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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

By _____
Chief Deputy Clerk

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

v.

CASE NO: *84 879*
5th DCA No.: 94-35

CHARLES MAXWELL,

Respondent.

_____ /

ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM
THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Respondent pled guilty to possession of altered property and sale of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school. He signed a plea form that stated that a hearing may be set to determine if he qualified as an habitual offender and that he understood that he could be subject to a maximum sentence of one year for the possession of altered property and life for the sale of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school with no eligibility for basic gain time if found by the judge to be an habitual offender. He affirmatively indicated at his plea hearing that he read the written agreement before he signed it, that he had an adequate opportunity to ask questions of his attorney about the agreement, and that he understood the agreement. Respondent was sentenced as an habitual offender to seven years imprisonment followed by ten years probation for the sale of cocaine offense and 364 days in jail for the misdemeanor conviction. The Fifth District Court of Appeal vacated the habitual offender sentences and remanded for resentencing citing Santoro v. State, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2302 (October 28, 1994), Thompson v. State, 638 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) and Cole v. State, 640 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The State then filed a Notice To Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction of this Court based on express and direct conflict with a decision of this Court.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The opinion issued in the instant case by the Fifth District Court of Appeal cites Santoro, infra, and Thompson, infra as controlling authority. Santoro is currently pending jurisdiction in this Court and Thompson is currently pending review. This constitutes prima facie express conflict, if accepted, thereby allowing this Court to exercise its jurisdiction.

As additional grounds for jurisdiction, the decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in this case is in express and direct conflict with this Court's decision in Massey, infra. Due to this conflict, this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

THE DECISION IN THIS CASE IS IN
EXPRESS AND DIRECT CONFLICT WITH A
DECISION FROM THIS COURT.

A district court of appeal per curiam opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the Supreme Court continues to constitute prima facie express conflict and allows the Supreme Court to exercise its jurisdiction. Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981). The opinion issued in the instant case by the Fifth District Court of Appeal cites Santoro v. State, supra, and Thompson v. State, as controlling authority. (Appendix) Santoro is currently pending jurisdiction in this Court, Florida Supreme Court Case Number _____, Fifth DCA Number 93-2404, and Thompson is pending review in this Court, Florida Supreme Court Case Number 83, 951, therefore, if accepted, this Court must exercise its jurisdiction in the instant case.

As additional grounds for jurisdiction, Petitioner asserts that the decision in the instant case is in express and direct conflict with this Court's decision in Massey v. State, 609 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1992). In Massey, this Court held that the State's failure to strictly comply with the statute requiring that notice of the state's intention to have the defendant sentenced as an habitual offender be served upon the defendant, may be reviewed under the harmless error analysis. In that case, the State's error in failing to serve actual notice to the defendant was harmless where the defendant and his attorney had actual notice of the State's intention.

In the instant case, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed Respondent's sentence relying on Santoro, supra and Thompson, supra. The instant decision is in express and direct conflict with Massey, supra, because the Fifth District failed to apply a harmless error analysis. As in Massey, the Respondent had actual notice of the possible consideration of habitual offender sanctions.

At the time of entering his plea, Respondent signed a plea agreement which provided for the maximum sentence should he be determined by the Judge to be an habitual offender as well as the consequences of such a sentence. Respondent affirmatively indicated at his plea hearing that he read the agreement, had an adequate opportunity to ask questions of his attorney about the agreement, and that he understood the agreement. Because Respondent had actual notice of the possibility of a habitual offender sentence before he entered his plea, the protections afforded by Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993), were provided to him, and any error in failing to provide formal written notice of habitualization was harmless. The Fifth District erred in failing to apply a harmless error analysis as outlined in Massey, infra.


The Fifth District's decision in the instant case is in express and direct conflict with this Court's decision in Massey, infra. This honorable court should exercise its jurisdiction in this case and resolve the conflict between the two cases.

CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments and authorities presented herein, Petitioner respectfully requests this honorable court exercise its jurisdiction in this case.

Respectfully submitted,


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Jurisdictional Brief has been furnished by delivery to Kenneth Witts, Assistant Public Defender, 112-A Orange Avenue, Daytona Beach, FL, 32114, this 14th day of December, 1994.


Robin Compton Jones
Assistant Attorney General

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner,

v.

CASE NO.

5th DCA Case No. 94-35

CHARLES MAXWELL,

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APPENDIX

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT

JULY TERM 1994

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94-055
CIB

CHARLES MAXWELL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL THE TIME EXPIRES
TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND,
IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.

CASE NO. 94-35

Opinion filed November 18, 1994

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Volusia County,
John W. Watson, III, Judge.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender,
and Kenneth Witts,
Assistant Public Defender,
Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Belle B. Turner,
Assistant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We vacate the habitual offender sentence imposed in this case
and remand this cause for resentencing. See Santoro v. State, 19
Fla. L. Weekly D2302 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 28, 1994); Thompson v.
State, 638 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). See also Cole v. State,
640 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Sentence VACATED; cause REMANDED.

PETERSON and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents without opinion.

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FIFTH DISTRICT
DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA