

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

ANDRE SHEFFIELD,

Petitioner,

v.

CASE NO. SC00-720

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____ /

INITIAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS

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APPENDIX TO INITIAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Andre Sheffield was the defendant in the trial court and will be referred to in this brief as "petitioner," "defendant," or by his proper name.

Filed with this brief is an appendix containing a copy of the decision issued by the district court in petitioner's case, *Sheffield v. State*, 25 F.L.W. D754d (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 21, 2000), and other documents pertinent to the case. Reference to the appendix will be by use of the symbol "A" followed by the appropriate page number in parentheses (A-3).

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

As noted in *Sheffield v. State*, 25 F.L.W. D754d (Fla. Mar.

21, 2000), petitioner was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the prison releasee reoffender statute on numerous grounds. The district court rejected this arguments but certified to this Court the same issue previously certified in *Woods v. State*, 740 So.d. 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(A-1).

Notice To Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction was timely filed March 30, 2000 (A-2). By *Order Postponing Decision On Jurisdiction And Briefing Schedule*, the Court requested petitioner to file a brief on the merits.

III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Petitioner was sentenced to prison under the prison releasee reoffender act. In this brief, petitioner argues that the prison releasee reoffender act is unconstitutional. It violates the

single subject and separation powers provisions of the state constitution, and also violates the due process, vagueness, equal protection, and cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.

IV. ARGUMENT

ISSUE I:

THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As noted in *Sheffield*, petitioner was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (A-1). While the district court ruled the

prison releasee reoffender act constitutional, it certified the same question that was certified in *Woods*. In *Woods*, the following question was certified:

DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER
PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION
775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES 1997), VIOLATE
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?

740 So.2d at 25.

Petitioner argues that the certified question should be answered "yes," since the prison releasee reoffender act does violate separation of powers principles. Moreover, petitioner contends the statute is unconstitutional for four additional reasons. The Court has authority and discretion to rule on these additional grounds pursuant to *Trushin v. State*, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1993).

Therefore, in this brief, petitioner contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as a prison releasee reoffender, because Section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997), is unconstitutional on five grounds. Petitioner first contends the statute violates the single subject provisions of Article III, Section 6, Constitution of the State of Florida. Second, petitioner argues the statute violates separation of powers under Article II, Section 3, Constitution of the State of Florida (the certified question). Third, petitioner asserts the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act violates the cruel and/or unusual

punishment provisions contained in the Eighth Amendment, Constitution Of The United States of America, and Article I, Section 17, Constitution of the State of Florida. Fourth, Petitioner argues the statute is void for vagueness under both the state and federal constitutions. Fifth, Petitioner argues the statute violates the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. Petitioner was discuss each of these points separately.

Single Subject Requirement

The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is contained in Section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). The provisions of the Act require sentences of specified terms of years for offenders who commit specified offenses within three years of being released from a state correctional facility. Here, the defendant was charged with robbery, occurring within a three year period of release from prison.

Article III, Section 6, Constitution of the State of Florida provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.

The legislation challenged in this case was passed as Chapter 97-239, Laws Of Florida. It became law without the signature of the Governor on May 30, 1997. Chapter 97-239 created the Prison Release Reoffender Punishment Act and was placed in

section 775.082, Florida Statutes (1997). The new law amended or created Sections 944.705, 947.141, 948.06, 948.01, and 958.14, Florida Statutes (1997). These provisions concern matters ranging from whether a youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department, to when a court may place a defendant on probation or in community control if the person is a substance abuser. See Sections 948.01 and 958.14, Florida Statutes (1997). Other matters included expanding the category of persons authorized to arrest a probationer or person on community control for violation. See Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1997).

The only portion of the legislation that relates to the same subject matter as sentencing prison releasee reoffenders is Section 944.705, Florida Statutes (1997), requiring the Department Of Corrections to notify every inmate of the provisions relating to sentencing if the act is violated within three years of release. None of the other subjects in the act are reasonably connected or related and are not part of a single subject.

