No: 96,044

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

NOVEMBER TERM 1999

FILED DEBBIE CAUSSEAUX

NOV 1 7 1999

BOOKER BIRDSONG, JR.,

Petitioner,

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Third District Court of Appeal for the State of Florida

SECOND
AMENDED BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

Respectfully submitted,

Booker Birdsong, Jr., pro se

Reg. No. 42831-004

Federal Corrections Institution

P.O. Box 979137

Miami, Florida 33197

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

There are no other parties who have an interest in the just resolution of this cause than those listed in the caption of the case.

CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE

The foregoing brief is formulated with 10-point Courier type, a font that is not proportionately spaced.

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Mandate of the Third District Court of Appeal

sending the case down to the lower tribunal

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

E. C.

On August 11, 1986, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of robbery and was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment; case number 86-9201. The circuit court entered judgment and then remanded Petitioner to the custody of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner fully served his sentence of imprisonment.

On February 17, 1998, Petitioner sought a writ of error coram nobis, which was subsequently denied on May 8, 1999. 2/ A timely notice of appeal was filed. Following a period of approximately eight months from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal, absent an acknowledgment of the notice of appeal, Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus in the appellate court.

The Third District Court of Appeal, in a per curiam opinion "affirm[ed] the denial of defendant's motion for postconviction relief and den[ied] both his Petition for

^{1/} Petitioner initially raised the following grounds:
(1) that his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered into; (2) that he did not understand the consequences of his plea. As a result of the procedural bar, Petitioner has usurped an issue in his attempt to demonstrate that the procedural bar under §3.850(b) is improper. (This issue is, of course, the first claim for relief).

^{2/} Rather obscurely the circuit court entered a second order on June 19, 1998 denying Petitioner's common law petition. The court then failed to grant an appeal which led to the request for mandamus.

Writ of Error Coram Nobis and his Petition for Writ of Mandamus." (Opinion order, May 19, 1999, (A-1 at 1, 2)). The appellate court found that "laches may bar claim for postconviction relief," quoting Smith v. State, 506 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) and that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure §3.850(b) imposes a two-year limitation period for the timely filing of postconviction motions, which Petitioner cannot satisfy. The appellate court's decision is final, in that a timely petition for rehearing was denied on June 16, 1999. (A-2).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- 1. WHETHER FLORIDA COURTS ARE MISINTERPRETING FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §3.850(b) AS BEING SO BROAD AS TO TIME BAR OR GIVE RISE TO LACHES WITH RESPECT TO A "PETITION" FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS FILED ON BEHALF OF A LITIGANT WHO IS NOT "IN CUSTODY" AS REQUIRED UNDER §3.850(a)'s JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME?
- 2. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXPLAIN OR ADVISE PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS BEFORE ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEA IN CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 86-9201, AS MANDATED UNDER BOYKIN V. ALABAMA, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), AND WHETHER PETITIONER EFFECTIVELY WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS ABSENT AN "ON THE RECORD" EXPLANATION OR ADVISEMENT?

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court should grant the writ of certiorari and thereafter cause a writ of habeas corpus to issue pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(9) of the Florida Constitution, in that, prior to the decision in Wood v. State, 24 Fla.L.Weekly &240 (Fla. May 27, 1999), the Petitioner's ancient common law writ of error petition was the appropriate As he is no longer "in custody," (at least not remedy. physical custody) and the ancient writ of error has been abolished Wood), his claim that his (federally (via protected) Sixth Amendment right --as explained in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) -- has been denied, states a valid cause for the issuance of habeas corpus. Article I, Section 13. ("Habeas corpus"), Fla. Const.; Article I, Section 9. ("Due process"), Fla. Const.; Article I, Section 16.(a) ("Rights of accused..."). Further the Court recognizes, under oath [see, Article VI, Section 3. ("Oath...'I do solemnly swear...that I will protect and defend the Constitution of the United States...'")], that the denial of a federally protected right is no mere trifle, but rather tests the intellectual honesty of those who are charged with enforcing our great Constitution, regarding it above personal preferences, political motivations, and the ever increasingly dishonest notions of good social policy.

In reliance upon the clear and convincing argument that Petitioner was denied three specifically enumerated rights, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is correctly and succinctly stated that a remedy in the nature of habeas corpus must lie.

