Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC99-60

MARIO VENERO, Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

[August 31, 2000]

PER CURIAM.

We have for review <u>Venero v. State</u>, 741 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), wherein the district court certified conflict with the Second District's decision in <u>Thompson v. State</u>, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), <u>approved</u>, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999), on the issue of standing to challenge chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, on single subject rule grounds. We have jurisdiction. <u>See</u> Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Since the issuance of the Third District's decision below, this Court has resolved the asserted conflict. In <u>Salters v. State</u>, 758 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. 2000), we

conclusively determined that those who seek to challenge the "violent career criminal sentencing provisions enacted by chapter 95-182 have standing to do so if the relevant criminal offense or offenses occurred on or after October 1, 1995, and before May 24, 1997." Thus, consistent with our <u>Salters</u> decision, we determine that because Venero committed the offenses he was convicted of on October 31, 1997, he lacks standing to raise a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-182. Accordingly, we approve the decision below.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal -Certified Direct Conflict

Third District - Case No. 3D98-2037

(Miami-Dade County)

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for Petitioner

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Fredericka Sands, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,

for Respondent