July 21, 1986

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BOARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

IN THE MATTER OF:



This is an appeal from an administrative determination of the Department of State that appellant, Maximum June (Maximum June (M

The determinative issue presented by the appeal is whether Mrs. Official intended to relinquish her United States citizenship when she made a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico. For the reasons elaborated below we conclude that she had the requisite intent. Accordingly, we affirm the Department's decision that she expatriated herself.

Ι

Mrs. Course, reference acquired United States citizenship by birth at the original of a United States citizen mother on Through birth in Mexico she also acquired Mexican nationality. Shortly after her birth her mother registered appellant at the United States Embassy in Mexico City. Mrs. Course has stated that from an early age she was aware that she was a citizen of both the United States and Mexico. In 1973 when she was 16 years old she obtained an identity card at the Embassy, and renewed it in 1978. Appellant married Arthur a Mexican citizen, in August 1978. The couple moved to Hermosillo. In 1980 she renewed her United States identity and registration card at the Consulate in Hermosillo.

1/ Section 349(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
0.S.C. 1481(a) (2), provides that:

Section 349. (a) From and after the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by --

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(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof;... 9

Appellant has stated (affidavit of April 15, **1985)** that she planned to go to France to study in the fall of **1982.** She realized she would not be able to travel abroad on her United States identity card and that her Mexican passport (presumably issued to her while she was a minor) had expired in **1980.** After family discussion, it was, she said agreed that it would be quicker for her to obtain **a** new Mexican passport than a United States passport, and that she would avoid problems upon returning to Mexico if she were to travel on a Mexican passport She states that her father arranged the necessary paper work in Mexico City for issuance of a passport and called her to Mexico City "when everything was ready."

When she arrived in Mexico City (presumably at the Departn of Foreign Relations), she has stated, "I was told that I could not have a new Mexican passport unless I affirmed my Mexican nationality." The procedure to obtain a Mexican passport requi that one execute an application for a certificate of Mexican nationality (CMN). Mrs. **Herefore** signed an applicatic for a CMN on August 10, **1982;** to judge from the copy of the application in the record, it appears that another filled out the form for her. The application appellant signed stated that she expressly renounced her United States nationality and all allegiance to the United States. She also declared loyalty, obedience and submission to the laws and authorities of Mexico. She was then **25** years old. A CMN was issued in the name of on August **12, 1982. 2**/

According to a statement appellant later made to an office at the Consulate in Hermosillo, when her Mexican passport had I arrived 3/ and the date of her planned departure for Europe c near, she-panicked and went to Tucson, Arizona (where she and 1 husband owned a house) to apply for a passport. The record she that on September 27, 1982 Mrs. Applied for a United St passport at Tucson, indicating on the application that she plan to go abroad in December. The Houston Passport Agency issued appellant a United States passport on September 30, 1982, valid 1987. In the end, appellant has stated, her study program was cancelled and she did not use either her Mexican or United States passport.

^{2/} Appellant claims that the certificate was received by her father in December 1982.

^{3/} In appellant's submissions there is a copy of a Mexican passport issued to appellant on July 10, 1982, valid until December 30, 1982.

On October 22, 1982 the Department of Foreign Relations informed the United States Embassy that Mrs. had applied for and obtained a CMN. <u>Three months later th</u> sulate at Hermosillo wrote to Mrs. on January 26, 1983 to inform her that she might nave lost her United States citizenship by on January 26, 1983 to inform making a declaration of allegiance to Mexico. She was advised that she might submit evidence to be considered by the Department in making a decision about her citizenship status. and was invited to complete a form for determining U.S. citizenship. If no reply were received within 60 days, the letter stated, the Consulate would assume that she did not wish to submit any evidence on her behalf. Appellant completed the citizenship questionnaire on May 28, 1983 and mailed it to the The Consulate forwarded the questionnaire to the Consulate. Department on July 31, 1983, requesting an advisory opinion on appellant's citizenship status. The Department replied by cable on August 31, 1983 to instruct the Consulate to execute a certificate of loss of nationality in appellant's name under section 349(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. September 8, 1983 the Consulate executed a certificate of On loss of nationality in the name of Mrs. The 4/

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4/ Section 358 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1501, reads as follows:

Sec. 358. Whenever a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States has reason to believe that a person while in a foreign state has lost his United States nationality under any provision of chapter 3 of this title, or under any provision of chapter IV of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, he shall certify the facts upon which such belief is based to the Department of State, in writing, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State. If the report of the diplomatic or consular officer is approved by the Secretary of State, a copy of the certificate shall be forwarded to the Attorney General, for his information, and the diplomatic or consular office in which the report was made shall be directed to forward a copy of the certificate to the person to whom it relates. officer concerned certified that appellant acquired citizenship of both the United States and Mexico at birth; that she made a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico; and thereby expatriated herself under the provisions of section 349(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In October the Department informed the Consulate that the CLN would not be approved pending further clarification. Specifically, the Department instructed the Consulate to interview Mrs.

A consular officer interviewed Mrs. On February 8, 1984. In reporting the interview to the Department the consula officer offered the following comments about her case:

> In view of the clearly stated renunciation of foreign citizenships in the Mexican application, it is unlikely that did not have at least an idea of seriousness of her actions. She impressed conoff as an educated and intelligent woman. She is now 23 years /sic/ old and has ample time in the five years since she reached the age of 18 to obtain complete information and proper documentation regarding her citizenship. Conoff is willing to believe that acted hastily and out of desperation. However, does not deny that she signed the oath, she repeatedly stated that she read all the documents she signed at the time of application and she does not claim that she did not understand the renunciation statement. In conoff's opinion, haste and desperation do not excuse the fact that, regardless of her stated intention not to renounce, she applied first for the Mexican passport and signed a clear statement of renunciation of her US citizenship when she was presumably well aware of her right to US citizenship and had been informed on at least one occasion of the possible problems of dual citizenship.

The Department approved the certificate of loss of nationality of March 20, 1984. In advising the Consulate that the certificate had been approved the Department offered the following rationale for its determination: 1. The Department believes that Mrs. Here has not presented sufficient evidence of intent to retain U.S. citizenship to overcome the presumption, given the very specific and clear language renunciatory of U.S. citizenship in her application for a certificate of Mexican nationality (CMN), that she intended to relinquish U.S. citizenship by that act.

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2. The fact that she applied for a U.S. passport in Tucson the same month she applied for a CMN ordinarily would be an indicator of intent to retain U.S. citizenship. However, she lives right in Hermosillo, she received a card of identity in 1980 from the post, and at that time she inquired about getting a passport at some future date. These facts inevitably give rise to the suspicion that she wished to avoid a possible question as to whether she had applied for a CMN and a Mexican passport to enable her to travel to Europe as planned.

completed the question-Mrs. C 3. naire, "Information for Determining U.S. Citizenship" in May 1983, but did not request an interview with a consular officer or otherwise pursue her case until February 1984, when she appeared at the post following the Department's request that further clarification be sought concerning her intent, as she had not signed the statement of voluntary relinquishment in the questionnaire. Her apparent lack of strong interest in her U.S. citizenship strengthens the presumption that she intended to relinquish that citizenship by taking her oath of allegiance to Mexico.

Approval of the certificate constitutes an administrative determination of loss of nationality from which a timely and properly filed appeal may be taken to the Board of Appellate Review. Mrs. entered a timely appeal through counsel.

II

Section **349(a) (2)** of the Immigration and Nationality Act prescribes that a national of the United States shall lose his nationality by making a formal declaration of allegiance to a

foreign state. 5/ The record attests that Mrs. made a formal pledge of allegiance to Mexico on August 10, 1982 in conjunction with an application for a certificate of Mexican nationality. The Mexican authorities obviously considered that she had made a meaningful declaration of loyalty to Mexico, thu complying with the requirements for issuance of a certificate o Mexican nationality, for a certificate issued in her name. Sin the declaration she made was clearly meaningful (it placed her complete subjection to Mexico), she brought herself within the purview of the United States statute. See <u>Terrazas</u> v. <u>Vance</u>, No. 75-2370, memorandum opinion (N.D. Ill. 1977).

Nationality will not be lost by performance of a statutory expatriating act, however, unless the citizen did the proscribe act voluntarily, and intended to relinquish United States citizenship. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 252 (1967); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).