ISSUE ONE

WHETHER FLORIDA COURTS ARE MISINTERPRETING
FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE \$3.850(b)

AS BEING SO BROAD AS TO TIME BAR OR GIVE
RISE TO LACHES WITH RESPECT TO A "PETITION"

FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS FILED ON BEHALF
OF A LITIGANT WHO IS NOT "IN CUSTODY" AS
REQUIRED UNDER \$3.850(a)'S JURISDICTIONAL
SCHEME?

On May 27, 1999, this Court in <u>Wood v. State</u>, 24 Fla.L. Weekly S240 (Fla. May 27, 1999,) had occasion to abolish the common law writ of error coram nobis. To accomplish the abolition of the ancient writ, the requirements for habeas corpus relief (i.e., Rule 3.850), were drastically altered.

A petitioner who now seeks habeas relief in the State of Florida will be (or so it appears) allowed a two year grace period running from the date of the opinion in <u>Wood</u>. See e.g., Fla.R.Crim.P. §3.850(b) (computing time limitations period). Since the ancient writ of error coram nobis has now been formally abolished, the grace period is wholly appropriate and should apply in this case as well.

Petitioner's cases in the lower tribunals centered and indeed hinged on the application of the ancient writ of

error, which is now nonexistent. Fortunately, this Court hath the power to remand this cause to the circuit court for a timely determination under Rule 3.850, or in its sound discretion, to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(9). Certiorari for a nonexistent remedy is not appropriate, but under <u>Wood</u> this Court may cause the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE TWO

WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO EXPLAIN OR ADVISE PETITIONER OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS BEFORE
ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEA IN CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER
86-9201, AS MANDATED UNDER BOYKIN V. ALABAMA,
395 U.S. 238 (1969), AND WHETHER PETITIONER
EFFECTIVELY WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND PROTECTIONS ABSENT AN "ON THE RECORD"
EXPLANATION OR ADVISEMENT?

The issue herein presented asks this Court to determine two factors: (1) If the Petitioner has sufficiently met his threshold burden of demonstrating noncompliance with the requirements of Boykin, and (2) if under federal standards Petitioner effectively waived his constitutional rights. The question of an effective waiver of a constitutional right, is, of course, governed by federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-243.

In <u>Boykin</u>, the United States Supreme Court specifically enumerated the constitutional rights which courts <u>must</u> explain to a defendant in the taking of a proper plea:

Several constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of quilty is entered in a state criminal trial. The first is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 Amendment. Second is the right to trial by (1974).Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 jury. (1968). Third is the right to confront one's Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 accusers. (1965)

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. "We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record."

Id., at 243 (underscoring added).

Petitioner Birdsong's claim, as in <u>Boykin</u>, denotes that there is no transcript of the proceedings, meaning that the constitutional rights were not effectively waived on the record. Under the standard set in <u>Fox v. Kelso</u>, 911 F.2d 563, 570 (11th Cir. 1990), coupled with <u>Boykin</u>, this Court may exercise jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, and the Court's decision in <u>Wood v. State</u>, (citation omitted), jurisdiction has been established. It is respectfully prayed that this Court will cause the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to vacate the conviction, or remand this cause to the lower tribunal for further proceedings under Rule 3.850, or any other relief as is deemed appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Booker Birdsong, Jr., pro se

Reg. No. 42831-004

Federal Correction Institution

P.O. Box 979137

Miami, Florida 33197

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 14th day of November 1999, in accordance with this Court's November 5, 1999 order (which was received on November 9, 1999), the Second Amended Brief on Jurisdiction was delivered to prison authorities for forwarding, and served upon the Respondent of Record:

Office of the Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs, RiverGate Plaza, 444 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida 33131.

Respectfully submitted,

Booker Birdsong, Jr., pro se

Reg. No. 42831-004

Federal Correction Institution

P.O. Box 979137

Miami, Florida 33197

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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

THIRD DISTRICT

JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1999

BOOKER BIRDSONG, JR.,

**

Appellant,

** CASE NOS. 98-3325

98-1935

vs.

**

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

** LOWER

TRIBUNAL NO. 86-9201

Appellee.

**

Opinion filed May 19, 1999.

Case No. 98-3325: An Appeal under Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(i) from the Circuit Court for Dade County, and Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, Barbara S. Levenson, Judge.