In *Bunnell v. State*, 453 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1994), the Court struck an act for containing two subjects. The Court, citing *Kirkland v. Phillips*, 106 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1959), noted that one purpose of the constitutional requirement was to give fair notice concerning the nature and substance of the legislation. However, even if the title of the act gives fair notice, as did the legislation in *Bunnell*, another requirement is to allow intelligent lawmaking and to prevent log-rolling of legislation. *State ex. Rel. Landis v. Thompson*, 120 Fla. 860, 163 So. 270 (1935) and *Williams v. State*, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186 (1930). Legislation that violates the single subject rule can become a cloak within which dissimilar legislation may be passed without being fairly debated or considered on its own merits. *State v. Lee*, 356 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1978). See also *State v. Thompson*, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1999) and *Heggs v. State*, 25 F.L.W. S137 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2000).

Burch v. State, 558 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1990), does not apply because, although complex, the legislation there was designed to combat crime through fighting money laundering and providing education programs to foster safer neighborhoods. The means by which this subject was accomplished involved amendments to several statutes, which by itself does not violate the single subject rule. *Id.*

Chapter 97-239, Laws Of Florida, not only creates the act, it also amends Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1997), to allow "any law enforcement officer who is aware of the probationary or community control status of [a] probationer or offender in community control" to arrest said person and return him or her to the court granting such probation or community control. This provision has no logical connection to the creation of the act, and, therefore, violates the single subject requirement.

An act may be as broad as the legislature chooses provided the matters included in the act have a natural or logical connections. **Chenoweth v. Kemp**, 396 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1981). See also **State v. Johnson**, 616 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1993)(chapter law creating the habitual offender statute violated single subject requirement). Providing any law enforcement officer who is aware that a person is on community control or probation may arrest that person has nothing to do with the purpose of the Act. Chapter 97-239, therefore, violates the single subject

requirement and this issue remains ripe until the 1999 biennial adoption of the Florida Statutes. *Id.*

The statute at bar, although less comprehensive in total scope as the one approved in *Burch*, is broader in its subject. It violates the single subject rule because the provisions dealing with probation violation, arrest of violators, and forfeiting of gain time for violations of controlled release are matters that are not reasonably related to a specific mandatory punishment provision for persons convicted of certain crimes within three years of release from prison. If the single subject rule means only that "crime" is a subject, then the legislation can pass review, but that is not the rationale utilized by the supreme court in considering whether acts of the legislature comply. The proper manner to review the statute is to consider the purpose of the various provisions, the means provided to accomplish those goals, and then the conclusion is apparent that several subjects are contained in the legislation.

Separation Of Powers

Petitioner argues that Article II, Section 3, Constitution of the State of Florida, is violated in three separate and distinct ways.

First, the Act restricts the ability of the parties to plea bargain in providing only limited reasons for the state's departure from a maximum sentence, which reasons are set forth in

Section 775.082(8)(d), Florida Statutes (1997).

"Under Florida's constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute." **State v. Bloom**, 497 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986). See also **Young v. State**, 699 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1997)(separation of powers violated if trial judge given authority to decide to initiate habitualization proceedings). See **Boykin v. Garrison**, 658 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), **review denied**, 664 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1995)(unlawful for court to refuse to accept certain categories of pleas). This provision unlawfully restricts the exercise of executive discretion that is solely the function of the state attorney in determining whether and how to prosecute.

Second, pursuant to Section 775.082(8)(d)(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), a victim (a lay person) is permitted to make the ultimate decision regarding the particular sentencing scheme under which a defendant will be sentenced. This occurs even if the trial judge believes that the defendant should not receive the mandatory punishment, or should not receive the mandatory maximum penalty.

The language of Section 775.082(8)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (1997), makes it clear that the intent of the legislature is that the offender who qualifies under the statute be punished to the fullest extent of the law "unless" certain circumstances exist.

Those circumstances include the written statement of the victim. There is no language in the statute which would appear to give a trial judge the authority to override the wishes of a particular victim. The legislature has therefore unconstitutionally delegated this sentencing power to victims of defendants who qualify under the statute.

Third, the Act also violates the separation of powers doctrine because it removes any discretion of the sentencing judge to do anything other than sentence under the mandatory provisions, unless certain circumstances set out in Section (2)(d)(1) are met. Every one of those circumstances is a matter that is outside the purview of the trial judge. The circumstances include insufficient evidence, unavailability of witnesses, the statement of the victim, and an apparent catch-all which deals with "other extenuating circumstances."

