## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## BOARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

IN THE MATTER OF:

1 12 1

Е G

This is an appeal from an administrativ mination of the Department of State that appellant, G

**E** , expatriated herself on May 27, 1981, under the of section 349(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act by making a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico. 1/

On April 13, 1982, the Department of State determined on the basis of the record before it that appellant had lost her United States nationality. It now contends that it cannot bear the burden of proving that appellant intended to relinquish her United States citizenship when she made a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico. The Department therefore requests that the Board remand the case for the purpose of vacating the certificate of loss of nationality. The Board will agree to the request.

Ι

On November 27, 1981, the United States Embassy at Mexico, D.F. pressure compared of loss of nationality in the name of General Enderson The Embassy certified that appellant was born at that she acquired the natio

virtue of birth to an American citizen father; that she acquired the nationality of Mexico by virtue of her birth therein; that she made a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico on May 27, 1981; that she obtained a certificate of Mexican nationality on May 27, 1981; and thereby expatriated herself under the provisions of section 349(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

1/ Section 349(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481(a) (2), provides:

Sec. 349. (a) From and after the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall, lose his nationality by --

(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof: . .



The Department of State approved the certificate on April 13, 1982, approval constituting an administrative determination of loss of nationality from which an appeal, properly and timely filed, may be brought to this Board.

Appellant gave notice of appeal on April 30, 1983.

On August 29, **1983,** the Special Counsel, Office of Citizenship Appeals and Legal Assistance, Bureau of Consular Affairs, submitted the record upon which the Department's determination of loss of nationality was based, and a brief requesting that the Board remand the case to the Department for the purpose of vacating the certificate of **loss** of nationality that was issued in appellant's name. The brief sets forth with particularity points of law and fact which in the Department's judgment warrant remand.

Although the Department maintains that appellant's formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico was a voluntary act, it asserts that the evidence of record is insufficient to support a finding that appellant intended to relinquish her United States citizenship when she performed the allegedly expatriating act: the Department therefore cannot bear its statutory burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant intended to surrender her American nationality. 2/

2/ As the Supreme Court held in <u>Vance v. Terrazas</u>, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), section 349(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act places on the Government the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the expatriating act was accompanied by the requisite intent to relinquish citizenship.

Section 349(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481, provides:

Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any action or proceeding commenced on or after the enactment of this subsection under, or by virtue of, the provisions of this or any other Act, the burden shall be upon the person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), any person who commits or performs, or who has committed or performed, any act of expatriation under the provisions of this or any other Act shall be presumed to have done so Voluntarily, but such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or performed were not done voluntarily.

We do not find the Department's arguments in support of its request for remand entirely persuasive, principally in light of Terrazas V. Haig,  $653\ F$ ,  $2d\ 285\ (1981)$ . Nonethe less, in view of the fact that the Department upon further review of appellant's case maintains that it cannot meet the burden of proving that appellant intended to relinquish her United States citizenship when she declared her allegiance to Mexico, and in the absence of manifest mistakes of law of fact in *these* proceedings, the Board is agreeable to the request for remand.

The case is hereby remanded for further proceedings. =

Chairman G. James,

Canad & Min Edward G. Misey, Member

Member

3/ Section 7.2, Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, 22 CF 7.2, provides in part:

... The Board shall take any action it considers appropriate and necessary to the disposition of cases appealed to it.

3

11