Case No. 98-1935: On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Circuit Court for Dade County, Barbara S. Levenson, Judge.

Booker Birdsong, Jr., in proper person.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before NESBITT, JORGENSON, and LEVY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the denial of defendant's motion for postconviction

relief, and deny both his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and his Petition for Writ of Mandamus. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (imposing two-year limitation on seeking postconviction relief in noncapital case unless facts on which claim is predicated were unknown to movant or movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence); see also Calloway v. State, 699 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that habeas petition cannot be used to circumvent the limitations period imposed by rule 3.850); Smith v. State, 506 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that laches may bar claim for postconviction relief).

Denial of Motion for Postconviction relief, affirmed;
Petitions for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Mandamus, denied.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

	AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA	
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,	CRIMINAL DIVISION	
Plaintiff,	Judge Barbara S. Levenson	
vs.	_ Case No. 86-9201	
BOOKER BIRDSON,	ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION	
Defendant.	RELIEF	
	defendant's motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to 3.850 and denies the motion without evidentiary hearing on the	
following ground(s),		
XX Motion is not timely	y filed	
XX Motion is legally in	sufficient because	
XX the defenda	ant's proposition of law is unfounded or the law upon which he	
relies is faul	ty, or has changed.	
oath is lega	lly insufficient	
defendant's allegations are refuted by the record (see attached)		
defendant f	ails to state sufficient facts in support of the motion	
motion is du	aplicitous of prior 3.850 motion (s). These grounds were or could	
have been	raised, on direct appeal.	
Other (specify)		
See attached page	:	
The defendant has	thirty (30) days from this date to appeal this ruling.	

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Dade County, Florida this 2 day of May,

1998.

JUDGE BARBARA S. LEVENSON

Copies furnished to:

Booker Birdson, Defendant Office of the State Attorney

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CRIMINAL DIVISION CASE NO: (46-9201

THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff. coller Biedson Defendant. The Court has considered the defendant's -Motion for Wat of Error Conam Robin, and having been fully advised in the premise, the Court rules on the following ground(s): The motion is not timely filed. The motion is legally insufficient because: the defendant's proposition of law is unfounded or the law upon which he relies is faulty, or has changed. the defendant is represented by counsel (motions will only be accepted from counsel). the defendant's is not represented by counsel, but this Court has no jurisdiction. the defendant is not represented by counsel, but motion is not supported by facts motion is duplicitous of prior 3.850 motion(s). These grounds were or could have been raised in prior motion(s). Other (specify) Service d). Your writs of Electron Coccurs Nobis do not claim emons of fact as required by law. (definedant) Petitions 4/28/48 and 5/11/48 and claim enough The Defendant has thirty (30) days from this date to appeal this ruling. DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Dade County, Florida this day of 1997. BOOKER BIRDSON I certify that a copy of this order has been furnished to the Movant, by mail this 19th day of

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

THIRD DISTRICT

JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1999

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1999

BOOKER BIRDSONG, JR.,

Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

** CASE NO. 98-3325 98-1935

** LOWER TRIBUNAL NO. 96-9201

Upon consideration, appellant's motion for rehearing is hereby denied. NESBITT, JORGENSON and LEVY, JJ., concur.

A True Copy

ATTEST:

MARY CAY BI

Appea

cc:

Robert A. Butterworth

/NB

As a second

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CHIEF JUDGE

JOSEPH NESBITT

JAMES R. JORGENSON

GERALD B. COPE, JR.

DAVID L. LEVY

DAVID M. GERSTEN

MARIO P. GODERICH

MELVIA B. GREEN

JOHN G. FLETCHER

ROBERT L. SHEVIN

RODOLFO SORONDO, JR.

JUDGES

ALAN R. SCHWARTZ

A North Atlanta



DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

THIRD DISTRICT
2001 S.W. 117 AVENUE
MIAMI. FLORIDA 33175-1716

TELEPHONE (305) 229-3200

July 2, 1999

RE: Booker Birdsong, Jr. vs. State

CIRCUIT #86-9201

DCA #98-3325, 98-1935

This is to advise you that the mandate in the above styled cause has been issued this date and mailed to Harvey Ruvin, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida.