In contrast, the habitual felony offender statute, Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997), vests the trial judge with discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. For example, if the judge finds that a habitual sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public, then the sentence need not be imposed. That is true for a person who qualifies as either a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal. Although sentencing is clearly a judicial function, the legislature has attempted to vest this

authority in the executive branch by authorizing the state attorney to determine who should and who should not be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. While prosecution is an executive function, sentencing is judicial in nature.

Once the state attorney decides to pursue a releasee reoffender sentence and demonstrates that the defendant satisfies the statutory criteria, the sentencing court's function then become ministerial in nature. The court "must" sentence pursuant to the Act. There is no requirement of a finding that such sentencing is necessary to protect the public. It is the lack of inherent discretion on the part of the court to determine the defendant's status and to determine the necessity of a prison releasee reoffender sentence to protect the public that renders the act violation of the separation of powers doctrine

In *State v. Meyers*, 708 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the third district stated:

Furthermore, because the trial court retains discretion to conclude the violent career criminal classification and accompanying mandatory minimum sentence are not necessary for the protection of the public, the separation of powers doctrine is not violated by the mandatory sentence.

708 So.2d at 663.

The separation of powers principles establish that, although the state attorney may suggest the classification and sentence, it is only the judiciary that decides whether to make the

classification and impose the mandatory sentence. **London v. State**, 623 So.2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Lacking the provisions of the violent career criminal statute and the habitual offender statute that vest sole discretion as to classification and imposition of a sentence in the sentencing court, the Prison Release Re-Offender Act violates the separation of powers doctrine.

Cruel And/Or Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Of The United States forbids the imposition of a sentence that is cruel **and** unusual. Under Article I, Section 17, Constitution of the State of Florida, no punishment that is cruel **or** unusual is permitted. The prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment mean that neither barbaric punishments nor sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed may be imposed. **Solem v. Helm**, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006, 77 L.Ed.d. 637 (1983), overruled in **Harmelin v. Michigan**, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). In **Solem**, the Supreme Court went on to iterate that the principle of punishment proportionality is deeply rooted in common law jurisprudence, and has been recognized by the Court for almost a century. 103 S.Ct at 3006-3008. Proportionality applies not only to the death penalty, but also to bail, fines, other punishments and prison sentences. **Id.** at 3009. Thus, as a matter of principle, "...a criminal sentence

must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted." *Id.* No penalty, even imposed within the limits of a legislative scheme, is *per se* constitutional as a single day in prison could be unconstitutional under some circumstances. *Id.* at 3009-3010.

In Florida, the *Solem* proportionality principles as to the federal constitution are the minimum standard for interpreting the state's cruel or unusual punishment clause. *Hale v. State*, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1993). Proportionality review is also appropriate under Article I, Section 17, of the state constitution. *Williams v. State*, 630 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1993). In interpreting the federal cruel and unusual punishment clause, the *Hale* court went on to expressly hold that *Solem* had not been overruled by *Harmelin* and that the Eighth Amendment prohibits disproportionate sentences for non-capital crimes. *Hale*, *supra* at 630.

The Prison Releasee Re-Offender Act violates the proportionality concepts of the cruel or unusual punishment clause by the manner in which defendants are punished as prison releasee reoffenders. Section 775.082(8)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1997), defines a reoffender as a person who commits an enumerated offense and who has been released from a state correctional facility within the preceding three years. Thus, the Act draws a distinction between defendants who commit a new

offense after release from prison, and those who have not been to prison or who were released more than three years previously. The Act also draws no distinctions among the prior felony offenders for which the target population was incarcerated. The Act therefore disproportionately punishes a new offense based on one's status of having been to prison previously without regard to the nature of the prior offense. For example, an individual who commits an enumerated felony one day after release from a county jail sentence for aggravated battery is not subject to the enhanced sentence of the Act. However, a person who commits the same offense and who had been released from prison within three years after serving a thirteen month sentence for an offense such as possession of cannabis or issuing a worthless check must be sentenced to the maximum sentence as a prison releasee reoffender. The sentences imposed upon similar defendants who commit identical offenses are disproportionate because the enhanced sentence is imposed based upon the arbitrary classification of being a prison releasee without regard to the nature of the prior offense. The Act is also disproportionate from the perspective of the defendant who commits an enumerated offense exactly three years after a prison release, as contrasted to another defendant with the same record who commits the same offense three years and one day after release. The arbitrary time limitations of the Act also render it disproportionate.

