it, that he had an adequate opportunity to ask questions of his attorney about the agreement, and that he understood the Respondent was sentenced as an habitual offender to agreement. six years imprisonment followed by three years probation on count one, three years consecutive probation on count two and three years probation on each of counts three and four concurrent with The Fifth District Court of Appeal vacated the count two. habitual offender sentences and remanded for resentencing citing Thompson v. State, 638 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), Santoro v. State, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2302 (October 28, 1994) and Cole v. State, 640 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The State then filed a Notice To Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction of this Court based on express and direct conflict with a decision of this Court.

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The opinion issued in the instant case by the Fifth District Court of Appeal cites <u>Thompson</u>, <u>infra</u>, as controlling authority which is currently pending jurisdiction in this Court. This constitutes prima facie express conflict, if accepted, thereby allowing this Court to exercise its jurisdiction.

As additional grounds for jurisdiction, the decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in this case is in express and direct conflict with this Court's decision in <u>Massey</u>, <u>infra</u>. Due to this conflict, this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

THE DECISION IN THIS CASE IS IN EXPRESS AND DIRECT CONFLICT WITH A DECISION FROM THIS COURT.

A district court of appeal per curiam opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the Supreme Court continues to constitute prima facie express conflict and allows the Supreme Court to exercise its jurisdiction. <u>Jollie v. State</u>, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981). The opinion issued in the instant case by the Fifth District Court of Appeal cites <u>Thompson v. State</u>, <u>supra</u>, as controlling authority. (Appendix) <u>Thompson</u> is currently pending jurisdiction in this Court, Florida Supreme Court Case Number 83,951, therefore, if accepted, this Court must exercise its jurisdiction in the instant case.

As additional grounds for jurisdiction, Petitioner asserts that the decision in the instant case is in express and direct conflict with this Court's decision in <u>Massey v. State</u>, 609 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1992). In <u>Massey</u>, this Court held that the State's failure to strictly comply with the statute requiring that notice of the state's intention to have the defendant sentenced as an habitual offender be served upon the defendant, may be reviewed under the harmless error analysis. In that case, the State's error in failing to serve actual notice to the defendant was harmless where the defendant and his attorney had actual notice of the State's intention.

In the instant case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed Respondent's sentence relying on <u>Thompson</u>, <u>supra</u>. The

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instant decision is in express and direct conflict with <u>Massey</u>, <u>supra</u>, because the Fifth District failed to apply a harmless error analysis. As in <u>Massey</u>, the Respondent had actual notice of the possible consideration of habitual offender sanctions.

At the time of entering his plea, Respondent signed a plea agreement which provided for the maximum sentence should he be determined by the Judge to be an habitual offender as well as the consequences of such a sentence. Respondent affirmatively indicated at his plea hearing that he read the agreement, had an adequate opportunity to ask questions of his attorney about the agreement, and that he understood the agreement. Because Respondent had actual notice of the possibility of a habitual offender sentence before he entered his plea, the protections afforded by Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993), were provided to him, and any error in failing to provide formal written notice of habitualization was harmless. The Fifth District erred in failing to apply a harmless error analysis as outlined in Massey, infra.

The Fifth District's decision in the instant case is in express and direct conflict with this Court's decision in <u>Massey</u>, <u>infra</u>. This honorable court should exercise its jurisdiction in this case and resolve the conflict between the two cases.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments and authorities presented herein, Petitioner respectfully requests this honorable court exercise its jurisdiction in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Jurisdictional Brief has been furnished by delivery to Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, 112-A Orange Avenue, Daytona Beach, FL, 32114, this Brief day of November, 1994.

Robin Compton Jones Assistant Attorney General

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STATE OF FLORIDA,

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CASE NO.

5th DCA Case No. 93-2403

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Respondent.

_____/

APPENDIX

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 1994

ERNEST COLEMAN,

Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Opinion filed November 10, 1994

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County, John W. Watson, III, Judge.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We vacate the habitual offender sentences imposed in this case and remand this cause for resentencing. <u>See Santoro v. State</u>, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2302 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 28, 1994); <u>Thompson v. State</u>, 638 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). <u>See also Cole v. State</u>, 640 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Sentences VACATED; cause REMANDED.

PETERSON, DIAMANTIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

CASE NO. 93-2403 L-C+ # 93-323 ATTORNEY USAGA 94 HOV 14 AN 9: 00 EXECUTION BEACH, FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL THE TIME EXPIRES

TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND,

IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.