In law, it is presumed that one who performs a statutory expatriating act does so voluntarily, but the actor may rebut the presumption upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was not voluntary. $\underline{6}/$

Mrs. Maximum has not undertaken to rebut the legal presump tion that she acted voluntarily. She has simply asserted witho elaboration that her action was involuntary, See her affidavit of April 15, 1985. Therein she stated that she had told her husband she felt "compelled" to sign the application for a certificate of Mexican nationality.

5/ Supra, note 1.

6/ Section **349(c)** of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. 1481(c), provides:

Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in i in any action or proceeding commenced on or after the enactment this subsection under, or by virtue of, the provisions of this any other Act, the burden shall be upon the person or party cla that such loss occurred, to establish such claim by a preponder of the evidence. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (k any person who commits or performs, or who has committed or per formed, any act of expatriation under the provisions of this or any other Act shall be presumed to have done so voluntarily, bu such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponder of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or performed we not done voluntarily. - 7 -

It is evident to us that there was no compulsion in Mrs. Case. She had a free choice to sign the application or not. It is beyond question a legitimate exercise of national sovereignty for Mexico to require dual nationals who wish to enjoy the rights and privileges of Mexican nationality to declare their loyalty to Mexico and repudiate all other allegiance. Mrs. Was not compelled to act by forces over which she had no control. She had a choice and she exercised it. This is the essence of voluntariness. See Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 441 F. 2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971).

III

Although Mrs. voluntarily performed a statutory expatriating act, it remains for us to determine whether she had the requisite intent to relinquish United States citizenship. <u>Vance v. Terrazas</u>, 444 U.S. 252 (1980). Under the court's holding in Terrazas, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant'intended to forfeit her United States citizenship. 444 U.S. at 267. Intent, the court said, may be expressed in words or found as a fair inference from proven conduct. <u>Id</u>. at 260. The intent that must be proved is appellant's intent when she made the prescribed declaration of allegiance to Mexico. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F. 2d, 285 (7th Cir. 1981).

Mrs. not only made a formal declaration of allegiance to **a** foreign state, an act that may be highly persuasive but not conclusive evidence of an intent to relinquish United States citizenship. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 261, citing Nishikawa v. Dulles, 358 U.S. 129, 139 (1958). But she also expressly renounced her United States citizenship and all fidelity to the United States.

Express renunciation of United States citizenship has been held to manifest an intent to relinquish United States citizenship. In Terrazas v. Hafg, supra, the court found abundant evidence of the petitioner's intent to relinquish United States citizenship in his willingly, knowingly and voluntarily acquiring a certificate of Mexican nationality, and in hi5 subsequent conduct. 653 F. 2d In Richards v. Secretary of State, the court held that at 288. "the voluntary taking of a formal oath of allegiance that includes an explicit renunciation of United States citizenship is ordinarily sufficient to establish a specific intent to renounce United States citizenship." 752 F. 2d at 1421. Similarly, Meretsky v. Department of State, et al., Civil Action 85-1985, memorandum opinion, (D.D.C. 1985).

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As we have seen, appellant applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality in August 1982 in order to obtain a Mexican passport for a trip she planned to make to Europe later that year. In her affidavit of April 15, 1985, she stated in part as follows:

> 7. When I arrived at the Passport Office, I was told that I could not have a new Mexican passport unless I affirmed my Mexican nationality. This came as a total surprise to me as I was never required to do this before. Then when I saw the oath that I was supposed to sign, I saw that it said I was renouncing my United States citizenship.

8. I was told that I could not get my new passport unless I signed the oath. Although I was bothered by the wording of the oath, I did not believe that by signing it I was choosing between my Mexican and American citizenships, as I was confident in my belief that such an oath was effective as a renunciation of my American citizenship only if I swore it in front of an American Consular Official.

Appellant's own words attest that she made a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico wittingly. 25 years of age at the time and fluent in the language of the application, Mrs. was presumptively capable of understanding that she was giving a serious, consequential undertaking to Mexico. Precisely because the renunciatory language of the declaration bothered her, she should have paused to seek advice from United States officials instead of rationalizing that the commitment she was making to Mexico would have no impact on her United States citizenship.

In both the citizenship questionnaire she completed on May 28 1983 and her affidavit of April 15, 1985, Mrs. **Stated** that she had no intention of relinquishing her United States citizenship when she made a declaration of allegiance to Mexico. Her only intent, she asserted, was to obtain a Mexican passport. The cases hold, however, that motivation is irrelevant to the issue of intent if one manifests an intention to relinquish United States citizenship in declaring allegiance to a foreign state.