The Act also violates the cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses of the state and federal constitutions by the legislative empowering of victims to determine sentences. Section 775.082(8)(d)(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), permits the victim to mandate the imposition of the mandatory maximum penalty by the simple act of refusing to put a statement in writing that the victim does not desire the imposition of the penalty. The victim can therefore affirmatively determine the sentencing outcome or can determine the sentence by simply failing to act. In fact, the State Attorney could determine the sentence by failing to contact a victim or failing to advise the victim of the right to request less than the mandatory sentence. Further, should a victim become unavailable subsequent to a plea or trial (through a circumstance unconnected to the defendant's criminal agency), the defendant would be subject to the maximum sentence despite the victim's wishes if those wishes had not previously been reduced to writing.

As such, the statute falls squarely within the warning of Justice Douglas in *Furman v. Georgia*, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); that:

Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man

or of 12.

Id. at 253 (Douglas, concurring).

Although the statute at issue here is not a capital sentencing scheme, it does leave the ultimate sentencing decision to the whim of the victim. Justice Stewart added his concurrence that the death penalty could not be imposed "...under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." *Id.* at 310 (Stewart, concurring). Without any statutory guidance or control of victim decision making, the Act establishes a wanton and freakish sentencing statute by vesting sole discretion in the victim.

If the prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment mean anything, they mean that vengeance is not a permissible goal of punishment. As Justice Marshall observed in *Furman*:

To preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has consistently denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment. It is undoubtedly correct that there is a demand for vengeance on the part of many persons in a community against one who is convicted of a particularly offensive act. At times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence society's abhorrence of the act. But the Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves. The "cruel and unusual" language limits the avenues through which vengeance can be channeled. Were this not so, the language would be empty and a return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case.

Id. at 344-345 (Marshall, concurring).

By vesting sole authority in the victim to determine whether the maximum sentence should be imposed, the Act is unconstitutional as it attempts to remove the protective insulation of the cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses.

Vagueness

The doctrine of vagueness is separate and distinct from overbreadth as the vagueness doctrine has a broader application, since it was designed to ensure compliance with due process.

Southeastern Fisheries Association, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1984). In ***Southeastern Fisheries Association***, the court observed:

A vague statute is one that fails to give adequate notice of which conduct is prohibited and which, because of its imprecision, may also invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In determining whether a statute is vague, common understanding and reason may be used.... Courts must determine whether or not the party to who the law applies has fair notice of what is prohibited and whether the law can be applied uniformly.

453 So.2d at 1353-1354.

In short, a law is void for vagueness when, because of its imprecision, the law fails to give adequate notice to prohibited conduct and thus invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. ***Wyche v. State***, 619 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1993).

Section 775.082(8)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (1997) provides that a prison releasee reoffender sentence shall be imposed

unless:

a. The prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to prove the highest charge available;

b. The testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained;

c. The victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory prison sentence and provides a written statement to that effect; or

d. Other extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender.

These statutory exceptions fail to define the terms "sufficient evidence," material witness," the degree of materiality required, "extenuating circumstances," and "just prosecution." The legislative failure to define these terms renders the Act unconstitutionally vague because the Act does not give any guidance as to the meaning of these terms or their applicability to any individual case. It is impossible for a person of ordinary intelligence to read the statute and understand how the legislature intended these terms to apply to any particular defendant. Therefore, the Act is unconstitutional since it not only invites, but seemingly requires arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

Due Process

Substantive due process is a restriction upon the manner in which a penal code can be enforced. ***Rochin v. California***, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.ED.2D 183 (1952). The scrutiny of the due process clause is to determine whether a conviction

"...offend[s] those cannons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." 72 S.Ct at 208. ***Fundiller v. City of Cooper City***, 777 F.2d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1985). The test is, "...whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive." ***Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Company***, 296 So.2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1974).

The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act violates state and federal guarantees of due process in a number of ways. First, the Act invites discriminatory and arbitrary application by the state attorney. In the absence of judicial discretion, the state attorney has the sole authority to determine the application of the act to any defendant.

