CODE OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 1--GENERAL
PROVISIONS
CHAPTER
III--ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES
PART
305--RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
1 C.F.R. s 305.87-5
s 305.87-5 Arbitration in
Federal programs (Recommendation 87-5).
The Administrative
Conference has recommended that agencies employ
alternative means of dispute resolution (ADR) in
federal programs. [FN1] ADR techniques for
rulemaking include structured negotiation and
mediation; for adjudication, they also include
arbitration, factfinding and minitrials.
[FN2] The bulk of these techniques do not
alter the placement of policymaking authority
within the agencies, and therefore pose few of the
legal and policy concerns of binding arbitration,
which typically involves the use of outside
arbitrators authorized to make decisions binding
upon the government. If an arbitrator decides a
claim by or against the government, public money
will be involved. Arbitration decisions concerning
other issues in administering a federal program,
such as the resolution of enforcement cases or
disputes between the agency and its employees,
affect administration of the program. In programs
where the agency's role is to resolve disputes
between private parties, arbitrated disputes will
relate to the purposes of the program, for example
by resolving disputes related to program
administration. In addition, the Constitution
requires that significant duties pursuant to public
law must be performed by Officers of the United
States and their employees. These concerns can be
met if Congress, in authorizing the use of
arbitration, or the agency, when adopting
arbitration, confines it to appropriate issues and
provides for the agency's supervision of
arbitration.
[FN1] See
generally Recommendation 86-3, Agencies' Use of
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 1 CFR
305.86-3.
[FN2] See
Recommendation 82-2, Resolving Disputes Under
Federal Grant Programs, 1 CFR 305.82-2;
Recommendations 82-4 and 85-5, procedures for
Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 CFR 305.82-4
and 85-5; and Recommendation 84-4, Negotiated
Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites Under CERCLA, 1
CFR s 305.84-4.
Existing law authorizes
resort to arbitration in a variety of different
contexts, including claims by and against the
government, disputes between private individuals
that are related to program administration, and
labor relations issues between the government and
its employees. Recommendation 86-3 calls on
Congress to act to authorize agency officials to
choose arbitration to resolve many additional
disputes.
This recommendation
contains procedural advice for Congress, and
occasionally agencies, in an effort to ensure the
fairness and acceptability of arbitration in
federal programs. The criteria are necessarily
general, and the appropriateness of particular
arbitral procedures must be judged in the context
of the particular functions they serve. Agencies
are generally in the best position to assess the
need for informal and expeditious process, and to
weigh that need against considerations of accuracy,
satisfaction, and fairness. While the Conference
encourages granting agency officials broad
"on-the-spot" discretion to use arbitration, it
recognizes the need for preliminary steps to meet
concerns that the process provide some executive
oversight, preserve judicial functions and ensure
quality decisions, and maintain legality and
fairness. This recommendation sets forth procedural
criteria to aid Congress and agencies in taking
these first steps.
Recommendation
1. In all cases,
congressional authorization for voluntary binding
arbitration, whether performed by government
employees or private arbitrators, should ensure
that Congress has made, or the agency will make, an
explicit judgment that arbitration is appropriate
for the case or class of cases in question.
Criteria for determining whether arbitration is
appropriate include the following:
(a) Cases subject to
arbitration should involve questions of fact or the
application of well-established norms, even if
statutory, rather than precedential issues or
application of fundamental legal norms that are
evolving.
(b) In determining whether
to employ arbitration, Congress or the agency
should consider the nature and weight of the
private interests involved, the nature and weight
of the government's interests, and the tradeoffs
between the costs and benefits of arbitration and
those of more formal processes. A heavy
adjudicative caseload and the particularization of
decisions in accord with previously declared
guidelines justify the use of private arbitrators
or other non-government persons.
2. Congress should assess
the desirability of mandatory arbitration in light
of the extent to which a person's participation in
the affiliated program is voluntary. [FN3]
For example, participation in an entitlement
program is more likely to reflect need than
consent, and should not be regarded as consent to
arbitration of eligibility.
[FN3] See
Recommendation 86-3, ¶¶ 7-9, Agencies'
Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, for
other limitations on the use of mandatory
arbitration.
3. Congressional
authorization for arbitration should ensure
that:
(a) The agency has an
opportunity to choose whether to resort to
arbitration, [FN4] and to review the
overall composition of any arbitral pool to ensure
its neutrality and, where appropriate, specialized
competence. Agencies should either employ arbitral
pools and procedures that are well-established,
such as those of the AAA, or should develop rosters
or pools to meet their special needs;
[FN5]
[FN4] See Id.
[FN5] See
Recommendation 86-8, ¶ 1(c), Acquiring the
Services of Neutrals for Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution.
(b) Parties to an
arbitrable controversy, including an agency, have a
role in the selection of the arbitrator, consistent
with preserving the neutrality of the decider, for
example by striking names from a list; and
(c) Arbitral awards are
review by agencies or by courts under the criteria
of the U.S. Arbitration Act, which authorizes
review of the facial validity of the award and the
integrity of the process. Agencies can be
authorized ordinarily to review individual awards
with no specific provision for judicial review.
[FN6] If so, no special provision need be
made for judicial review of individual awards.
Judicial review of the overall structure and
fairness of the arbitration program should suffice.
In the rare case in which a serious constitutional
issue attends an individual arbitration, such as an
allegation of a taking, existing law provides
avenues for relief.
[FN6] See
Recommendation 86-3, ¶ 4, Agencies' Use of
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution.
4. Agencies should ensure
that the standard for arbitral decisions is
reasonably specific, by promulgating administrative
standards where statutes do not sufficiently guide
arbitral decision. A substantial justice standard
for arbitral awards should be used only when
explicitly approved by the agency, because of the
resulting difficulties of administrative or
judicial review of the outcome. The sufficiency of
other standards should be judged by whether the
parties can consent meaningfully to arbitration and
can prepare their cases, whether the arbitrators
can produce reasonably consistent decisions, and
whether reviewing entities can judge the facial
validity of awards.
5. The following
considerations should govern the ongoing
administration of arbitral programs:
(a) Agencies should be
careful to preserve the objectivity of arbitration
by avoiding instructions or forms of oversight that
would threaten to undermine the arbitrator's
neutrality in a particular case. Plainly, however,
generally applicable indicators of pertinent
government policy, such as interpretive
regulations, are meant to be controlling, whether
proceedings be in the form of arbitration or agency
adjudication.
(b) Authority to determine
the arbitrability of particular disputes can be
placed in the courts, as under the U.S. Arbitration
Act, or in another neutral third party, such as the
administering agency where arbitration concerns
private parties, or in an agency other than one
which is a party to arbitration.
(c) Interpretive
rulemaking can alter the standards for future
arbitration when monitoring of awards reveals
outcomes inconsistent with the agency's
expectations in employing arbitration.
[52 FR 23635, June 24,
1987]
Authority: 5 U.S.C.
591-596.
SOURCE: 38 FR 19782, July
23, 1973; 57 FR 61760, 61768, Dec. 29, 1992, unless
otherwise noted.
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