Very truly yours,

Clerk District Court of Appeal, Third District

MARY CAY BLANKS

KENNETH F. POTTER

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

DOROTHY L. TUTT

ANN E. HEARIN

DEPUTY MARSHAL

CLERK

MCB/kw

co: Booker Birdsong, Jr.; Robert A. Butterworth

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Fla.R.Crim.P. §3,850(a), (b)

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Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure §3.850(a) and (b) provide as follows:

- (a) Grounds for Motion. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by the laws of Florida claiming the right to be released on the ground that the judgment was entered or that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the State of Florida, that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment or to impose the sentence, that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, that the plea was given involuntarily, or that the judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack may move, in the court that entered the judgment or imposed the sentence, to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment or sentence.
- (b) Time Limitations. A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case or more than 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final in a capital case in which a death sentence has been imposed unless it alleges that:
- (1) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or
- (2) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively.

Debbie Causseaux, acting Clerk Supreme Court of Florida

500 SOUTH DUVAL STREET TALLAHASSEE 32399-1927 (850) 488-0125

Mr. Booker Birdsong, Jr. Reg. No. 42831-004 Federal Corrections Institution P. O. Box 979137 Miami, Florida 33197 10/11/99

filed 10/08/99

Booker Birdsong, Jr.

٧.

State of Florida

CASE NO. 96,044

I have this date received the below-listed pleadings or documents:

Briefs filed in this Court must conform to Fla. R. App. P. 9.210. We are enclosing a copy of this rule.

Please amend your petitioner's brief on jurisdiction to include a table of contents; table of citations; certificate of font size; statement of the case and the facts; a summary of argument; argument with regard to each issue; conclusion and certificate of service. Your amended brief shall be served on or before October 21, 1999

Please make reference to the case number in all correspondence and pleadings.

Most cordially,

Dullie Causseaux

Acting Clerk

Supreme Court

ALL PLEADINGS SIGNED BY AN ATTORNEY MUST INCLUDE THE ATTORNEY'S FLORIDA BAR NUMBER.

DC/bdm

cc: Ms. Christine E. Zahralaban

St. Cons. p. S.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

THIRD DISTRICT

JULY TERM, A.D. 1998

JANUARY 8, 1999

BOOKER BIRDSONG JR.,

** CASE NO. 98-03325 98-01935

Petitioner(s), **

vs.

* *

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

** LOWER

TRIBUNAL NO. 86-9201

Respondent(s). *

The petitioner is deemed insolvent and may proceed in forma pauperis for purposes of this cause.

Upon the Court's own motion, it is ordered that the above appeal and petition are hereby consolidated for all appellate purposes under case no. 98-3325.

A True Copy

ATTEST:

MARY CAY BLANKS

Clerk District Court of

Appeal, Third District

Menuty Clerk

cc: Booker Birdsong Jr.

Harvey Ruvin

/AG

Robert A. Butterworth

November 14, 1999

DEBBIE CAUSSEAUX

NOV 1 7 1999

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

Debbie Causseaux, Acting Clerk Supreme Court of Florida 500 South Duval Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927

Attention:

Enclosed is the Second Amended Brief on Jurisdiction, in accordance with this Court's November 5, 1999 order directing that the NOvember 4, 1999 Amended Brie[f] be refiled to reflect a page limit of ten (10) pages.

Respectfully,

Booker Birdsong, Jr., pro se

Reg. No. 42831-004

Federal Correction Institution

P.O. Box 979137

Miami, Florida 33197

DEBBIE CAUSSEAUX, ACTING CLERK Supreme Court of Florida

500 SOUTH DUVAL STREET TALLAHASSEE 32399-1927 (850) 488-0125

Mr. Booker Birdsong, Jr. Reg. No. 42831-004 Federal Corrections Institution P. O. Box 979137 Miami, Florida 33197 11/5/99

filed 11-4-99

Booker Birdsong, Jr.

v.

State of Florida

CASE NO. 96,044

I have this date received the below-listed pleadings or documents:

Your amended brief was filed on November 4, 1999; however, it exceeds the ten (10) page limit. Please amend your brief not to exceed ten pages and resubmit to the Court and serve opposing counsel.

Please make reference to the case number in all correspondence and pleadings.

Most cordially,

Acting Clerk Supreme Court

> ALL PLEADINGS SIGNED BY AN ATTORNEY MUST INCLUDE THE ATTORNEY'S FLORIDA BAR NUMBER.

DC/bdm

cc: Ms. Christine E. Zahralaban