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See <u>Richards</u>, <u>supra</u>, where the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioner's argument that his particular motivation negated his intent to relinquish his citizenship. In <u>Richards</u> the court found that an effective renunciation of citizenship is not limited to cases in which a plaintiff's "will" to renounce his citizenship "is based on a principled, abstract desire to sever allegiance to the United States." **752** F. 2d at 1421. The court stated:

 \angle It is7 abundantly clear that a person's free choice to renounce United States citizenship is effective whatever the motivation. Whether it is done in order to make more money, \angle or7 to advance a career . . . a United States citizen's free choice to renounce his citizenship results in loss of that citizenship.

Similarly, Meretsky v. Department of State, supra.

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Finally, we must determine whether there are any factors here that so outweigh the highly persuasive evidence of an intent to relinquish United States citizenship inherent in appellant's declaration of allegiance to Mexico as to lead us to conclude that the Department has not sustained its burden of proof. 2/

As evidence of a lack of intent to relinquish her United States citizenship, appellant stresses the fact that she applied for and obtained a United States passport shortly after she performed the expatriative act.

It is, of course, impermissible to presume intent to relinquish citizenship. See <u>Vance</u> v. <u>Terrazas</u>, 444 U.S. 252, 268 (1980). Having analyzed the Department's language, we conclude that it did not place the burden on appellant to prove lack of intent, but its formulation was, to say the least, infelicitous.

^{7/} As noted above, in informing the Consulate at Hermosillo in March 1984 that it had approved the certificate of loss of nationality in Mrs. The case, the Department stated that it believed she had not presented sufficient evidence of intent to retain citizenship to overcome the presumption, given the clear language of the renunciatory language in the application for a CMN, that she intended to relinquish United States citizenship.

The Department observed in its March 1984 cable to the Consulate that such action might suggest lack of intent to relinquish United States citizenship, but given the facts in appellant's case, the suspicion arose that she might have sought the passport to avoid a question as to whether she had **applied** for a CMN and a Mexican passport. We agree.

Appellant told an officer of the Consulate in February 1984 that she had applied for a United States passport in Tucson because she panicked when the Mexican passport had not arrived and the date of her departure for Europe drew closer. Her contention was that she was desperate to get a passport, any passport. But in appellant's submissions is a copy of a Mexican passport bearing an issue date of July 10, 1982, one month before she applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality. Was that passport not delivered to appellant until after she applied for a United States passport in September 1982? Furthermore, in her application for a United States passport she indicated that she would not depart for Europe until December 1982. The reason for appellant's panic in the fall of 1982 is hard to understand.

More importantly, why did appellant not apply €or a United States passport at the Consulate at Hermosillo in the fall of 1982 rather than at Tucson? In an affidavit executed on January 29, 1986, appellant simply stated that it was more convenient for her to do so since she and her husband were in Tuscon where they owned a home in September 1982. The following except from the report the Consulate made to the Department in February. 1984 is especially revealing:

> Consulate records show that applied for a US identification card on May 8, 1980. She was therefore familiar with the application form and the conditions for retaining citizenship listed on the back of the form. **FSNE** /**Io**cal employee7 who dealt with that occasion states that asked her if she could later apply for a passport at the Consulate. She could not explain why she ultimately chose to go to Tucson to obtain her US passport. When asked by ConOff why she did not seek further information regarding the consequences of obtaining **a** Mexican passport, she said only that she was in such a hurry that she thought only of getting whichever she could lay her hands on first.

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We do not think appellant has been deceitful. But so many unanswered questions about her application for a United States passport in **Tucson** in September 1982 arise that they negate whatever probative value that action might have with respect to her intent to retain United States citizenship.

Surveying the entire record, we find no affirmative actions by appellant that manifest a resolve to retain her United States nationality when she made a formal declaration of allegiance to Mexico and expressly renounced her United States citizenship and allegiance to the United States. We think the Department has carried its burden of proving that Mrs. Intended to relinquish her United States citizenship.

IV

Upon consideration of the foregoing, we hereby affirm the Department's March 31, 1984 determination that Mrs.

James, G. Chairman Alan

Bernhardt, Member Pe

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