Second, the state attorney has sole power to define the exclusionary terms of "sufficient evidence," "material witness," "extenuating circumstances." and "just prosecution" within the meaning of Section 775.082(8)(d)(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Since there is no definition of those terms, the prosecutor has the power to selectively define them in relation to any particular case and to arbitrarily apply or not apply any factor to any particular defendant. Lacking statutory guidance as to the proper application of these exclusionary factors and the total absence of judicial participation in the sentencing process, the

application or non-application of the act to any particular defendant is left to the whim and caprice of the prosecutor.

Third, the victim has the power to decide that the act will not apply to any particular defendant by providing a written statement that the maximum sentence not be sought. Section 775.082(8)(d)(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1997). Arbitrariness, discrimination, oppression, and lack of fairness can hardly be better defined than by the enactment of a statutory sentencing scheme where the victim determines the sentence.

Fourth, the statute is inherently arbitrary by the manner in which the Act declares a defendant to be subject to the maximum penalty provided by law. Assuming the existence of two defendants with the same or similar prior records who commit the same or similar new enumerated felonies, there is an apparent lack of rationality in sentencing one defendant to the maximum sentence and the other to a guidelines sentence simply because one went to prison for a year and a day and the other went to jail for a year.

Similarly, the same lack of rationality exists where one defendant commits the new offense exactly three years after release from prison, and the other commits an offense three years and a day after release. Because there is not a material or rational difference in those scenarios, and one defendant receives the maximum sentence and the other a guidelines

sentence, the statutory sentencing scheme is arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and discriminatory.

Fifth, the Act does not bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. In enacting this statute the legislature said, in pertinent part, as follows:

WHEREAS, recent court decisions have mandated the **early release of violent felony offenders** and

* * * * *

WHEREAS, the people of this state and the millions of people who visit our state deserve public safety and protection from **violent felony offenders who have previously been sentenced to prison and who continue to prey** on society by reoffending....

Chapter 97-239, Laws Of Florida (1997)(emphasis supplied).

It is clear that the legislature attempted to draft legislation enhancing the penalties for previous **violent felony offenders** who **reoffend** and continue to prey on society. In fact, the list of felonies to which the maximum sentence applies is limited to violent felonies. See Section 775.082(8)(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). Despite the apparent legislative goal of enhanced punishment for violent felony offenders who are released and commit new violent offenses, the actual operation of the statute is to apply to any offender who has served a prison sentence for **any** offense and who commits and enumerated offense within three years of release. The Act does not rationally relate to the stated legislative purpose and reaches far beyond the

intent of the legislature.

Equal Protection

The standard by which a statutory classification is examined to determine whether a classification satisfies the equal protection clause is whether the classification is based upon some difference bearing a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. ***Soverino v. State***, 356 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1978). As discussed above under "Due Process," the Act does not bear a rational relationship to the avowed legislative goal. The legislative intent was to provide for the imposition of enhanced sentences upon violent felony offenders who have been released early from prison and then who reoffend by committing a new violent offense. Chapter 97-239, Laws Of Florida (1997). Despite that intent, the Act applies to offenders whose ***prior*** history includes no violent offenses whatsoever. The Act draws no rational distinction between offenders who commit prior violent acts and serve county jail sentences, and those who commit the same acts and yet serve short prison sentences. The Act also draws no rational distinction between imposing an enhanced sentence upon a defendant who commits a new offense on the third anniversary of release from prison, and the imposition of a guidelines sentence upon a defendant who commits a similar offense three years and a day after release. As drafted and potentially applicable, the act's operations are not rationally

related to the goal of imposing enhanced punishment upon violent offenders who commit a new violent offense after release.

V. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis and authorities, petitioner requests the Court to hold the prison releasee

reoffender act unconstitutional, quash the district court's decision in *Sheffield*, and remand the case to the trial court with directions to resentence the defendant pursuant to a constitutional sentencing statute.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, by delivery to The Capitol, Criminal Appeals Division, Plaza Level, Tallahassee, Florida, 32301, and a copy has been mailed to Andre Sheffield, DOC# 116194, Union Corr. Institution, P. O. Box 221, Raiford, FL 32083, on this ____ day of May, 2000.

Respectfully submitted,

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SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

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